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His account of the sequence of events / activities is intermittently sound. However, the specifics of his theory are based on references to geographical / map features (especially 'hills') which don't exist and call into question his ability to understand a topographic map.

The naming of 'hills' is based on taking the elevation of a height's peak as the designator for the overall hill / mountain. Neither his 'Hill 805' nor his 'HIll 663' exist as peaks.

'Hill 805' may be a typo intended to be 'Peak 835' - the intermediate rise or hump between Kholat-Syakhylor and the flanking peak to the east. Alternatively and more probably it's an allusion to 'Peak 905' - the outlying peak to the east. Wilkins' murky explanation of a navigational error seems to suggest the 'Peak 805' Dyatlov erred about was in fact 'Peak 905'.

'Peak 835' is hardly 20 - 30 meters higher than the saddle (top elevation) of the pass itself, but it would have been a geodetic reference point on the topographic map available in 1959. It's certainly marked on the later topo maps.

There is no 'Hill 663'. There is a reference landmark on the slope leading up the south side of the ridge the party climbed marked at elevation 663 (m). This is not a peak at all - it's an arbitrarily designated spot on the side of a slope. I'm not sure about the map symbology for this spot, but I suspect it's a ruin or other landmark. I'm also uncertain whether this spot on the slope was marked on the map(s) available in 1959.

There is no 'Hill 611', either ... The '611' designation is a reference point for the *lowest* elevation in a vale / valley on the north side of the pass - the very vale into which the doomed party fled and died. In other words, it's the exact opposite of a 'hill'. According to diary entries the original plan was to cross the pass, set up camp and possibly their cache in the vale beyond (i.e., the '611' area), and approach Ortoten using the 'low road' strategy (i.e., staying in the watershed's forested valleys until a final climb up Ortoten).

Notice that Wilkins' theory is partially predicated on T-B and Zolo being prepared to get oriented to the location of Hill 611 if visibility ever improved overnight. There was no Hill 611 toward which they would seek to obtain such a bearing. Moreover, no such bearing was necessary in the first place. Map point '611' was the valley into which they'd flee and die, and all they had to do to find it was to follow the slope downward from their tent site - precisely what they did (presumably during the night, by standard interpretations). Dyatlov was carrying topo maps of the area, and he was experienced enough to read them.

Pitching camp high up on the flank of Kholat-Syakhylor suggests either (a) they had to abandon their original plan to continue downhill into the valley on the north side or (b) they'd decided to stay at the higher elevation and approach Ortoten using the 'high road' strategy typically employed in the summer months. Option (a) had still been in effect the preceding day, because they attempted to scale the pass before establishing their cache. The conditions and approaching sunset forced them to retreat back into the river valley from which they'd come.

Option (b) must have been decided that night or early the following morning, because they set up their cache before making their second attempt to climb the pass.

To the extent the high road strategy would minimize subsequent climbing I agree with Wilkins that economizing time and effort was or could well have been a factor in whatever their decision making process was.

Except for the geographic reference bungling and blaming everything on compass-based navigational issues most all the rest of Wilkins' exposition repeats stuff already known and mentioned here.

There are other errors in his exposition - most particularly mis-attributions of what some of the images represent and misstatements of facts in his dramatization of the search party's experiences.

Even ignoring these other miscellaneous errors I have to give Wilkins' analysis low marks for basing his theory on a clearly mistaken interpretation of the basic landscape.
What about his summing up of what the 'compelling unknownforce' was that forced them to abandon the tent? And his interpretation of the 33/34 photo?
 
This must be a drawing of the CUF:
1*-buI9YgU-Zz0fdpMJsCcsg.png

http://omgfacts.com/what-killed-9-people-at-the-dyatlov-pass/
 
Lots of groups of 9 people dying :eek:
I haven't looked at it for years, but it seems like there will never be an answer. The orange "spheres" seen there have been interpreted as exhaust from Soviet missile tests. The Theory that the tent was cut from the inside has also been challenged. The whole thing seems odd though, and when I read about it after my experience, I thought something like what the illustration depicts occurred. Need more evidence to make any conclusions about anything, and it's still a mystery to those who believe it is more than just a sad case of hypothermia and death by freezing.
 
