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Chance Of Nuclear War Is Greater Than You Think

ramonmercado

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I'm putting this in the Human Condition Forum as the outcomes depend on human interaction and decisions. I don't think his Cuba analogies stand anymore. A mad North Korean regime is capable of anything but I think the Iranian Theocracy would be more likely to use (IF it had them) nuclear weapons against its own people to retain power rather than use them against Western targets.

Some comments at the article link.

Chance of nuclear war is greater than you think: Stanford engineer makes risk analysis
http://www.physorg.com/news167327145.html
July 20th, 2009 BY CHRISTINE BLACKMAN

Professor Emeritus Martin Hellman began his work on the threat of nuclear destruction in the 1980s.

What are the chances of a nuclear world war? What is the risk of a nuclear attack on United States soil? The risk of a child born today suffering an early death due to nuclear war is at least 10 percent, according to Martin Hellman, a tall, thin and talkative Stanford Professor Emeritus in Engineering.

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Nuclear tensions in Iran and North Korea are increasing the need to take a long look at how the United States handles weapons of mass destruction, Hellman said.

Auto manufacturers assess the risk of injury to drivers, and engineers assess potential risks of a new nuclear power plant. So why haven’t we assessed the risk of nuclear conflict based on our current arms strategy? Hellman and a group of defense experts, Nobel laureates and Stanford professors are calling for an in-depth analysis.

With more than 25,000 nuclear weapons in existence and the ability to build many times more, the choice is between creating a safer world and having no world at all, Hellman wrote in his paper “Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence.”

Weapons from the Cold War still remain, but public concern for nuclear strategy has dissipated, Hellman said. Many of those who do think about it, such as political leaders, say the fantasy of nuclear disarmament is too risky for national defense, he explained.

“People who are saying change is too risky are implicitly assuming that the current approach is risk free, but no one really knows what the risk is if we don’t change,” Hellman said.

Hellman’s story

Hellman first became concerned about nuclear war in the 1980s when Ronald Reagan became president. Reagan brought the nuclear threat into clearer focus by being honest about fighting plans, Hellman said. Also, a fellow Stanford professor, Harry Rathbun, started a group to convince people that nuclear weapons represented more than just scientific progress, but a real threat of global destruction. Hellman credited his wife, Dorothie, for getting him to join the group: “I never would have gotten involved if it wasn’t for her.”

In 1982, Hellman took an 18-month, unpaid leave from Stanford to work as a volunteer for the group started by Rathbun. During this time, Hellman became convinced that nuclear destruction not only could happen, but would happen unless we changed some of our fundamental beliefs about national security and war.

Hellman’s numbers

About fifteen years after Hellman became convinced of impending destruction, he began punching numbers to calculate the probability of such a catastrophe based on events focused around the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. According to Hellman’s numbers, the risk of a person not living out his or her natural life because of nuclear war is at least 10 percent.


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Hellman gives another analogy: “The risk that each one of us dies as a result of failed deterrence is thousands of times greater than the risk you would bear if a nuclear power plant were built right next to your home.”

Determining such a risk seems a little like predicting the future, but Hellman is confident about his numbers. He justifies his probability by breaking down a catastrophe into a sequence of smaller failures, incorporating expert opinions, examining history and estimating within a range of numbers.

Hellman’s path to risk assessment

Before returning to Stanford from his volunteer leave, Hellman started a project with the Soviet Academy of Sciences through a committee led by Evgeny Velikhov, who later became Mikhail Gorbachev’s science advisor. In 1984, Hellman and his wife traveled to the Soviet Union to create dialog and build relationships with the Soviet scientists. Soviet restrictions on free speech prevented totally open discussion, but by 1986, Gorbachev lifted censorship, and the project became possible, Hellman explained.

The fruit of their labor came a year later in the form of a book called Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking. It had the radical thesis that either humanity would end war or war would end humanity.

But the cold war faded, along with public support, and Hellman focused his work on easing ethnic tension on campus (for which he won three awards) before retiring in 1995. After a few years of attending to family responsibilities, he returned to his work on risk assessment.

