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Toulouse 21 September, 2001: The 'AZF' Disaster

Analis

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I open this thread, dedicated to the disaster that took place in Toulouse, on 21 September 2001. The city was ravaged by a powerful blast from a nearby factory, leaving thousands of people homeless. In the early aftermath, victims as well as the general public hoped that liabilities would be soon established. But from the developments of the case, it soon became apparent that the French government did not intent to shed light, but had chosen to cover up what had happened this day. And to ignore numerous anomalies. This is not without precedent. Political skullduggery is far from uncommon in France. French authorities had concealed inconvenient truths a number of times. But as a result, the causes of what is supposedly the greatest industrial disaster in France remain unknown. Whatever they were, they worry the French government for unknown reasons. Which rises intriguing, and disturbing, questions.

In the midst of Toulouse, along the Garonne stood the "Chemical Pole" (Pôle Chimique) factories : the state owned SNPE (Société Nationale des Poudres et Explosifs), dedicated to the manufacturing of explosives, phosgen gas and rocket propellants, on the islet Ramier ; its subsidiary, Tolochimie, linked to the former by a phosgen conduct ; the factory AZF (AZote Fertilisants), one of six in France owned by S.A. La Grande Paroisse, a subsidiary of Atofina, itself the property of TotalFinaElf. Also known locally under its former name ONIA. Specialized in the manufacturing of nitrate compounds, notably ammonium nitrate. It was one of the biggest production centers of fertilizers in France. There stood the shed B221, where was stored off-specification granular ammonium nitrate. The Pole was surrounded by two high schools (Galliéni and François), the psychiatric hospital Marchant, and housing estate. A careless situation, a consequence of negligent zoning policies.

Maps : AZF and SNPE : http://www.azf-10h18.com/SNPE/Aeroscan% ... 202001.jpg
AZF and 221 warehouse : http://azf-enqueteassassinee.typepad.co ... .html#more
SNPE in 2000 : http://www.azf-10h18.com/SNPE/Google%202000%20SNPE.jpg
http://www.azf-10h18.com/SNPE/SNPE%20Plan.jpg

In the morning of 21-9-2001, the weather is sunny. Strangely, a number of people notice mists around the SNPE perimeter. A little before 10h18', a distinct, loud explosion is heard in the vicinity of the Chemical Complex. At the same time, a series of electric malfunctions happen in the same area. Then, approximatively 10 seconds later, a second, huge explosion and a tremendous air schockwave. Toulouse is devastated. Where the B221 was, stands a huge oblong crater, 60 m long, 40 m wide, and app. 7 m deep. The area is levelled on a 200 m radius. 29 dead, 8833 wounded, approx. 30.000 flats, 4280 industrial and business premises, 29 high schools and 200 administrative buildings are damaged or destroyed.

In the following hours, it becomes apparent that the hangar B221 had detonated. But what happened is shrouded in confusion. Some say that the body of a kamikaze was found close to the crater. Others speak of a blinding lightning. The RéNaSS (Réseau National de Surveillance Sismique) says it registered a 3.4 Richter scale tremor. There is much confusion ; police believes at first 5 or 6 bombs exploded, at the city hall, the railway station... Some think that the explosion took place on the SNPE site. In the late afternoon, a civil servant from the prefectural office says the disaster was caused by the explosion of an ammonium nitrate production tower. Curiously, at 11H36 (9H36 GMT), an AFP release states that "only one explosion was heard".

Prime minister Lionel JOSPIN comes to Toulouse at 13h00, but says nothing of the causes of the disaster. Followed by President Jacques CHIRAC at 17h30. While Jospin says nothing of the causes of the disaster, Chirac seems well informed, as he tells that evidence points towards negligence. But he adds that there's no definitive certainty.
10 days after the traumatic events of New York and Washington, many immediately suppose a terrorist attack. But three days later, the Toulouse prosecutor ( = district attorney) Michel BREARD makes a strange comment : "From the data at our disposal, we are 99% sure that the cause was accidental" ; or maybe it was "more than 90% sure", sources differ. Whatever, from this moment on, the judicial investigation will focus exclusively on the industrial accident thesis. Even more remarkably, an AFP release on 21 sept. as soon as 12h31 had already claimed that according to first police findings the cause was probably accidental. Police did not start investigating on the devastated factory until later in the afternoon. On the following day, La Dépêche du Midi cited judicial experts on explosions, probably Daniel VAN SCHENDEL or Dominique DEHARO. Who explained that it was probably the result of a self-ignition. Two days later, the same paper (who will play a prominent part in supporting official claims) would write that a terrorist attack had been ruled out.
Despite a few dissenting voices, mediatic and political worlds will stick to this view. La Grande Paroisse will set its own Independant Investigation Commission (CEI), a legal obligation, to balance the investigations, along with a few journalists and independant investigators. But they will have little weight. Enough to draw a picture of the many inconsistencies and mistruths spread by the French authorities to give credence to an accidental cause, and the cover up of contrary evidence and proofs. The remarkable part is that despite their many attempts to evidence their assertions, and to discourage alternative investigation, more than 7 years later the latters have not come with any evidence or a plausible scenario of an industrial accident. I will depict first their attempts to support at any cost the scenario of an industrial negligence, and the extant of their violations of the basic rules of evidence and investigation (a comprehension account of them was given in the books by Marc Mennessier, Franck Hériot and Jean-Christophe Tirat), then will focus on the other sides of the case.