What about his summing up of what the 'compelling unknownforce' was that forced them to abandon the tent?

The idea that the party abandoned the tent in response to it filling with smoke from the stove would be an interesting hypothesis ...

... if only the stove had been in use that night on the mountain.

It wasn't. The search party and inquest documents clearly state the stove and all its associated pipes were found packed away (for carrying) and it had not been in use at that final site. The stove had not been unpacked, much less set up, much less used. The stove had to be suspended from the ridgeline of the tent's roof, and it couldn't simply be unpacked and repacked while the tent was erected.

The one chunk of wood (i.e., the only trace of usable firewood) found at the scene was outside the tent, apparently having been repurposed as an anchor or brace in setting the tent up in a place where there were no surrounding trees or other sturdy things to which they could tie the tent's lines.


And his interpretation of the 33/34 photo?

Every bit as incredulous, highly 'spun', and ultimately uninformative as all the other interpretations. We've been through all this before. There's no solid basis for believing that last photo was snapped prior to the trekkers abandoning the tent. The most likely explanation is that the camera was tripped when the search party was rummaging through the tent's contents and dropped it or knocked it over.
 
I haven't looked at it for years, but it seems like there will never be an answer. The orange "spheres" seen there have been interpreted as exhaust from Soviet missile tests. The Theory that the tent was cut from the inside has also been challenged. The whole thing seems odd though, and when I read about it after my experience, I thought something like what the illustration depicts occurred. Need more evidence to make any conclusions about anything, and it's still a mystery to those who believe it is more than just a sad case of hypothermia and death by freezing.
I read the thread but wasnt aware of the 9 mansi hunters and the 9 aircraft deaths in the area aswell as Dyatlovs group.
 
I read the thread but wasnt aware of the 9 mansi hunters and the 9 aircraft deaths in the area aswell as Dyatlovs group.
Maybe EnolaGaia can weigh in on it; I just stick my nose into it now and again to see where the debate is heading and it seems it's pretty much stalled out. I didn't know the Mansi had drawn what they saw in the sky though; I'd like to see the drawing, but it doesn't seem to be available.
 
Be
Maybe EnolaGaia can weigh in on it; I just stick my nose into it now and again to see where the debate is heading and it seems it's pretty much stalled out. I didn't know the Mansi had drawn what they saw in the sky though; I'd like to see the drawing, but it doesn't seem to be available.
good to see, if it turns up. If its out there the guys here will find it :D
 
I read the thread but wasnt aware of the 9 mansi hunters and the 9 aircraft deaths in the area aswell as Dyatlovs group.

That general area was used for various military training exercises and maneuvers over the decades. These included aerial exercises and night flying trials. There have been multiple aviation accidents in the area. To the best of my recollection none of them occurred around the time of the Dyatlov party incident.

My recollection is that the deaths of 9 Mansi hunters was a very old historical or mythic event that may or may not have been associated with one peak (Peak 905) being the site of an alleged indigenous (i.e., Mansi) ritual or commemorative site.
 
That general area was used for various military training exercises and maneuvers over the decades. These included aerial exercises and night flying trials. There have been multiple aviation accidents in the area. To the best of my recollection none of them occurred around the time of the Dyatlov party incident.

My recollection is that the deaths of 9 Mansi hunters was a very old historical or mythic event that may or may not have been associated with one peak (Peak 905) being the site of an alleged indigenous (i.e., Mansi) ritual or commemorative site.
Odd still that they are all groupd of 9 :eek:
 
So they blame it on a slab avalanche and the layout of the terrain.
https://www.slf.ch/en/avalanches/avalanche-science-and-prevention/avalanche-types.html

The 'slab avalanche' bit is simply a re-labeling of the 'snow slip' hypothesis that's been proposed for years - most especially by mountaineers. It's certainly consistent with the depth of the hole the trekkers dug to pitch their tent the last time (as illustrated in the final photos).

The original searchers and investigators ruled out any substantial 'avalanche' (e.g., coming off the main peak nearby) on the scene at the time. They saw no evidence of an avalanche at the tent or the slope below the tent itself. Other allusions to an avalanche at the den site refer to a possible snow slippage coming off the slope to the east of the tent site or perhaps starting lower on the slope than the tent's elevation.