Hellman’s method

Hellman used a risk analysis approach, which breaks down a catastrophic event into a sequence of smaller failures. He further simplified the analysis by only considering failures triggered by a crisis involving Cuba. He began by evaluating three events that could have initiated a conflict: deploying American missiles in Turkey (which began in 1961), re-imposing a naval blockade around Cuba (which was threatened in the 1980s) and installing a missile defense system in eastern Europe, a current project that has drawn objections from Russia.

Based on the outcomes of these events, Hellman estimated these numbers:

• Rate of initiating events: six percent per year
• Probability that an initiating event leads to a major crisis: 33 percent
• Probability that a major crisis leads to the use of a nuclear weapon: 10 to 50 percent

The third probability is hardest to estimate because we have yet to drop a bomb on Russia (or vice versa). Hellman used the 10 to 50 percent range based on studying what transpired in the Cuban Missile Crisis and on statements by the participants. People can make irrational decisions when under the gun, he explained. Once a major crisis erupts, it becomes a question of who will back down first; like a game of nuclear chicken, he said.

Iran and North Korea

Iran’s nuclear program and North Korea’s nuclear testing add complexity to the assessment, Hellman explained. Nuclear terrorism was not included in the preliminary analysis, which makes Hellman’s probability more conservative. Factoring in nuclear terrorism adds a scary new dimension with additional risk, he said. A country with nuclear weapons and a terrorist presence could trigger a nuclear war, especially if the terrorist hostility is directed at a United States or Russian city, Hellman explained.

“If New York or Moscow went up in smoke, as horrendous as that would be, it could be a catalyst for an even worse catastrophe.” Conflict could arise as United States and Russian troops meet in the terrorist country to secure any remaining weapons, he explained.

According to Hellman, solving the conflict with Russia is the first key step to addressing issues with Iran or North Korea.

“Let’s work on the United States and Russia first because that’s where the most weapons are, it’s the easiest one to solve, and it will make a more fertile ground for solving later crises,” he said. “If we behave more rationally toward Russia, it might help Iran and North Korea see us as more trustworthy.”

Is disarmament the answer?

Moving toward a solution starts with taking small steps, such as recognizing the problem and analyzing the risk, Hellman explained.

“When people think about nuclear disarmament - if they do - they tend to think nothing will change except that we get rid of nuclear weapons. That’s not going to happen. Before we can even determine if nuclear disarmament is possible, we need to get beyond the simple good-guy/bad-guy view of the world and recognize that things are much more complex.”

While many might brand him as foolish for tackling such a seemingly insoluble problem, Hellman takes that as an unintended compliment, noting that his award-winning work in cryptography was seen in a similar light - until it paid off.

He looks to events in the past that give humanity hope for the future. If America had rejected seemingly impossible tasks, we’d still have slavery and women wouldn’t be able to vote; history has proven that people can change, he said.

Provided by Stanford University
 
While it's an interesting article, I still would have far greater concerns that an Iranian regime with nuclear weapons would try to strike Israel, and the Israelis will respond several times over. That would inevitably bring several other countries into the mix, and bingo, canned instant sunshine for everyone.
 
It's the North Koreans that we need to keep an eye on, even though I don't think they'd start the ball rolling I do think they could be easily provoked into doing something daft.
I also think that now they do have the bomb it could lead them into a renewed belief that they should push into the South, sparking a new civil war which could bubble up into an international crisis.
 
If your betting a tactical nuke toss between Pakistan and India in our life time is good odds.
 
Again this fits in Human Condition. Perhaps these officers need more than just retraining. Then perhaps the missiles need to be scrapped.

Air Force strips 17 officers of nuclear watch command
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-22457265

The inside of the deactivated Delta Nine nuclear missile launch facility near Wall, South Dakota

The US Air Force has stripped 17 officers of the authority to control nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles, US media have reported.

The unprecedented action was taken in April, after the unit's deputy commander wrote in an email the programme was suffering "rot".

The story was first reported by the Associated Press.

The Air Force's top official told a Senate hearing that the revelation shows it has strengthened inspections.

Michael Donley, the Air Force secretary, said he was confident that the nuclear missile force was secure.

24-hour watch
In an email initially obtained by the AP, Lieutenant Colonel Jay Folds wrote that drastic action was needed because "we didn't wake up" after an underwhelming inspection the month before.

The 91st Operations Group at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota, the unit responsible for 15 Minuteman III missile launch control centres, received an satisfactory review overall in March.

