Accounting For Belief In Experiments

[Aether Blue]

Whenever people debate psychic phenomena, I usually start to think about how one might design an experiment that distinguishes between the two following scenarios:

A) A physical phenomenon actually occurs, but only if everyone perceiving it believes that it can happen.

B) A psychosocial phenomenon occurs, whereby a group of believers convince themselves, and one another, that a certain physical phenomenon occurs when in fact it does not.

It seems to me that most skeptics approach these situations with the assumption that only scenario B) ever occurs, or indeed is possible. When trying to understand the baseline functioning of the universe, in the absence of human intervention, this assumption is generally reasonable and appropriate.

However, when investigating phenomena where human mental faculties are alleged to directly affect the world, then this assumption may not be valid. How one can investigate a phenomenon without "damping it out" through excess doubt becomes an interesting problem.

Maybe detailed surveillance via electronic means?

 

[EnolaGaia]

Long story short ...

Experimentally demonstrating Option A would necessarily involve controlling for two states (or actions or characteristics) applying to all the subjects involved:

- perception of object(s) or scene(s) which they are observing and with or within which the target phenomenon is manifest

- each participant's belief that an effect or outcome is possible, much less probable, much less guaranteed

One could argue that ongoing brain sensing / monitoring research results suggest the first of these criteria might eventually be achievable. Simpler and currently feasible strategies such as eye-tracking can reasonably indicate opportunity for perception, but they cannot guarantee perception per se. Phrased another way ... In a lab we can ensure you're looking at something, but we cannot guarantee you're seeing it. Meeting this criterion is therefore conceivable but as yet unproven.

There is no reason to suspect, much less believe, that the second criterion can ever be met using third-party / external sensing or monitoring capabilities. 'Belief' entails a second- or higher-order reflection on an abstraction (thought; concept), and there's little hope (I would say none ... ) that an observer's orientation to or conceptual 'take' on a given thing or situation will ever be reliably detectable or traceable by objective means. Phrased another way ... Even if we can ensure you're looking at something and demonstrably seeing it, there's little or no chance we can determine what you think about it (in and of itself) in the given situation at the given moment, much less what you may think or predict it will become or how its situation will play out.

 

[Aether Blue]

> Phrased another way ... In a lab we can ensure you're looking at something, but we cannot guarantee you're seeing it.

It is my understanding that computer assistance now permits us to decipher transcranial measurements of the visual cortex well enough to identify simple shapes on simple backgrounds in the subject's visual field. In any case, what I should have said was, "in the same room," or "in proximity of the experiment."

> 'Belief' entails a second- or higher-order reflection on an abstraction (thought; concept), and there's little hope (I would say none ... ) that an observer's orientation to or conceptual 'take' on a given thing or situation will ever be reliably detectable or traceable by objective means.

Well, I had thought, perhaps naively, that belief in a phenomenon could be ascertained with a survey, or by checking whether the subject claims to use the phenomenon professionally. Upon further reflection, I concede that there is no shortage of convincing hypocrites who might claim to believe in something out of a cynical profit motive, or to put one over on the gullible.

How then would one test for phenomena that respond to belief in them, or lack of same? That was the essence of my question.

 

[EnolaGaia]

> Phrased another way ... In a lab we can ensure you're looking at something, but we cannot guarantee you're seeing it.
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It is my understanding that computer assistance now permits us to decipher transcranial measurements of the visual cortex well enough to identify simple shapes on simple backgrounds in the subject's visual field. In any case, what I should have said was, "in the same room," or "in proximity of the experiment."

True - there are tentative research results suggesting certain gross aspects of the instantaneous visual field can be deciphered in general terms. This, however, indicates no more than what it is the visual cortex is providing as a stimulus (or input, if you prefer ... ). Whether the mind recognizes what something is or represents within that visual field is a different issue.

The optical eye can 'forward' inputs the 'mind's eye' cannot grasp or even detect with any clarity. For example ... I suffered from a severe migraine condition for several years in my younger days. During an attack it was common for me to be unable to 'see' or 'recognize' well-known objects in front of me owing to their being obscured by the visual side-effects of my over-pressurized brain or their falling within a virtual blind spot in the center of my visual field that registered their presence but nothing of the details necessary to discriminate what they were or represented.

There's also the general issue of attention in scanning or reviewing the visual field. Anyone can overlook something sitting right in front of them.

 

[EnolaGaia]

> 'Belief' entails a second- or higher-order reflection on an abstraction (thought; concept), and there's little hope (I would say none ... ) that an observer's orientation to or conceptual 'take' on a given thing or situation will ever be reliably detectable or traceable by objective means.
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Well, I had thought, perhaps naively, that belief in a phenomenon could be ascertained with a survey, or by checking whether the subject claims to use the phenomenon professionally. Upon further reflection, I concede that there is no shortage of convincing hypocrites who might claim to believe in something out of a cynical profit motive, or to put one over on the gullible.

There are two distinct issues you've cited here, and both are valid (and very pesky) concerns ...

The first relates to whether or not one can assess relevant belief - i.e., belief specifically relevant to whatever is occurring within the experimental setting - via evidence or means external to the experimental setting itself. To use the examples you've cited ...

