Needham’s Great Question On China: Answered

[Endlessly Amazed]

(Mods – I cannot decide the best place to post this – please move to wherever you think best. Thanks.)

Needham’s great question on the Chinese failing to produce the industrial revolution has come up several times here in Forteanaland. This has intrigued me enough to take a brief look and respond.

I have not read any part of Needham’s 27 volumes on China. His great question about why China did not spearhead the industrial revolution has been answered at least several times, in great detail, and to the satisfaction of many historians who do not share Needham’s:

• Marxist philosophy – especially the early and mid-century variety in English universities
• Love of all things Chinese and loyalty to Chinese students he met at Cambridge
• Assumption that his understanding, especially of the role of Chinese culture and political organization, was near complete (he lacked modesty)
• Deep exploration of Chinese history and culture, but shallow exploration of other cultures, especially the Americas, Africa, and Islam. A mile deep and an inch wide. Needham had no demonstrated ability to equitably compare and contrast on this topic.
• An inability to admit to his own biases. This was a common occurrence in highly respected academicians of the mid-twentieth century. This is fatal to science, especially in areas of study dealing with cultural and political history because biases in these areas are part of the human condition.

He posed his great question in a way which does not easily produce a satisfactory answer – but satisfactory answers were produced. I suspect he was dismayed at cogent, well-researched answers in his lifetime because they clearly implied he was wrong in at least some of his assertions.

Plus, he was a Cambridge don, formally honored, Member of the Royal Society, British Academy, a Great Man, etc. This seems to me, an American, to be much more important in the UK and of that time (1930-1980) than in other countries, and in more recent times. The near reverence he was held in was a great inhibitor to answer his great question – and in so doing, be in public conflict with Needham, who was a powerful and well-connected figure. I have had the experience of being in public conflict with respected academicians in my own field, and it certainly takes much resolve over years. I was fortunate in that I did not have to worry the conflict would hurt my chances at tenure (I left academia to run various research projects).

I am by inclination, education, and employment an interdisciplinarian. This means that I assume every orientation to research has both benefits and drawbacks. Especially my own. This necessary caution or modesty is necessary if one is to do good research. Needham would have done better research if he had more modesty, and had not been a Sinophile and Marxist. Of course, if he wasn’t a Sinophile and Marxist, he may not have spent close to 50 years writing about Chinese culture and science.

I have been lucky enough to know several British-educated academicians, and several well-educated, smart, fervent Marxists. This exposure has perhaps given me a slightly better understanding of this orientation than I would have otherwise had.

I found this brief 130 page paper to be robust; but this is outside of my field of expertise. I suggest that the conclusion starting on page 117 be read first as an overview.

An Examination of the Needham Question: Why Didn't China Have a Scientific Revolution Considering Its Early Scientific Accomplishments? (cuny.edu)

In contrast to Needham, I offer the Durants’ eleven volume “The Story of Civilization.” Will and Ariel Durant were contemporaries of Needham, but were American historians. They were not specialists in any culture or era, but instead presented a good comparison and contrast of different worldwide cultures and the resultant sciences. Their work is not perfect, it is not complete, it contains biases clearly presented – but it remains a good grounding of the history of cultures and the history of science – and the connection between the two. I have read all eleven volumes at least twice in my life.

Let the smack-down begin!

 

[AmStramGram]

Last week, I read in a scientific vulgarisation newspaper that some scientists (climatologists ? historians ? I have no idea) had advanced the idea that the industrial revolutions in Western Europe were the consequence of climate change : according to the article, increased drought had rendered watermills inefficient, prompting the search for alternative sources of energy, and paving the way for the steam engine. It was a summarized article, and I didn't bother to go check the sources, but I found it amusing, and in a way revealing.

There are "fashions" in historical research. In a time of anguish toward climate change, we tend to see the impacts of climate change everywhere. In the sixties, it was "class struggle" (In the 1990s, I remember reading a 1968 marxist-inspired history book about Chinese secret societies, and it was hard not to laugh out loud because of its out-of place theories about class consciousness). And earlier, for a protestant sociologist such as Max Weber, the leading force behind progress was of course protestantism (tell that to the catholic italian bankers of the Renaissance) !