But the unit received the equivalent of a D grade on the test of its mastery of the missile launch operations.

Continue reading the main story

Start Quote

Minuteman launch crews have long been marginalised and demoralised by the fact that the Air Force's culture and fast-track careers revolve around flying planes”

Bruce Blair
Former ICBM officer
Lt Col Folds also complained of unwarranted questioning of orders by launch crews and the failure of more senior officers to report infractions.

"We're discovering such rot in the crew force," he wrote, that the unit was accepting violations of safety rules and code compromises "all in the name of not inconveniencing yourselves".

The 17 officers were removed from duty of 24-hour shifts watching over nuclear missiles that can strike targets across the globe. Inside each underground launch control capsule, two officers stand "alert" at all times, ready to launch an ICBM upon presidential order.

The Air Force said the lapses never put the security of the nuclear force at risk and that the officers pulled from the watch will receive more training. They are expected to return to normal duty within two months.

The service has removed officers from nuclear authority before, but never so many at one time.

The move comes after a 2008 Pentagon report excoriated the Air Force for a series of blunders, including a bomber's mistaken flight across the country armed with nuclear-tipped missiles.

The top civilian and military leaders of the Air Force resigned over the report.

It had taken numerous steps since then to improve the force's nuclear performance.

Deep malaise
At a Senate hearing on Wednesday, Mr Donley said the launch control officers were relatively junior in rank and needed to be reminded continually of the importance of "this awesome responsibility".


Air Force Secretary Michael Donley said the nation's nuclear missile force is secure
The Air Force's chief of staff also endorsed the handling of the situation by Minot Air Force base officials and said it had been "more of an attitude problem than a proficiency problem".

But at least one senator was not calmed by official assurances. Illinois Democrat Richard Durbin, chairman of the Senate appropriations defence subcommittee, expressed outrage, saying the AP report revealed a problem that "could not be more troubling".

Bruce Blair, who served as an Air Force ICBM launch control officer in the 1970s and is a co-founder of nuclear weapons elimination group Global Zero, said the email points to a broader problem.

"The nuclear air force is suffering from a deep malaise caused by the declining relevance of their mission since the Cold War's end over 20 years ago," Mr Blair said.

"Minuteman launch crews have long been marginalised and demoralised by the fact that the Air Force's culture and fast-track careers revolve around flying planes, not sitting in underground bunkers baby-sitting nuclear-armed missiles."
 
Yes, because minding phallic objects you hope never to even think about using is stimulating.
 
Almost happened, one person made the difference.

Stanislav Petrov: The man who may have saved the world
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24280831

Stanislav Petrov says no-one would have blamed him if he'd just passed the information on

Thirty years ago, on 26 September 1983, the world was saved from potential nuclear disaster.

In the early hours of the morning, the Soviet Union's early-warning systems detected an incoming missile strike from the United States. Computer readouts suggested several missiles had been launched. The protocol for the Soviet military would have been to retaliate with a nuclear attack of its own.

But duty officer Stanislav Petrov - whose job it was to register apparent enemy missile launches - decided not to report them to his superiors, and instead dismissed them as a false alarm.

This was a breach of his instructions, a dereliction of duty. The safe thing to do would have been to pass the responsibility on, to refer up.

But his decision may have saved the world.

Continue reading the main story

Start Quote

There was no rule about how long we were allowed to think before we reported a strike. But we knew that every second of procrastination took away valuable time”

Stanislav Petrov
"I had all the data [to suggest there was an ongoing missile attack]. If I had sent my report up the chain of command, nobody would have said a word against it," he told the BBC's Russian Service 30 years after that overnight shift.

Mr Petrov - who retired with the rank of lieutenant colonel and now lives in a small town near Moscow - was part of a well-trained team which served at one of the Soviet Union's early warning bases, not far from Moscow. His training was rigorous, his instructions very clear.

'Couldn't move'
His job was to register any missile strikes and to report them to the Soviet military and political leadership. In the political climate of 1983, a retaliatory strike would have been almost certain.

And yet, when the moment came, he says he almost froze in place.

"The siren howled, but I just sat there for a few seconds, staring at the big, back-lit, red screen with the word 'launch' on it," he says.