Having a subject respond to a survey (interview, whatever) to ascertain their belief with respect to a phenomenon can illustrate what they think of the phenomenon in general or in the abstract. This doesn't necessarily mean they'll have, apply or hold onto the same belief (or degree of belief) when immersed in the specific experimental setting. Similarly, acknowledgment of belief based on experience with the given phenomenon in everyday or professional life is no guarantee that the belief or its strength necessarily translates unchanged so as to apply exactly the same within the experimental setting.

Such pre-experimental evaluations aren't all that problematic when testing for measurable / observable basic perceptual, cognitive and / or task performance factors. They provide a relatively poor basis for evaluating higher-order mental processes. One reason is that objective evidence is out of reach, being accessible only from what the subject says. This leads to the second concern ...

This second concern - basically lying - can invalidate not only pre-experimental baseline setting but the eventual results as well. Beyond the problem of deliberate or self-serving prevarication, subjects may unintentionally twist the evidence in their reports of what's what prior to the experiment and what they experienced within the experiment. The essential problem here is reliance on self-reports about things whose subtleties may exceed the subjects' ability to recognize, note, remember and express them. This problem in turn entails the problem of whether or not the subjects understand what they're asked about in the same terms and manner the experimenters intend.

How then would one test for phenomena that respond to belief in them, or lack of same? That was the essence of my question.

The key to this question is essentially the same as the key problem relating to the earlier one(s) - defining a means for identifying a relevant belief in such a way that it may be unequivocally specified as an experimental factor and reasonably measured as a critical variable with reliability / confidence.

Recall the old joke: "Shall we brainwash him? Show me the brain and I'll wash it!" ...

The problem here is: "Show me the belief as a thing unto itself and we'll confirm its effect on the experimental task!"

 

[Carl Grove]

Whenever people debate psychic phenomena, I usually start to think about how one might design an experiment that distinguishes between the two following scenarios:

A) A physical phenomenon actually occurs, but only if everyone perceiving it believes that it can happen.

B) A psychosocial phenomenon occurs, whereby a group of believers convince themselves, and one another, that a certain physical phenomenon occurs when in fact it does not.

It seems to me that most skeptics approach these situations with the assumption that only scenario B) ever occurs, or indeed is possible. When trying to understand the baseline functioning of the universe, in the absence of human intervention, this assumption is generally reasonable and appropriate.

However, when investigating phenomena where human mental faculties are alleged to directly affect the world, then this assumption may not be valid. How one can investigate a phenomenon without "damping it out" through excess doubt becomes an interesting problem.

Maybe detailed surveillance via electronic means?

I think you have to consider also scenario (C) where phenomena do occur regardless of the opinions or beliefs of any of the participants.

 

[Aether Blue]

I think you have to consider also scenario (C) where phenomena do occur regardless of the opinions or beliefs of any of the participants.

This is the default assumption about most phenomena, so proving it isn't particularly interesting, and breaks no new ground.

Proving that a physical phenomenon, like dowsing in the original context of the discussion, produces different outcomes based on the beliefs of nearby people, would on the other hand be paradigm-shifting.

 

[Moth Twiceborn]

We have over a hundred years of experimental data (admittedly of varying quality) - what we are missing is a theoretical framework as to why we experience these things.

 

[Carl Grove]

This is the default assumption about most phenomena, so proving it isn't particularly interesting, and breaks no new ground.

Proving that a physical phenomenon, like dowsing in the original context of the discussion, produces different outcomes based on the beliefs of nearby people, would on the other hand be paradigm-shifting.

Typically, and we have had a few examples in the dowsing thread, people often approach dowsing with a sceptical bias and then get surprised when they see that it works. Where sceptical scientists try to test dowsing they typically employ inappropriate methodology and often betray an ignorance of basic geology. But the big problem here is that sceptics and many in the New Age area of dowsing assume that the skill is something paranormal or requiring special abilities, whereas the truth appears to be that dowsing ability is probably more dependent upon physiological factors -- Reddish suggested that it depends on the amount of water in the human organism. You can see how the beliefs do influence the results quite clearly at times. In a recent TV documentary (US) the investigators went to Avebury and were shown energy dowsing by Maria Wheatley, one of the more prominent dowsers. One of the team was given a pair of rods and as he walked along, holding his arms quite rigidly, they crossed over a point where Maria knew there was an energy source. Maria then "proved" that it was really his own "unconscious movements" by connecting his forearms rigidly with a wooden stick. This time they didn't cross. But Reddish showed (using photos taken of his hands when the rods were pointing forwards and when crossing) that it was the rods themselves that moved. (And this was 30 years or more after Fortean Ivan Sanderson had constructed a device comprising rods mounted in cylinders and showed that they reacted to targets even when nobody had any physical contact with them). If linear rods or pipes etc. modify the earth's energy field, then connecting someone's hands together with one seems like a good way of short-circuiting the process, and really doesn't tell us anything about the operator's role. This is the sort of confused thinking that reflects no more than unwarranted assumptions and also ignorance about all the previous research in this area.