Main references here :
http://toulouse.azf.free.fr/
http://toulouse.azf4.free.fr/forum/inde ... a9708f278b ( http://forumazf.lesnews.org/ )
http://www.azfsilencedetat.com/ (currently not available)
http://azf-enqueteassassinee.typepad.com/
http://www.azf-10h18.com/
http://azf.danieldissy.net/
http://www.agoravox.fr/article.php3?id_article=13666
http://www.leblogfinance.com/2009/01/az ... .html#more
http://depris.cephes.free.fr/azfan1.htm
http://www.verite921.com/indexFrame.html
http://www.geopolintel.fr/rubrique12.html

Most recent books :
AZF - Toulouse, quelle vérité ? by Daniel DISSY.
AZF un silence d'Etat by Marc MENNESSIER.
AZF l'enquête assassinée by Jean-Cristophe TIRAT and Franck HERIOT

Other books : AZF Toulouse un mensonge d'Etat ? and Toulouse 21 septembre 2001 : attentat à la SNPE : la face cachée de l'affaire AZF by J.-P. SERBERA, Toulouse : an I après AZF. De la catastrophe au complot d'Etat by André DISPEIL.

Articles : L'Express 14.11.2001, 19.12.2001, 6.2.2003, 16.1.2003, 22.3.2004 by Anne-Marie CASTERET ;
Le Figaro 28.9.2001, 1.10.2001, 2.10.2001, 5.10.2001, 16.1.2003, 20.2.2004 by Marc MENNESSIER.
Valeurs Actuelles 28.9.2001, 5.10.2001, 12.10.2001, 26.10.2001, 21.12.2001, 18.1.2002, 25.1.2002, 1.2.2002, 22.2.202, 22.3.2002, 21.6.2002, 5.7.2002, 24.1.2003, 31.1.2003, 21.2.2003, 4.4.2003, 19.9.2003, 17.10.2003, 19.12.2003, 2.4.2004, 16.4.2004, 2.7.2004, 1.10.2004, 19.11.2004, 20.5.2005, 30.9.2005, 21.10.2005, 27.1.2006, 17.4.2006, 19.5.2006, 9.6.2006, 21.7.2006, 28.7.2006, 29.9.2006 by J-C. TIRAT, F. HERIOT, F. MADOUAS, T. DERANSART.
Top Secret 15 by Henry FARRENY.
 
The thesis supported by French authorities was the disaster was the result of carelessness. It was in their interest to depict the factory as a "usine-poubelle" (dustbin factory), and they would repeatedly tried. Supposedly, B221 was a dump where dangerous compounds were mixed with a permanent crust of AN, among poodles of water on a "porous" and "degradated" concrete slab. The staff was supposedly negligent and incompetent, acting in violation of all security regulations. It was widely believed, because Total, involved in the wrecking of the oil tanker Erica less than two years before, had a very bad reputation. It had become the embodiement of greedy businessmen and shareholders, prone to put people and the environment at risk for financial motives.
As for the terrorist lead, investigations will work from a number of assumptions to refute this possibility. Notably that the stack had detonated in its middle, where it would be too difficult for terrorists to climb... And that its detonation would require a great amount of explosives. One judicial expert will say to La Dépêche du Midi in october that one ton of dynamite would not be enough. Bréard will say on 15 January 2002 that 250 to 300 kg would be required. The first inconsistency comes here : if AN is so difficult to detonate, how is it that the warehouse exploded at first ?

What are ammonium Nitrate features ?
Ammonium nitrate (AN) is used as a fertilizer and as an explosive. But one of its main characteristics is its high stability - the reason for its use, as it is not the most powerful explosive. A number of explosive accidents caused by AN are known ; some much more powerful than the AZF disaster. But AN explodes only when in contact with a powerful primary explosion, or as the result of a fire, at more than 100°C.

In the first case, a number of accidents were the result of the use of dynamite to desaggregate AN, which led to the prohibition of this method. However, it happened only in a tiny fraction of attempts. Evidence of its stability. Confinement is an important factor. The explosive ability can be enhanced by mixing it with other compounds, notably organic compounds as hydrocarbons (terrorists often use gasoil), chrome, aluminium, acids, etc.

Examples : - at Oppau, Germany, on 21 September (!) 1921, workers tried to split a clooged mixture of fertilizer made of ammonium nitrate and ammonium sulfate by using dynamite. It caused the detonation of several hundreds tons of fertilizer. The technique was thought as harmless, as 20 000 attempts had been made previously.
- A similar accident happened at Tessenderlo, Belgium on 29 April 1942, after an attempt to desaggregate AN with industrial explosives.
- At Miramas, France, on 5 August 1940, containers of toluene took fire and their content flew on a pile of 240 t of AN in sacks ; the explosion of a munitions train dropped a shell in the burning pile, causing its detonation. But on 5 June 1940, at Rouen, the Luftwaffe attempted to detonate a warehouse full of AN. A bomb exploded right in its middle, the AN was simply dispersed, but did not explode. It was not enough confined.

In the second case, AN sometimes explodes in a number of conditions : confinement ; mixing with other compounds ; and a long lasting fire.

Examples : A famous occurence is the Texas City disaster on 16 April 1947. The hold of the cargo ship Grampian, filled with 2600 t of AN, took fire. The captain made the fatal mistake to close the hold, creating confinement and resulting in the explosion of the ship one hour later. The explosion was probably facilitated by the fact that AN was filled in bags laden with parrafin.
At Barracas, Spain, 9 March 2004, in a road accident, a stock of 25 t of AM got mixed with gasoil and caught fire. It exploded half an hour later.

None of those conditions were met at Toulouse.
 
I had forgotten about this, I do remember seeing it reported on the news in the UK, but as is usually the case, very little mainland European news gets reported in any depth here, versus the amount of detail we get about the most trivial events in America. (For another thread maybe?)