The system was telling him that the level of reliability of that alert was "highest". There could be no doubt. America had launched a missile.

"A minute later the siren went off again. The second missile was launched. Then the third, and the fourth, and the fifth. Computers changed their alerts from 'launch' to 'missile strike'," he says.

Mr Petrov smokes cheap Russian cigarettes as he relates the incidents he must have played over countless times in his mind.

"There was no rule about how long we were allowed to think before we reported a strike. But we knew that every second of procrastination took away valuable time; that the Soviet Union's military and political leadership needed to be informed without delay.

"All I had to do was to reach for the phone; to raise the direct line to our top commanders - but I couldn't move. I felt like I was sitting on a hot frying pan," he told us.

Soviet missiles on display in Moscow, 1989
Soviet protocol said the military should respond to a nuclear attack with one of its own
Although the nature of the alert seemed to be abundantly clear, Mr Petrov had some doubts.

Alongside IT specialists, like him, Soviet Union had other experts, also watching America's missile forces. A group of satellite radar operators told him they had registered no missiles.

But those people were only a support service. The protocol said, very clearly, that the decision had to be based on computer readouts. And that decision rested with him, the duty officer.

But what made him suspicious was just how strong and clear that alert was.

"There were 28 or 29 security levels. After the target was identified, it had to pass all of those 'checkpoints'. I was not quite sure it was possible, under those circumstances," says the retired officer.

Mr Petrov called the duty officer in the Soviet army's headquarters and reported a system malfunction.

If he was wrong, the first nuclear explosions would have happened minutes later.

"Twenty-three minutes later I realised that nothing had happened. If there had been a real strike, then I would already know about it. It was such a relief," he says with a smile.

'Lucky it was me'
Now, 30 years on, Mr Petrov thinks the odds were 50-50. He admits he was never absolutely sure that the alert was a false one.

He says he was the only officer in his team who had received a civilian education. "My colleagues were all professional soldiers, they were taught to give and obey orders," he told us.

So, he believes, if somebody else had been on shift, the alarm would have been raised.

A few days later Mr Petrov received an official reprimand for what happened that night. Not for what he did, but for mistakes in the logbook.

He kept silent for 10 years. "I thought it was shameful for the Soviet army that our system failed in this way," he says.

But, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the story did get into the press. Mr Petrov received several international awards.

But he does not think of himself as a hero.

"That was my job", he says. "But they were lucky it was me on shift that night."
 
Sooner or later, someone is bound to use one. It will be the reaction to that which determines whether the human race retains any interest in global warming - or anything else.

The current deterrent policy has one flaw - if you don't know who set the darn thing off you don't know who to obliterate.
 
Someone has used one, two in fact, at the end of the Second World War.
 
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But at the time no-one else had one, so there was no deterrent.

I believe the deterrent policy has worked from the 50's until now. Whether it will always work is another matter.
 
Nine fired in US nuclear force cheating scandal
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-26779765

Colonel Robert Stanley in an undated photo

Col Robert Stanley, Malmstrom Air Force Base's 341st Missile Wing, is said to have resigned his post in the wake of the cheating scandal

The US Air Force has sacked nine mid-level nuclear commanders and will discipline dozens more in a test cheating scandal, officials have said.

Nearly one in five of the Air Force's nuclear missile officers have been implicated in a ring of cheating on monthly proficiency tests.

Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James has said the nuclear force is suffering from "systemic problems".

A series of programmes to improve leadership are also said to be planned.

High-level review
None of the fired commanders is directly involved in the alleged cheating. Each was instead determined to have failed in leadership responsibility.

Continue reading the main story
US nuclear programme scandals

October 2013 - Maj Gen Michael Carey, a two-star general in the 20th Air Force, is sacked after accusations of drunken misconduct
October 2013 - US Navy Vice-Adm Tim Giardina is removed as deputy head of US Strategic Command and investigated for illegal gambling
August 2013 - the 341st Missile Wing at Malmstrom Air Force Base fails a safety test, and its commander is relieved of duty
May 2013 - The US Air Force temporarily strips 17 officers at Minot base in North Dakota of their nuclear watch authority following a poor grade in a missile launch test.
October 2007 - The air force relieves several officers of their duties after a B-52 bomber was mistakenly flown across the US loaded with nuclear-armed missiles
The most senior leader said to be involved is the commander of Malmstrom Air Force Base's 341st Missile Wing, Col Robert Stanley, who was reportedly allowed to resign.