A smaller-scale localized slippage of snow pack onto the tent wasn't suggested until much later, after the incident had become a legend.

However ... The slab avalanche hypothesis - as described in this Daily Mail article - doesn't account for the injuries to Dubinina, who couldn't have walked down the mountainside if she'd suffered her final physical damage at the tent site. The article also claims they ran away, and the investigators emphasized there was no sign of running in the footprint trail.
 
What I wonder, is that if it was an avalanche, slab or otherwise, then it is unlikely that any of them could outrun it...possibly in the dark, possibly without shoes on, but certainly in the cold, the wind, and uneven terrain.
 
What I wonder, is that if it was an avalanche, slab or otherwise, then it is unlikely that any of them could outrun it...possibly in the dark, possibly without shoes on, but certainly in the cold, the wind, and uneven terrain.
You really need ro read this thrwad from the start lol it only took me 3 days :p pretty much all of the various theories are discussed, argued, discussed again, argued some more, an certain amount of agree to disagree action, i suggest you concentrate on enolagaia's posts and the documents although in my opinion SamRuger makes some good points.
 
What I wonder, is that if it was an avalanche, slab or otherwise, then it is unlikely that any of them could outrun it...possibly in the dark, possibly without shoes on, but certainly in the cold, the wind, and uneven terrain.

Right ... One big problem with the avalanche / snow slip hypothesis is that if they were buried in the tent (and still alive and capable of exiting it) they should have been able to clothe and equip themselves better before heading off down-slope. The alternative is that they panicked and ran, but the footprint trail didn't indicate running or chaos.

There's a common variation on the avalanche theme - i.e., that it was fear of an imminent avalanche (rather than an actual snow slippage event) that prompted them to flee the tent. It's plausible that ominous sounds from the high winds convinced them an avalanche was happening or had just occurred near them. Still, even this leaves the conundrum concerning why they left in such an ill-equipped state.

One solution to this inconsistency is that the tent site's evacuation didn't involve all of them leaving at the same time. As time goes on I tend to think there were at least 2 groups who separately descended the slope - the later ones taking care to follow the trail of footprints left by the earlier ones.
 
One solution to this inconsistency is that the tent site's evacuation didn't involve all of them leaving at the same time. As time goes on I tend to think there were at least 2 groups who separately descended the slope - the later ones taking care to follow the trail of footprints left by the earlier ones.

That has been the idea that has made the most sense to me. Don't recall the details offhand, but it seems to be the best explanation for quite a few things that are not (much) in dispute.
 
There's a comparison on line Dyatlov Pass Incident vs Chivruay Tragedy. There are a lot of similarities.
 
I was one of the people who coldly refuted Lemmino's explanation (the smoking stove theory), but in the long run, I found myself glad it came up, because I believe in the rebuttal lies a bit of a hint.

When you consider the night temperatures fell as low as -30 or even -35 °C around February 1st, the mere fact the stove was not assembled for the night begs a question.

Why?

The answer is obvious. They had no firewood. They took none from the storage they set up earlier, because they originally did not plan to spend the night on the slope, but down by the forest line which would have provided enough firewood to make it through the night no matter how cold it was gonna be.

Steering off the planned direction or maybe deciding not to descend at last minute (be it because they did not wanna lose the altitude or because they already were too tired) were the first (second) terrible mistake(s) they made. I believe the cold combined with the wind and supposedly merciless windchill caught them slightly unprepared, and as we know, extreme cold does impair judgement.

So, they have their last dinner, create their joke paper, go to sleep, but it gets colder, colder, and yet colder. As everyone who spent the night out under similar conditions knows, it's almost impossible to really fall asleep when the cold is too much and you have no external source of heat. So, I don't believe they had a good sleep until...

What we will never know is what exactly happened that convinced them to abandon the tent and walk down the slope. We also don't know whether or not they knew they weren't heading back towards their storage or if heading back towards the storage ever crossed their minds.

What we can safely guess is that what they looked for down in the forest was fire/warmth. And what we can almost certainly guess is that the tent had collapsed, which I think is the only explanation as to what made them feel a very uncertain future down by the forest line was a better option than staying up on the slope. Of course, they were wrong again, but they did not know it yet.