Of course everyone in my town are now painfully aware of TotalFina, following the Buncefield explosion:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005_Hertf ... minal_fire (Copy & paste this in to a search)

This was not really covered up as such IMO, but resulted from an institutional lack of procedure and poorly maintained sytems & safety equipment. Thank God no one was killed this time.

I guess in the case of Toulouse maybe the authorities were too anxious to dispel a terrorist act (at that time) to look too closely at the real cause.
 
jeff544 said:
Thank God no one was killed this time.

Partly because it happened at night. But I suppose better zoning policies played a role ?

I guess in the case of Toulouse maybe the authorities were too anxious to dispel a terrorist act (at that time) to look too closely at the real cause.

They probably were. What is stranger is that not only at that time, but later they could not come with any convincing explanation. They only made matters worse as time passed.
At Buncefield the investigation could establish that it was an UVCE (whatever the cause). Nothing such at Toulouse, despite the fact that AN chemistry is well known. The authorities simply used the magical solution of the "dustbin". The list of their prevarications is long, and may seem boring ; but it is interesting to know all of them, as they draw a picture of the way the cover-up worked.
Michel Bréard lost no time to "explain" in the following days that the explosion was caused by a complex and long physical-chemical process in a hellish mixture, which had been taking place for 80 years... Did he believe that the B221 had never been cleaned for 80 years ? In fact, it had been emptied only two months before... And cleaned the day before. Nonetheless, this "revelation" will be repeated by "well informed" sources and the press months later. From there, the first theory would be that the ammonium nitrate "self ignited". A big revolution in chemistry, which should have awarded them a Nobel Prize ! The investigation focused from the beginning began to work on the most implausible solution. But this was the theory Dominique Van Schendel supported in the article he wrote for La Dépêche du Midi as soon as 23 September, in clear violation of the criminal code. His colleagues said they felt worried by the unloading the day before of a stock of 20 to 30 t of AN. They were seemingly supported by the claims of a worker for the subcontractor TMG, Jean-Louis C.. Who, despite protests by his colleagues, described the concrete slab of the B221 as extremely deteriorated. On 28 September, Bréard started proceedings for unvoluntary manslaughter and destructions.

But B221 being a dump or not, the decomposition of AN doesn't strenghten its explosive capacity, it weakens it. Mixed with organic products or not, the fact remains that it can explode only when in contact with a powerful source of heat, and doesn't take fire spontaneously, impure or not (although self-sustained AN fires exist, but happen in different conditions). And any fire, spontaneous or not, should have lasted long, and would have been unmistakenably spotted. Plus the AN was not confined, and investigations failed to evidence any significant impurities. The shed was cleaned regularly by a competent staff under a competent management. Analysis by the LCPP of Paris showed that the carbon impurities were negligible, around 0.16 - 0.37 % of the nitrate crust.

As for the concrete slab, photos of its fragmented blocks published by Anne-Marie Casteret in L'Express on 20 December 2001 showed that it was in a good state and certainly not deteriorated. As for Jean-Louis C., he will admit to an investigator of the CEI that he had been pressured to tell counter-truths.
This hypothesis proving a dead end, the experts will try to find an unlikely "chemical match". The variety of theories they'll come with is truly surprising for people who were "more than 90% sure" that it was an accident.
In the following months, they'll put forward :
-a mix af sulfuric acid, lime and soda. Quite harmless, they produce respectively plaster and sodium sulphate.
-cans of industrial glue, but they were separated by two walls of concrete...
-a mix water- ion O2-. But the presence of O2- in an AN stack is very unlikely. It is produced in presence of a powerful -oxydant. Ammonium is a reducer, nitrate a weak oxidizer.
-the transformation of Ammonium nitrate in ammonium nitrite. The latter can explode at only 60°C. But this transformation is almost impossible. It requires huge quantities of a powerful reducer, absent in ANitrate. And A Nitrite is stable too.
-that the AN was heated by moisture. Another chemical impossibility, water is used to extinguish AN fires, and AN can't ferment.
-that it was heated by a "compost effect". Such effect could not rise the temperature above 60°C.
-and there was the dead rat scenario. Its body producing methane, causing the detonation...
Other suspects included a layer of asphalt, but asphalt would need to be intimately mixed with AN, and would not by itself cause a detonation ; or sulphur, but the same remarks apply. The experts regularly bumped into AN stability. But as one of them said, they needed to "get rid of preconceived ideas about AN"...

It's funny to note that the investigators made a U-turn : they claimed at first that 100 t of dynamite could not detonate the stack, now they were looking for less and less powerful causes... And less and less likely to detonate the stack... Now they were in danger of having run short of ideas.
This list of hypothesies is first evidence the authorities misled the public. Their theories shifted 100%. In stark contrats to the "more than 90% certainty" of an accident as expressed by Bréard. If he had such relevant data as to be "more than 90% sure" only three days later, if Chirac knew that first findings pointed towards an accident, if experts 'knew' as early as 22 Sept. that the cause was accidental, how is it that investigators couldn't come with a consistent explanation years later ? The obvious answer : they had no such data.
 
This game of musical chairs may seem entertaining, but it took on a more sinister turn when it came to charge and put into custody people on bogus reconstructions.
The investigators had finally come with a seemingly more plausible idea (not very difficult !) : chlorine. Of more precisely one of its compound, as chlorine itself doesn't react with AN. The factory manufactured also chlorine compounds. They were segregated from AN by strict rules. Chlorine itself doesn't react with AN, but some of its compounds can From now, the investigation will suppose that the staff was negligent and badly trained, and focus on sodium dichloro-isocyanate (DCCNa). Mixed with AN, the reactions lead to heat production and the release of nitrogen trichloride, NCl3. Highly unstable, it can explode spontaneously at more than 93°C. And supposedly, the experts will conduct experiments proving that this scenario worked, notably François BARRAT, a chemist. But while this theory was presented as definitive, it will prove only another series of prevarications.