Commanders of the 341st Wing's three missile squadrons - each of whom is responsible for three nuclear missiles - were also fired, the Associated Press news agency reports.

Ninety-one missile launch crew members at Malmstrom have thus far been implicated in the cheating scandal, including more than 40 who face disciplinary action that may include dismissal.

Cheating allegations first emerged during investigations into alleged drug use by personnel at other bases.

In the wake of the revelations, the Air Force announced the entire team at the base would be re-tested.

It is the latest scandal to hit the US Air Force and nuclear missile force.

Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel had previously ordered a high-level review of the US nuclear forces, saying he was "deeply concerned" about morale and discipline among nuclear officers, while insisting that US nuclear arms were safe.
 
The US Air Force will begin a court-martial in January in the case of a nuclear missile launch officer charged with drug use and obstructing justice following a criminal probe that exposed an exam-cheating scandal involving nearly 100 nuke officers.

According to the Associated Press, Second Lt. Nicole Dalmazzi of the 341st Missile Wing at Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana is believed to be the first nuclear launch officer, or missileer, charged amid the drug investigation that was made public last January on the same day US Department of Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel visited Malmstrom, one of three nuclear-missile land bases in the country.

Dalmazzi was charged with illegal drug use and obstructing a probe by the Air Force Office of Special Investigations for dyeing her hair to "alter the results of potential hair-follicle drug tests," said Josh Aycock, a spokesman at Malmstrom, according to AP. Her court-martial will begin on Jan. 21.

Missileers operate Minuteman 3 missiles, which are armed with nuclear warheads controlled by two missileers on duty during rotating shifts in an underground launch center. AP was unable to reach her for comment. ...

http://rt.com/usa/211179-nuclear-officer-drug-charges/
 
It’s the kind of stuff you’d want to keep strict tabs on. Yet in July, the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, dispatched more uranium to a private company in the US than it meant to, it now admits.

This was caused by human error, says Steven Wyatt of the National Nuclear Security Administration, which manages the Y-12 site. “Personnel mistakenly placed more material into containers than intended,” he says.

Contractors at the unnamed firm reported the overgenerous delivery, prompting Y-12 – a nuclear weapons facility – to take action. “All material shipped… was recovered by a Y-12 team and returned to the Oak Ridge site safely,” says Wyatt.

“These things shouldn’t happen,” says Robert Alvarez of the Institute for Policy Studies, a think tank in Washington DC. Alvarez has previously criticised security and safety at Y-12, which has struggled since the cold war’s end to safely manage its vast stores of uranium, he says.

https://www.newscientist.com/articl...gn=twitter&cmpid=SOC|NSNS|2015-GLOBAL-twitter
 
1950s U.S. Nuclear Target List Offers Chilling Insight

Target category No. 275 from the nuclear target list for 1959 may be the most chilling. It is called simply “Population.”

For the first time, the National Archives and Records Administration has released a detailed list of the United States’ potential targets for atomic bombers in the event of war with the Soviet Union, showing the number and the variety of targets on its territory, as well as in Eastern Europe and China.

It lists many targets for “systematic destruction” in major cities, including 179 in Moscow (like “Agricultural Equipment” and “Transformers, Heavy”), 145 in Leningrad and 91 in East Berlin. The targets are referred to as DGZs or “designated ground zeros.” While many are industrial facilities, government buildings and the like, one for each city is simply designated “Population.”

“It’s disturbing, for sure, to see the population centers targeted,” said William Burr, a senior analyst at the National Security Archive, a research group at George Washington University that obtained the target list in response to a request first made in 2006. Mr. Burr, who specializes in nuclear history, said he believed it was the most detailed target list the Air Force had ever made public.

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/23/u...rod=nytcore-ipad&smid=nytcore-ipad-share&_r=0
 
Ugggh. And there I was thinking how handy it is for the Israelis to have Iran to point an accusing finger at - it deflects attention away from the 200 or so nukes which Israel already owns but hasn't admitted to, and the fact the Israelis haven't signed any protocols or treaties concerning the potential use of the nukes they officially don't have. And remind me again about the Samson Option: the threat to take everyone else down too if Israel falls. Who was it who said an Israeli plane could be above every European capital within hours? A senior spokesman for their administration, wasn't it? Nothing like saying "we know where you live and where your children go to school... now keep the money flowing, goyim..."
 