Regarding Needham's question, the "answers" are multifactorial and should not focus on China alone, for another mystery is why did the West start to lag behind China at some point ? A Chinese may see a kind of "Yin Yang" pattern in the ebb and flow of scientific progress and industrialisation worldwide. Ancient Greece, Ptolemaic Egypt and Rome, were at a time a hotbed of scientific innovation, with engineers such as Heron of Alexandria designing proto-steam engines and incredible machines. In Rome, emperor Nero was able to build a rotative panoramic banquet room on the Palatine. Why did it all stop ? Why did advanced technologies such as the "Greek Fire" disappear ? And why focus on China's era of stagnation instead of Europe's ?

I suspect Needham adopted a "modern / nationalist" Chinese prism on the matter : from the late 1890s onward, there was indeed a whole movement in China criticizing the Manchu regime for being unable to modernize and defend China against the West. It developped into the "May fourth movement" and the Guomindang & CCP lines of thought. The Chinese wanted to regain their international status and their "centrality" (China's Chinese name is Zhongguo : the Middle Kingdom), hence the question : when did it go wrong ?

I personally do not buy the theory about neo-confucianism being the culprit. It was the Chinese Nationalist's idea in the early 20th century, hence their campaigns against "feudal thought" and traditional culture (including the martial arts). The Guomindang was at that time as hostile to these traditions as the Communists. However, the facts contradict this ideological hypothesis : Chinese native science and technology still flourished during the Song dynasty, a time of triumph for neo-confucianism. If my memory is correct, some of China's best mathematicians were active during the Song.

The "high-equilibrium trap" is an interesting theory. It is true that Ming and early Qing China had huge manpower ressources, and thus a lack of incentive to increase mechanized production. They even exported their manpower abroad, allowing colonies of Chinese workers establish in all of Southwestern Asia : Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia.

Diplomacy may also be a factor. After Zheng He's sea expeditions, Ming China started to isolate from the outside world. Although the Qing were more open to the international scene, they mainly bothered themselves with fighting against central asian nomad empires. By that time, however, central Asia was no longer a dynamic place of exchange, as the trade routes had shifted towards the sea. So there wasn't much to gain, in terms of cultural exchange & challenge, to control the Silk Road. Isolationism is rarely favourable to scientific progress.

On the other hand, if we go back to the Tang and Song dynasties, the cultural and diplomatic landscape was far richer. The Tang ruled at a time of huge dynamism of the Silk Road, and they were challenged by international superpowers : the Tibetan empire, the Uyghur empire, and marginally, the Islamic empire (battle of Talas). Even the leadership of the country had international origins, as the imperial Li clan had Turkic roots, as many high ranking officials and favourites did (An Lushan, for instance, hailed from a Sogdian background). Although apparently less expansionist, the Song were actually surrounded by competing foreign kingdoms with equal claims to dominance, the Xixia (Tangut), and the Jin (Jurchen). The Song only controled a fraction of the Han and Tang territory, and they could hardly claim to be an unequalled "central kingdom". They were challenged until their collapse. This competitive environment probably favoured innovation.

 

[Kondoru]

Thanks for bringing this up; Needham, (Along with Waley) is my Sinological Hero.

You are right about Marxism in GB academia; it is endemic, and indeed, always has been.

 

[Endlessly Amazed]

Last week, I read in a scientific vulgarisation newspaper that some scientists (climatologists ? historians ? I have no idea) had advanced the idea that the industrial revolutions in Western Europe were the consequence of climate change : according to the article, increased drought had rendered watermills inefficient, prompting the search for alternative sources of energy, and paving the way for the steam engine. It was a summarized article, and I didn't bother to go check the sources, but I found it amusing, and in a way revealing.

There are "fashions" in historical research. In a time of anguish toward climate change, we tend to see the impacts of climate change everywhere. In the sixties, it was "class struggle" (In the 1990s, I remember reading a 1968 marxist-inspired history book about Chinese secret societies, and it was hard not to laugh out loud because of its out-of place theories about class consciousness). And earlier, for a protestant sociologist such as Max Weber, the leading force behind progress was of course protestantism (tell that to the catholic italian bankers of the Renaissance) !

Regarding Needham's question, the "answers" are multifactorial and should not focus on China alone, for another mystery is why did the West start to lag behind China at some point ? A Chinese may see a kind of "Yin Yang" pattern in the ebb and flow of scientific progress and industrialisation worldwide. Ancient Greece, Ptolemaic Egypt and Rome, were at a time a hotbed of scientific innovation, with engineers such as Heron of Alexandria designing proto-steam engines and incredible machines. In Rome, emperor Nero was able to build a rotative panoramic banquet room on the Palatine. Why did it all stop ? Why did advanced technologies such as the "Greek Fire" disappear ? And why focus on China's era of stagnation instead of Europe's ?