The first lead will be of smugglers who would have left a bag of DCCNa in the B221. It will be dropped, but investigators will find soon a new suspect. A worker and driver of tipper-trucks, employed by a subcontractor, Surca, he will be an easy scapegoat as he supposedly didn't know the factory well. Gilles F. will be accused of having dumped a bag full of DCCNa in the slab. 500 kg in a tipper to be more precise. Initiating a chain reaction leading to the explosion. Approximatively 20 mn earlier, so that the 80 years delay had now been reduced to 20 mn !

A description of the warehouse B221 : it was divided into two spaces : the main where the stack lied, separated by a small wall from a small room at the entry, where a smaller stack lied ; this was where new AN was dropped. Earlier in the morning, app. 10 t of AN had been unloaded, before Gilles F. dropped the contents of his tipper.

Note a new U-turn : at first, the experts insisted that the detonation took place near the core of the stack. Supposedly "definitive" evidence that it couldn't be a terrorist attack. Indeed, studies conducted in 2003 by the British laboratory Qinetics, and in May 2006 by Pr Michel LEFEBVRE, from the Belgian Polytechnic Institute, reached the conclusion that the ignition point was located there. But well, obviously, the investigators (?) never had to produce a consistent version of the events...

Gilles F. had explained that on 19 Sept., he had found a riped big bag or GRVS (grand récipient vrac solide) containing app. 500 kg of AN. He showeled it into a tinper, in order to discharge it into the B221, which he did two days later. Nothing unusual. But on 3rd october 2001, an empty but uncleaned GRVS of 1000 kg of DCCNa had been found in the stab B335. Conditions of this find were in themselves suspect, as no-one had noticed it previously. But on 27 november, police will seize this bag, and pretend that it was the one Gilles F. discharged. According to their scenario, he had confused the two compounds. It will lead to the indictment of 12 workers and managers, including the supervisor George PAILLAS. Along with AZF director Serge BIECHLIN and the S.A. La Grande Paroisse. They will be put in police custody, and treated quite harshly. But none will admit any mistake.
Indictment or not, this lead will prove another disaster. The CEI will identify the whereabouts of the DCCNa big bag trough its serial number, and prove in a report released on 19 March 2002 that it was empty as early as June 2001. The police will have to admit that. So, no DCCNa to dump in the B221. And it is a dangerous and toxic compound. Its fumes would suffocate anyone unprotected coming close to it. It wasn't difficult for the workers to prove that it is impossible to showel it without a full protective suit. No confusion is possible. The reglementation was drastic, no-one would have ignored it (or could have without suffocating). The police will try another scenario, that Gilles F. used an elevator-truck to carry directly the bag. But the 1000kg GRVS can't be carried with the kind of elevator-trucks used in the factory. And the problem of the fumes remains.
A judicial reconstitution will be set on 9 and 11 October 2002. Why at first a reconstitution, as it was proven that there was no DCCNa bag to discharge ? But it will turn comical. Experts, judges and policemen will leave the scene coughing and watering.
Incredibly, it wouldn't prevent the "investigators" to say that the DCCNa hypothesis remained valid. The DCCNa involved in the reconstitution, of the anhydrous variety, was not of the "good" kind. The "good" kind was in fact dihydrous. Its surface oxydizes faster, and becomes less odorous. But the problem remains the same : as soon as it is manipulated, it becomes asphyxiasting.
As a result of a total lack of evidence, 10 of the indicted staff will be discharged on Sept. 2003 by instructor judge Perriquet, then George Paillas on July 2004. As the prosecutor appealed, they will have to wait for one year for the discharge to be definitive.

As for the experiments, they should be called be bogus : the specimen used by François Barrat was made mostly of urea and contained... 0,74% of AN. In fact, it was made mostly of urea ! In a second experiment, he mixed AN and DCCNa with turpentine oil. No conclusions could be drawn from experiments conducted in conditions so different from actual ones .
Expert working for the D.G.A. Didier BERGUES will conduct somewhat more serious experimentations. He'll obtain a few explosions, but will admit in his judicial report in summer 2003 that results are poor. Explosions were weak. And the conditions were different : DCCNa and AN were intimately mixed and confined, and dampness and temperature were high. And he still had added turpentine. French and Dutch experts working for La Grande Paroisse in 2003 will succeed to detonate AN at 20°C, but still in favorable conditions : intimate mixing, milled coumpounds, high percentage of water and high confinement in boxes. The same remark applies to trials by the SNPE staff the same year. Simply pouring a bag of DCCNa on an AN stack won't produce any explosion.
The Semenov Institute in Moscow will confirm that : putting tens of kg of AN and DCCNa, unmixed and unconfined, sometimes produces smokes, but nothing more. Despite the fact they had added water. Logically, the chlorine theory should have ended here.
 
Logically... But it was now clear that logic had little to do with the "investigation". Another implausible scenario was found. The DCCNa came from sweepings from the B335... Gilles F. had supposedly put them in a tipper full of AN by ignoring security regulations, leading to an intimate mixing of the two compounds. So that Gilles F. had emptied not 500 kg of DCCNa, but of AN ! It would seem laughable, if not for the seriousness of the situation... And now, a mere "few kg" of DCCNa were enough. How mere sweepings could provide a few kg of DCCNa at all was another problem (maybe they used a magical broom ?).