Pondering this, I came to the conclusion there was a single, more or less unified descent. And the reason why Kolevatov, T-B, Zolotaryov, and, to an extent, Dubinina were better clothed than the rest of the pack was the simple fact they could reach their stuff much easier than the rest of the group, with the snow slip scenario looking like a strong possibility there.

(I know that evidence from the scene depicts it some way, but we have very little idea of what the tent site looked like on February first compared with the days the search party arrived.)

So, they descend in hope that maybe starting the fire down in the forest buys them out of this jam, and it was a serious one. They obviously made it all the way down alive, but it's questionable what state Yuris were in by the time they actually made a fire. Given how little they wore and how bad the weather was, I can't see them doing too well for very long. But I can't see the rest of the pack just giving up on them.

Which, I believe, was the final mistake they made. They had the right idea in the sense that returning to the tent was actually the only hope, because whatever little heat the fire they could make provided, it was not enough to carry them thru the night barefoot. Yet by the time they got going, it was too late. And it was too late probably because they wasted too much time trying to keep their worst dressed buddies alive by maintaining a fire the research party described as "good", but barefoot, underdressed, out in a blizzard with temperatures hitting -30s, no fire is good enough, especially a fire hastily thrown together with raw/damp branches. Not only I believe trying to keep Yuri's alive probably cost them some vital minutes they should have wisely spent on their way back. I believe seeing their friends freeze to death must have had a devastating psychological effect too.

The only question remaining for me is whether or not the second party would have made it through the night had they not walked into that hole filled with rocks. And again, I believe the official report misleads us with words like "they were well enough dressed to sustain the cold".

I believe they were not dressed well enough to survive, because no matter how many layers of rags homeless people cover themselves with, when the brutal cold comes, whoever stays out is as good as dead, and this yearly occurrence of homeless people freezing to death on the streets of the so-called so cold civilized world does not really require -35 °C and snowstorms. -20 °C seems low enough to mass-kill people who are actually used to staying out.

I would go as far as to suggest part of the reason the Zolotaryov group wandered into the ravine as clumsily was they were half-frozen to death already. After all, Kolevatov died of hypothermia as well, although he was one of the properly dressed fellas.
 
I was one of the people who coldly refuted Lemmino's explanation (the smoking stove theory), but in the long run, I found myself glad it came up, because I believe in the rebuttal lies a bit of a hint.
When you consider the night temperatures fell as low as -30 or even -35 °C around February 1st, the mere fact the stove was not assembled for the night begs a question.
Why?
The answer is obvious. They had no firewood. They took none from the storage they set up earlier, because they originally did not plan to spend the night on the slope, but down by the forest line which would have provided enough firewood to make it through the night no matter how cold it was gonna be.
Steering off the planned direction or maybe deciding not to descend at last minute (be it because they did not wanna lose the altitude or because they already were too tired) were the first (second) terrible mistake(s) they made.

Exactly ... The firewood situation at the fatal site atop the pass is something I've long considered a key clue.

Early in the expedition Dyatlov had consulted with experienced folks at one or both the settlements where they'd stayed concerning the route(s) for their intended agenda (to Ortoten and back). There was basically one option for the first part of the trek - follow the Auspiy river valley. The second phase (ascending what's now named Dyatlov Pass) split the possibilities into two options - both of which were discussed in the early consultation(s).

The options were:

(1) to continue from the pass on the 'high road' (the usual summertime route, staying above the tree line from Kholat Syakhl to Ortoten), thus maintaining the altitude they'd gained from climbing to the pass and avoiding having to climb again at Mt. Ortoten.

(2) to cross the pass, descend into the Lozhva river valley, approach Ortoten via this 'low road' through the forests, and then climb to the top of Ortoten.

When they first approached the pass on the preceding day they had intended to scale the pass and descend into the Lozhva valley to establish their cache. This is mentioned in Kolmogorova's diary as her understanding of the plan. In other words, they were originally planning to follow the 'low road' routing. Because they were delayed in reaching the pass area and had more trouble ascending the slope than expected, they had to turn back and pitch camp in the Auspiy valley. They did not build a fire or use the stove that night. In addition, there's a mention in the diaries that firewood at the campsite was wet and unsuitable for readily building a fire. They were notably exhausted, and they ate a cold meal that night.