Ugggh. And there I was thinking how handy it is for the Israelis to have Iran to point an accusing finger at - it deflects attention away from the 200 or so nukes which Israel already owns but hasn't admitted to, and the fact the Israelis haven't signed any protocols or treaties concerning the potential use of the nukes they officially don't have. And remind me again about the Samson Option: the threat to take everyone else down too if Israel falls. Who was it who said an Israeli plane could be above every European capital within hours? A senior spokesman for their administration, wasn't it? Nothing like saying "we know where you live and where your children go to school... now keep the money flowing, goyim..."
I'd never heard of that before.
Why on earth would they do that? We're their allies and there are lots of Jewish people in Europe.
That's a kind of blackmail, isn't it?
 
Does Israel have allies? It's a contentious subject and maybe not one to open this late at night, but you get the feeling that like the old South Africa they're a people who feel beleaguered and on their own - something of a fortress mentality applies. Keeping the Americans onside is vitally important - think of the $3 billion dollar dole they get - but Benjamin Netanhayu, in unguarded moments, has described the Americans as "useful dupes" and spoken with approval on how easily they can be manipulated if you know which buttons to press. Getting good PR in western countries is important too. . But you get the feeling they'd go it alone against anyone if they had to: I'd imagine Europe is a continent with bad memories for a lot of Jewish people currently resident in Israel. Having said that, I like the idea the country is there: but that doesn't excuse a lot of its bad behaviour in the OT, and doesn't mean we shouldn't be aware of how paranoid some of its planning is.
 
Israel knows who there "friends" are,they need the europeans and the US to exist,with the way the middle east is at the minute theyd dance with the devil.Sabre rattling i think just to keep there lobby in europe on its toes.Would they not realise either if they used a nuke they would get the same back?A country as small as Israel with not many major cities wouldnt be much of a probelm to bomb for a major power either.You cant blame there paranoia with whats happened in the past,3 day war,Yom Kippur etc,and been surrounded by everyone that hates them.
 
And on that note... as they say on tvtropes, Rule Of Cautious Editing Judgement applies.

I do think that after the collapse of old certainties in the 1990's, it's fairly safe to assume a lot of formerly Soviet nukes may not have been rigorously accounted for. OK; radioactive material decays, and nukes need regular refurbishment for the fissile material to retain its potency. After twenty-odd years, anything that dissappeared at the time of the collapse of the USSR is most likely to be not in tip-top condition, if it did not fall into the hands of people with the know-how and resources to maintain the works. But that doesn't rule out the possibility that there's enough unaccounted radioactive stuff floating around for suitably inclined people to make a cheap dirty bomb of some sort, recycling 1994's state-of-the-art into something cruder and necessarily lower-tech, but in its way just good enough. I hope I'm wrong; but ISIS or similar fanatic group with a dirty bomb is a horrifying thought. Some of the right-wing Christian militias in the USA of the sort who want to give God a nudge about Armageddon, for instance. And on that very cheerful note.... goodnight....
 
And on that note... as they say on tvtropes, Rule Of Cautious Editing Judgement applies.

I do think that after the collapse of old certainties in the 1990's, it's fairly safe to assume a lot of formerly Soviet nukes may not have been rigorously accounted for. OK; radioactive material decays, and nukes need regular refurbishment for the fissile material to retain its potency. After twenty-odd years, anything that dissappeared at the time of the collapse of the USSR is most likely to be not in tip-top condition, if it did not fall into the hands of people with the know-how and resources to maintain the works. But that doesn't rule out the possibility that there's enough unaccounted radioactive stuff floating around for suitably inclined people to make a cheap dirty bomb of some sort, recycling 1994's state-of-the-art into something cruder and necessarily lower-tech, but in its way just good enough. I hope I'm wrong; but ISIS or similar fanatic group with a dirty bomb is a horrifying thought. Some of the right-wing Christian militias in the USA of the sort who want to give God a nudge about Armageddon, for instance. And on that very cheerful note.... goodnight....

Ok, I liked the comment but I don't like what it implies might happen!
 