But the tipper had remained for two days untouched, and no reaction had taken place. In any case, it was dubious that wetness conditions were met. So, the "experts" would now suppose that the compounds were not intimately mixed, but DCCNa had remained at the surface of the AN... This new U-turn will be called the "sandwich" theory : a sandwich made of three layers : a lower of wet AN (10,7%), supposedly the crust of the slab ; an intermediate of wet DCCNa (4,5%) and an upper of dry AN.
Didier Bergues tested this scenario in 2005 with the help of the SNPE Laboratories. They sometimes produced explosions. But it relied on that the AN in the tipper remains magically suspended for 14 seconds to allow DCCNa to fall on the wet crust, a physical impossibility. And it is certainly dubious that the explosion was of the kind to detonate a stack of AN by "sympathy". The small wall was an obstacle, and the main stack wouldn't detonate only if it was hurt by some of its parts. The experts supposed that the detonation would propagate laterrally via the crust, ot that the small stack had spealed out. AN being what it is, it is highly unlikely. But well, they had to get rid of preconceived ideas about AN...

Fragments of the crust recovered in the aftermath did not exhibit significant evidence of water, which was consistent with multiple testimonies that there were no puddles of water ; and the coup de grâce comes from an analysis by the laboratory CATAR-CRITT of samples from the B335 ground. Results were transmitted to the instructors on July 2006 (curiously, judge Perriquet ordered them to be conducted only in Déc. 2005). No noticeable chloride was present. It confirmed that the staff was observant of security rules.

Clearly, any reconstitution would prove a failure, problably the reason why the instructor judge refused to conduct any. But some were, in the same conditions that prevailed on 21.9.2001, in Netherlands by ZUID Chemie B.V.. A subsidiary of La Grande Paroise, it was followed by a number of independant scientists to ascertain its fairness. Unsurprisingly, it confirmed that it would be impossible to reach such a "sandwich" configuration.

Despite this massive amount of counter-evidence, the investigators and the judge remained imperturbable. They weren't deterred by protests from a number of scientists, including Georges Guiochon, one of the world's leading experts on AN, Claude Lion, director at the CNRS, Armand Lattes, president of the Société Française de Chimie, Rémy Pech, chairman of the Toulouse-le-Mirail college, Bernard Rolet, technical director of CdF Chimie, Bernard Meunier, director of research at the CNRS Laboratory of Chemistry, etc. While Gilles F. had finally been discharged on 13 July 2006, judge Perriquet closed the investigation on 20 sept. 2006. 5 years after the press and the prosecutor had announced that the solution had been found... On 3 May 2007, the Court of Appeals rejected demands for new enquiries, and closed pendant civil investigations. On 9 July 2007, judge Perriquet refered to the Court Serge Biechlin and S.A. La Grande Paroisse. Despite that no fault or violation of industrial laws had been established. A trial is set for 23 February 2009.
Other sides of the official inquiries displayed the same ignorance of the basic rules of evidence.
 
The accident theory proving a dead end, the other possibilty that springs to mind is, quite naturally, a terrorist attack. Would the authorities try to cover it up, if it proved to be the solution ?
They would certainly have motives. Not difficult to guess what political consequences of a terrorist attack would be in the early aftermath of September 11. Widespread panic ; and a huge rise in xenophobia if the perpetrators turned to be muslim, probably not confined to the borders of France. They didn't want to add hysteria to horror. That was what a source close to the Prime Minister said, according from an article in France Soir, 6 oct 2001. Chirac was reported to say when he came to Toulouse "I don't want to hear of a terrorist attack" (L'Homme Nouveau, 20 January 2002). The French government would have had little choice left, but to enlist in Bush's crusade against terror.

Was there any evidence evidence suggesting a terrorist attack ? If so, their motives to cover it up were clear, but is there evidence they tried ? There is plenty that investigators had made such findings as soon as in the early hours following the disaster ; and that the prosecutor tried not only to discourage any inquiry of a terrorits lead, but to suppress any attempt. To the point of using intimidation.
The first evidence was detailed in the following weeks by articles from newspapers like Valeurs Actuelles, Le Parisien and Le Figaro ; Anne-Marie Casteret took over later in L'Express :
http://www.lexpress.fr/informations/tou ... 46592.html
http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societ ... 97126.html
http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societ ... 96902.html
The books AZF un Silence d'Etat (AZFSE), p.34-60, 134-176, and AZF l'Enquête Assassinée (AZFEA), p.23-44, gave an extensive review of this lead.

(a summary is found here, a little simplistic, but it is the only one roughly accurate I could find in english : http://atlasshrugs2000.typepad.com/atla ... .html#more )

Note : the intent is not to defame or to expose anybody to a trial by the mob. But to expose anomalies in the files, and to point a number of facts which have never been adressed, despite that they are genuinely intriguing. But until fair investigation and trial are conducted (which is not the case until now), everybody is presumed innocent.
And while there was evidence to suggest the possibility of an islamist attack, this lead is only one of the many facets of the case.

Claims that kamikazes had been involved came as early as the afternoon of 21 Sept. They revolved notably around two workers for the subcontractor TMG, Hassan Jandoubi (Hassan J.) and Aberrassack Tahiri (Abder T.). Pr Anne-Marie Duguet was the first forensic expert to examine the body of Hassan J., at Purpan Hospital, on 22 Sept. at 12h05. He had been found close to the crater. She noted that he wore five underwear pennies clothing. She thought that it was reminiscent of a ritual used by islamist kamikazes. The intent being to protect their genitals, so that they could fully enjoy the 72 virgins Allah promised them. Strangely, police will refuse to hear her.