The only firewood they were carrying was a single substantial chunk / piece which was all they needed as a reserve if following the 'low road' plan and assuming they could easily collect firewood in the Lozhva valley beyond the pass. As such, I tend to think they were still committed to the 'low road' overall routing scheme when they set out late (after establishing their cache in the Auspiy valley) and set out to attempt the pass for a second time.

If they'd already decided to pursue the 'high road' scheme to make up for lost time they should have been carrying additional firewood (especially smaller pieces for kindling) in anticipation of remaining above the tree line. Instead, they weren't carrying any more firewood than they'd had the day before. I take this as a heavy clue that they were still intending to follow the 'low road' strategy when they set out on their last trekking day.

They found themselves atop the pass late in the afternoon with the light failing. Here's where and when things get fatally strange. The weather atop the pass was every bit as brutal as it had been the day before (and forced them to abort their first attempt). The straightforward solution was to stick to their apparent 'low road' strategy, stay on their skis, and simply ski downhill to the forest - the same forest where they'd end up dead. The forest was no more than 1.5 km downhill, and they should have been able to reach it in mere minutes. Navigation wasn't a big concern, because any / all paths downhill led to forest in the Lozhva valley, and they knew it.

Instead, they chose to stay at the higher elevation and pitched the tent in a snowstorm with only their skis and ski poles to use in anchoring and erecting the tent. The single chunk of firewood was put outside the tent, apparently to aid in anchoring or bracing one of the supports. The stove was not unpacked, much less hung inside the tent. They didn't even give themselves the possibility of heat.

I have no idea what they thought they were doing in pitching camp atop the pass rather than quickly skiing down to the forest and pitching camp in a much more protected setting. Whether they'd suddenly decided to switch to a 'high road' strategy or not they'd screwed up horribly by leaving themselves in that situation. They were left in an exposed position with no fire / heat and no hot food for the second night in a row. The arrival of a strong cold front, causing a dramatic drop in temperatures, was the coup de gras.
 
... We also don't know whether or not they knew they weren't heading back towards their storage or if heading back towards the storage ever crossed their minds. ...

Agreed ... The possibility of retreating back the way they'd come to fall back to their cache is an issue nobody (to my knowledge) has ever seriously considered.

This is not to say I believe that would have been a viable option for the Dyatlov party. Here are three reasons why ...

First, their most essential equipment for survival was the equipment they'd carried up onto the flanks of Kholat Syakhl. They were also carrying sufficient food for multiple days. In other words, I don't know why they would have thought there was anything back at the Auspiy valley cache that would give them a better chance of survival.

Second, the cache (labaz) was farther away than the Lozhva valley forest into which they descended. The cache was on the order of at least 1.5 times as far away as the cedar (the fire site where 2 bodies were found).

Third, I find it very difficult to believe they could have been so disoriented as to think they were descending back the way they'd come rather than into the Lozhva valley. Even with the reduced visibility apparent in the final daylight photos I believe there's little chance they could have misinterpreted the lay of the immediate landscape badly enough to mistake one valley for the other.
 
... And the reason why Kolevatov, T-B, Zolotaryov, and, to an extent, Dubinina were better clothed than the rest of the pack was the simple fact they could reach their stuff much easier than the rest of the group ...

Only two of the nine trekkers (who were also two of the four found at the den / ravine scene) were fully clothed with coats, hats and a pair of boots - Zolo and T-B.

Kolevatov and (especially) Dubinina were wearing clothing items apparently stripped from the two who died at the cedar / fire site. Neither of them had any footwear. Dubinina had a "small hat" (as contrasted with the 2 hats apiece found on T-B, Zolo and Kolmogorova). If you subtract the clothing they'd taken from their deceased friends they were no better clothed than any of the other five who died at the cedar or attempting to climb back to the tent site.

The fact that Zolo and T-B were the only ones clothed fully enough to reasonably be outside the tent is something I take as a clue that they were operating separately from the other seven in some way or at some time. Some accounts suggest they were simply the only two standing outside the tent when it collapsed - perhaps having stepped outside to pee. I suspect their different state of dress insinuates some activity or agenda more extensive than a simple pee break.
 
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