I suspect Needham adopted a "modern / nationalist" Chinese prism on the matter : from the late 1890s onward, there was indeed a whole movement in China criticizing the Manchu regime for being unable to modernize and defend China against the West. It developped into the "May fourth movement" and the Guomindang & CCP lines of thought. The Chinese wanted to regain their international status and their "centrality" (China's Chinese name is Zhongguo : the Middle Kingdom), hence the question : when did it go wrong ?

I personally do not buy the theory about neo-confucianism being the culprit. It was the Chinese Nationalist's idea in the early 20th century, hence their campaigns against "feudal thought" and traditional culture (including the martial arts). The Guomindang was at that time as hostile to these traditions as the Communists. However, the facts contradict this ideological hypothesis : Chinese native science and technology still flourished during the Song dynasty, a time of triumph for neo-confucianism. If my memory is correct, some of China's best mathematicians were active during the Song.

The "high-equilibrium trap" is an interesting theory. It is true that Ming and early Qing China had huge manpower ressources, and thus a lack of incentive to increase mechanized production. They even exported their manpower abroad, allowing colonies of Chinese workers establish in all of Southwestern Asia : Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia.

Diplomacy may also be a factor. After Zheng He's sea expeditions, Ming China started to isolate from the outside world. Although the Qing were more open to the international scene, they mainly bothered themselves with fighting against central asian nomad empires. By that time, however, central Asia was no longer a dynamic place of exchange, as the trade routes had shifted towards the sea. So there wasn't much to gain, in terms of cultural exchange & challenge, to control the Silk Road. Isolationism is rarely favourable to scientific progress.

On the other hand, if we go back to the Tang and Song dynasties, the cultural and diplomatic landscape was far richer. The Tang ruled at a time of huge dynamism of the Silk Road, and they were challenged by international superpowers : the Tibetan empire, the Uyghur empire, and marginally, the Islamic empire (battle of Talas). Even the leadership of the country had international origins, as the imperial Li clan had Turkic roots, as many high ranking officials and favourites did (An Lushan, for instance, hailed from a Sogdian background). Although apparently less expansionist, the Song were actually surrounded by competing foreign kingdoms with equal claims to dominance, the Xixia (Tangut), and the Jin (Jurchen). The Song only controled a fraction of the Han and Tang territory, and they could hardly claim to be an unequalled "central kingdom". They were challenged until their collapse. This competitive environment probably favoured innovation.

Thank you for the detailed response. I now know more about Chinese history than I ever did. I agree with you about fashions and multiple factors. Also - giving too much weight on recency of events to interpret events of centuries ago.

@Kondoru - why is Needham your hero? I have thought about who my heroes would be, and I come up with heroic attributes and characteristics, not names. So, my heroes are legion.

 

[AmStramGram]

my heroes are legion.

Like in Mark 5 : 9 ?

Sorry. Bad joke ...

 

[Endlessly Amazed]

Like in Mark 5 : 9 ?

Sorry. Bad joke ...

I am so glad you picked up on that nuance.

I am in a long-standing disagreement on another forum about the evils of orthodoxy (not the religious variety).

Scientific research - conclusions - application - disseminations to the unwashed masses - unwashed rubric (errors) of the conclusions and applications - widespread belief in the rubric - ORTHODOXY (and then unwashed rejection of scientific research, etc.)

One may observe this same pattern in conspiracy theory postings.

 

[Frideswide]

You are right about Marxism in GB academia; it is endemic, and indeed, always has been.

Really? I'm struggling to think of many - Eric Hobsbawm of course, and Maurice Levitas, both of whom I knew personally. In more recent years, I don't think I've known any. I "know" people's party politics of course.

Which could mean that they bare all in deep cover, and / or I am that Marxist!

 

[AmStramGram]

Really? I'm struggling to think of many - Eric Hobsbawm of course, and Maurice Levitas, both of whom I knew personally. In more recent years, I don't think I've known any. I "know" people's party politics of course.

Which could mean that they bare all in deep cover, and / or I am that Marxist!

They are in deep cover. It's a classical trotskyst tactic ! https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entryism