In the following days, the rumour will grow. A driver, "Ali", came the following day to the police to testify that Hassan J. and Abder T. had been agressive just prior to the explosion. An AZF manager had reported similar facts on the afternoon of 21 Sept.. Papers published similar testimonies of workers at AZF. They reported the police had been interested by their whereabouts, and had conducted a search at J.'s flat, but that it had been cleaned of all his belongings. And published a controversial preliminary report ("note blanche") by the Renseignements Généraux (RG). Dated 2 october 2001, it supposed Hassan J. had islamist affinities, and was asking for inquiries.
(the full report here : http://www.azf-10h18.com/PGR_ATTENTAT-IV.html (go to #1) )

Most media tried to ostracize journalists who followed this lead. They accused them of racism and islamophobia. The same didn't have such reservations when it came to 11 September...
At first, prosecutor Bréard tried to deny that a possible kamikaze had been found. When contrary evidence was published, he called it total nonsense, and insisted that all leads were properly investigated. He even accused the disagreeing journalists of working for Total. He added that there had been no revendications. He got angered, and charged Valeurs Actuelles, Le Figaro and the journalists with spreading false news (a criminal offense in France), alongside J.'s relatives who sued for libel. The decision of the Toulouse Court in 2002 was curiously twisted : the defendants were discharged for spreading false news, but convicted of having defamed Hassan J. They appealed, and were cleared by the Court of Appeals on 9 January 2003. J.'s relatives had all their suits dismissed, except Hassan J.'s wife Nadia M., but only of the count that Le Figaro should not have written on 5 october 2001 she had cleaned her flat.
On 16 January, in a new article, Marc Mennessier justified his assertion by citing two police sources : "He was allowed to conduct a search only on Friday morning, five days later. Much time lost. In the flat, everything was clean. No more clothes, not even any photos, nothing..." "the flat had been more than cleaned : it was sterilized. Now we're ruined. We lost one week, and in a judicial investigation, we can't make up for such lost time."
http://www.azf-10h18.com/PGR_ATTENTAT-VI.html

About revendications, while it is still claimed by a number of newspapers (notably La Dépêche du Midi) that there had been none, this was proven false. One had even been sent to La Dépêche... An intriguing one was revealed by A.-M. Casteret. Signed "Alpha Bravo", it was sent on 28 Sept. from near London, to France 3 Sud, through the firefighters departmental service' fax. Uncanny because it is a secure state line. It was in the judicial files, which means that the authorities had lied. Aonther from "Alpha Bravo" was sent to local resort TLT the same day.

When it came to the many underwear as a sign of kamikaze intents, the press tried to ridicule this idea. The Toulouse SRPJ (Service Régional de Police Judiciaire) wrote in a report released on 4 June 2002, that it had asked experts on islam and the Israeli embassy, who had all denied that such a ritual existed. Hassan J.'s relatives and friends had unanimously explained that Hassan J. use to carry many underpants daily, because he had a complex about his thinness (One of them said he weighed 55kg). Plus he was not an islamist, not even a believer, not matter what the RG report said. As for the reason Nadia M. had gotten rid of his belongings, she explained that she wanted to ease her pain, retaining them would have only reminded her of him. They could say that the lead had no substance.

But notwithstanding the SRPJ report and the sarcasms of the media, it is a known fact that a number of kamikazes follow this ritual, how bizarre it might seem (but well, they are men who expect 72 virgins granted to them in Paradise...). A.-M. Casteret will reveal the contents of the judicial files : they will contradict the report on all counts.
 
In fact, in a reply sent on 24 october 2001, the Israeli embassy had written exactly the contrary : while it was usually difficult to ascertain, due to the usual state of dead kamikazes, Israeli police had already found in 2000 at least one not killed by the explosion, wearing multiple underwear (in an article in Libération, 11 August 2001, Jean-Pierre Perrin mentioned another example in Israel in 2001). They confirmed the rumour of the protection of genitals and the 72 huris, but could not confirm this was the true motive. They knew of no examples of relatives getting rid of the kamikaze's belongings ; they supposed that if it was to happen, it would be logical to suspect that the family would try to hide his involvment. As for the experts on Islam, two stated that it was not a Quran prescription - and this is true ; one of them admitted he had no good knowledge of political islamism, and couldn't confirm or infirm if this ritual existed. Two others, including Dalil Boubakeur, rector at the Mosquee of Paris, had confirmed this was not a prescription, but that a number of kamikazes followed this rule - and this is true.

The judicial files similarly dismissed the "thinness complex" explanation (AZFSE p.37). It was contradicted by the relatives' first depositions, their first reaction being of complete surprise. On 25 sept.2001, Nadia M. told that he sometimes wore a pant in addition to a slipway, because he was slender ; but couldn't explain why he had so many underpants. His father Chedli J. vehemently denied his son had such a strange habit. M. Mennessier revealed p.38 of AZFSE that his sister Leila J. had a similar reaction. She told too her brother had grown more and more islamist the months before ; to the point that it had become difficult to have discussions with him. Nadia M. was more ambiguous on his religiousness, but she had told that her contact with her husband had led her to come closer to religious prescriptions. One week later, their claims would change abruptly, with no obvious motive (funnily, Leila J. supported that her father had the same habit of wearing multiple underwear !). This explanation was definitely put to rest when it was revealed that Hassan J. weighed app. 70kg and not 55 kg. In any case, it would be difficult to go to work daily with such heavy clothing...
Leila J.'s assertions seem to have surface in an October 2001 file from the Direction de la Sécurité du Territoire (DST). It says that "according to what his sister told the RG, J. would be an islamist". Did Leila speak directly to the RG, or did Toulouse police reported this to them ? In any case, police services took her declarations seriously.