Errors by three airmen troubleshooting a nuclear missile in its launch silo in 2014 triggered a "mishap" that damaged the missile, causing the Air Force to withdraw the airmen's nuclear certification and launch an accident investigation, officials said Friday.

In a statement released to The Associated Press, the Air Force declined to provide key details or a copy of the report produced last year by an Accident Investigation Board, saying the information was classified as too sensitive to be made public.

Under the Air Force's own regulations, Accident Investigation Board reports are supposed to be made public. The Air Force did release a brief summary to the AP after it sought answers about the mishap. The summary said the full report was classified on Nov. 9, 2015, by Gen. Robin Rand, the four-star general who commands Air Force nuclear forces.

The accident happened May 17, 2014, but the Air Force only explained the consequences on Friday after repeated inquiries by the AP starting in January 2015.

http://bigstory.ap.org/article/34ef...uman-error-damaged-nuclear-armed-missile-silo
 
This is the red trigger that launches Britain’s nuclear weapons

ad_193883569.jpg


On HMS Vigilant, one of the UK’s four nuclear submarines, there is no red button as such, but instead a red, handheld trigger.

Once the device, modelled on the Colt .45 Peacemaker, is pressed, there is no going back.

Speaking from Vigilant’s missile control room, Lt Cdr Woods said: ‘Once the missile has left the submarine there is no self-destruct button.

‘Once it’s gone from here, it is effectively ‘fire and forget’ – it is going to reach its target.
http://metro.co.uk/2016/01/22/this-...at-launches-britains-nuclear-weapons-5639607/
 
Looks worryingly old and worn.
 
I think this fits here. Not only was nuclear war close at times; nuclear missiles were closer then most people thought.

Where Los Angeles and Other American Cities Used to Store Their Nuclear Missiles

There's a scene in Bridesmaids in which the character of Megan, played by Melissa McCarthy, claims not only to work for the U.S. government but to have Top Secret security clearance. This means, she adds, that she knows where all the country's nuclear missiles are hidden. "You would be amazed," she whispers conspiratorially. "A lot of shopping malls."

There's more truth to this joke than you might expect. During the Cold War, many missile defense sites—precisely because their purpose was to guard infrastructure of vital national interest—were housed in urban or suburban locations. Los Angeles in particular, thanks to its aerospace facilities, military bases, and booming postwar population, became one of the most fortified regions in the United States. "Unknown to millions of Southern Californians who lived among them," a story in the Los Angeles Times reported back in 2000, "hundreds of surface-to-air missiles fitted with nuclear warheads were poised at nine of the bases to be launched against enemy bomber formations that never appeared."

At the intersection of Woodley Avenue and Victory Boulevard in Van Nuys, Nike missiles—named, like the athletic shoe, after the Greek goddess of victory—were housed in silos until 1974. The site, known as LA-96L and still used by the Air National Guard, is now a giant concrete pad fenced from public access. It sits across the street from a well-groomed golf course behind a lush Japanese garden that is part of the Donald C. Tillman Water Reclamation Plant. Beyond lies the domestic sprawl of the San Fernando Valley, just as it did when the site had an underground arsenal ready to fire on a moment's notice. ...

http://www.travelandleisure.com/articles/cold-war-missile-defense-los-angeles
 
Placing this here, as the scary implication is that we understand nuclear weapons a lot less well than we think we do.

The Holy Grail of space-minded dreamers and researchers has always been nuclear-powered propulsion. Nuclear-powered propulsion would be far cleaner, far cheaper, far more efficient, and far less noisy than current roar-and-a-fireball rocket propulsion. (Not sure the last is an advantage. I’m a big fan of roar-and-a-fireball in almost anything, including rocket launches, howitzers, and NASCAR races.)

And in fact we’ve had nuclear propulsion for some time. The small maneuvering engines of deep-space probes are typically nuclear-powered, but not in the way usually envisioned: They are tiny, nearly soundless (even on Earth) little fast-particle emitters that generate fractions of an ounce of thrust. That’s enough to rotate a spacecraft, given time, and their nuclear sources last virtually forever, but they’re hardly the earth-shaking monsters we envisioned blasting from Earth into space. Too bad we’ve not been able to accomplish that.

Or have we?...
 
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