Judicial files ask other questions. Interestingly, Abder T.'s wife was asked if her husband used to wear multiple underpants. The reason is not given. Was he dressed too as a kamikaze ? His autopsy is nowhere to be found.
In fact, police had heard some of J.'s relatives as early as 21 September. Chadli J. confirmed that on 2 oct. (AZFSE p.175). According to a police source, one of them told "I knew that Hassan would screw up" (AZFEA p.25). Contrarily to what M. Bréard claimed, police had suspicions very early. The contents of those early hearings were never added to the instruction files, despite protests by lawyers and even judge Perriquet.

So, far from the lead being dead, many unanswered questions remained.
 
Who was Hassan J. ?
Of Tunisian descent, he came from a well-integrated family. As shown by the fact that his father Chadly uses to call himself "Charles", his sister Leila "Liliane", his brothers Hamdi, "Bernard", and Djilali, "Gérard". A former delinquent, he had been condemned for rape and procuring in November 1986, then for theft in December 1987. He was supposed to have settled down, and had religiously wed Nadia M. on 26 May 2001. But in the previous year he had been suspected of involvment in car trafficking. He was working for a garage held by "Laurent" M. and his wife Kheira el B. He had travelled for professional motives a number to times to Francfort, to convoy second hand cars back from Francfort to Toulouse with Senouci and Younes, sons of his employer. As Francfort is a known center for islamist nets, it reinforced some in the idea that Hassan J. had Islamist ties.
What he did exactely there remains controversial. Curiously, Younes M. told the police on 12 october 2001 that Hassan J. was not paid for those travels, he was only helping them. Was he employed by Laurent M. at all ? In any case he had produced paybills to rent a flat. His employers were never heard by the police (AZFEA p.28 ). At least, it would have been interesting to know why they travelled 2500 km (1560 miles) back and forth to buy second hand cars. What is sure, is that Hassan J. bought his own car at Francfort. But was it on June, August or early September, accounts differ.
Shortly after his marriage, he leaved his job to a temporary assigment at TMG, a AZF subcontractor. This was curious, because he was afforded only 5400 francs net per month, while his former net salary had been 9060.75 francs (1381.30 euros). His relatives explained that he needed money to buy a flat... Which seems a bit illogical.

Was he then truly a militant islamist ? This is unclear. Some of his acquaintances were. But his former behaviour was more of an apostate. He came from a secular family. However, his wife and his sister depicted him as a firm believer. Such a change would not be unusual among western muslims. Once again, the most striking part is that his friends and relatives changed their version.

The fact is that his behaviour, as well as Abder T.'s, had been unusual and aggressive in the days prior to the disaster.
On 20 Sept, he had tried to enlist one of his friends Smaïn B., under a false name, Truck (sic). Despite the insistence of Hassan J., the security refused, and Smaïn B. was not allowed to enter the factory. The same day, Hassan J. and some of his arab colleagues, were aggressive towards a number of workers and truck drivers. Notably a driver who had raised a US flag to Bern, in solidarity with the victims of September 11. They told him they were muslims and had to fight non-muslims. Similar altercations had taken place earlier this same week. Yvon L. reported that his deceased son Bernard, another TMG worker at AZF, had told him that he was afraid to go to work because "the arabs at the factory intended to destroy it" (AZFEA p.53).
On 20 Sept., in the midst of the Marché des Carmes and, an unidentified north african man threatened customers and shopkeepers, and shouted loudly that "tommorow, the whole world will hear of Toulouse" (AZFEA p.50).
On the morning of 21 sept., Hassan J. came to work at 4.30 am with Abder T. Unusually, he parked his car outside the factory. They trailed in their work, quarrels with workers and drivers followed immediately. The driver "Ali", already involved in disputes the previous days, told that they had loaded only ten sacks in his truck when he came at 5.30 (which was more than the previous day, when they had not begun until 6.30...). They almost came to blows. There were holes in their timetable. They were nowhere to be found on more than one occasion, sometimes for almost an hour. Hassan J. was heard telling distinct threats. He said that he was a "Turkish warrior", that this would be a memorable day, that he and his friends were going to destroy the whole factory and slaughter everybody. To a worker who had lighted a cigarette, he told this was of no use because everything was going to blow up. Retrospectively, this is certainly intriguing.

The handling of the crime scene displayed similar anomalies.
 
Hassan J. 's autopsy exhibited other anomalies : A.-M. Duget noted that while his torso and arms displayed burned spots (the autopsy at Rangueil hospital the following day established he displayed the most severe burns of all the bodies recovered near the B221), his t-shirt was intact, only a little dirty. There was no blood on it. Same for his trousers, as seen on photos from bith hospitals. Rescuers who found him reported he was deeply buried. Surprising as it may seem, this suggests that his t-shirt and trousers were changed before his body was sent to Purpan. Why ?
An another anomaly forensic experts could not explain : his eyes, normally brown, had become blue. Photos of him at Purpan and Rangueil hospitals confirm that. But curiously, the preliminary autopsy report at Purpan states they were dark. And mentions an absence of tatoos, in contrast to the body examined at Rangeuil.
http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societ ... 96902.html

But whose body was it exactly ? The preliminary autopsy depict his eyes as brown, and the absence of tatoos. There were curious fluctuations in the death toll and in the location of bodies around the crater. First counts inside the factory mentions 23 dead, 2 more than the definitive official estimate. It may look like a sign of confusion, but accounts were precise, detailing the whereabouts of each find. But the SRPJ and the AZF CHSCT (Comité hygiène, sécurité et conditions de travail) give two completely different locations for the bodies of five victims, including Hassan J. and Abder T. ( http://www.azf-10h18.com/PGR_ATTENTAT-VI.html ). This is confirmed by the testimonies of rescuers (AZFSE p.168-171). Hassan J. and Bernard L. were found (?) two times. Were the conflicting accounts used to conceal the identities of some of the deceased, the same name being given to different persons ?
Henry Farreny gives another motive of growing more suspicious. It relates to the use of the standard legal procedure followed by rescuers to handle the recovery of deceased persons. Among other things it regulates the relation firefighters-police officers. Judicial proceedings reveal the procedure... had been suspended. This was an order from the prefecture. This lasted at least for 3 hours. According to firefighters' colonel P. and Lt Col G., it resulted in the destabilisation of the identification process. Bodies were then unusually dispatched.

Except for commissionner Pierre Tristan, assistant to the departmental director to security, who came briefly at 11.00 am, police investigators were not allowed to come to the site until the mid-afternoon. Allowing any tampering with the crime scene. Notably to erase an unexplained dark slash in the ground, at least one hudred meters in lenght, going through a building to the edge of the crater. It was filmed by a gendarmerie helicopter around 1.45 PM. It was filled in later in the afternoon
http://www.azf-10h18.com/PGR_CRATERE-III.html (go to #2)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QVN8aHK2D-U


Hanry Farenny's article (long, but interesting ; translation will come progressively)

http://www.altermonde-levillage.com/spi ... rticle1283
http://www.altermonde-levillage.com/spi ... rticle1285

CATASTROPHE DE TOULOUSE :

POURQUOI TANT DE MYSTERES ?

par Henri Farreny

professeur à l’Institut National Polytechnique de Toulouse


Chacun se souvient de la catastrophe qui s’est produite dans la « Zone chimique Toulouse-sud » le 21/9/01, vers 10 H 17 : une trentaine de morts, des milliers de blessés, des dégâts matériels colossaux. Trois ans après, ni les circonstances de la catastrophe, ni les responsabilités afférentes, ne sont établies. La durée de l’instruction judiciaire, sans cesse prolongée, contraste avec la précipitation initiale de Michel Bréard, procureur de la République à Toulouse, qui dés le 24 septembre déclarait en conférence de presse (Le Monde, 28/9/01) : « Il y a 90 % de chances pour que ce soit un accident dû au fait que le stock de nitrate d’ammonium aurait été le siège d’un processus physique engagé depuis quatre-vingt ans, un processus long, complexe, qui a dû s’accélérer dans les jours qui ont précédé l’explosion ».

MYSTERES DE L’INFORMATION INITIALE

Le 21 septembre à 12 h, lors du premier direct réalisé par France 3 depuis le voisinage de la Zone chimique, le reporter Marc Degli indique : « Il semblerait que ce soit à la SNPE que s’est produite l’explosion ». Le journaliste Pierre Nicolas intervient en plateau : juste après la catastrophe, il s’est précipité avec un cameraman. Il commente les premières images de désolation, de douleur et de sang. Il témoigne de ce qu’il a entendu avant d’enfourcher sa moto : « deux explosions séparées de quelques secondes… cinq à six secondes ». Mais il n’a aucune information quant à la nature de ces explosions ni leurs localisations. Vers 12 h 15, Marc Degli revient en direct : « Les gendarmes ne savent pas encore où a eu lieu l’explosion, ni s’il s’agit d’un accident ou d’un attentat ».

Parole de secrétaire général de préfecture

A 15 h, sur France 3 toujours, le premier ministre Lionel Jospin affirme qu’il convient d’ « établir les causes : un accident ou autre chose ». Le secrétaire général de la préfecture de Haute-Garonne, Jean-Luc Marx, lui succède, net et précis : « Il s’agit d’une explosion sur le site de la Grande-Paroisse [c’est-à-dire l’usine AZF] : c’est une tour de fabrication qui a explosé ».
Depuis le 30/6/89, la gestion des risques majeurs relatifs à la Zone chimique Toulouse-sud est sous l’autorité suprême de la préfecture, via un Plan Particulier d’Intervention (PPI). Pour faire face à toute éventualité, une imposante salle de commandement, équipée de moyens ultra modernes, est prête 24 h sur 24. De là on peut communiquer directement avec les trois usines (AZF, SNPE et Tolochimie) et avec tous les services de police et de secours.
Ce 21/9/01 à 15 h, le secrétaire général a pris le parti d’être tranchant. Il a affirmé d’emblée qu’il s’agissait « d’une explosion » (« une » pas deux) et situé la cause : « une tour de fabrication qui a explosé » sur le site d’AZF. Le secrétaire général a ignoré les déclarations précédentes, sur la même chaîne, faisant état d’une explosion à la SNPE et de deux bruits d’explosions. Il n’a rien à dire quant à la formule primo-ministérielle : « accident ou autre chose ».
Pourtant, le secrétaire général est bien placé pour savoir ce que Marc Mennessier, ne sera en mesure de révéler que deux ans plus tard [Le Figaro, 20/9/03] : la SNPE était sous surveillance et « avertie d’un risque d’attentat » depuis au moins le 31/8/01, soit 2 semaines avant l’attentat de New-York. Le secrétaire général est bien placé pour savoir déjà ce que Marc Mennessier révèlera 33 mois plus tard [Le Figaro, 18/6/04] : la police a été informée la veille de la catastrophe qu’un Algérien « issu des milieux islamistes, spécialiste en explosifs » était arrivé à Toulouse pour « tâter le terrain » ; mais le PV de police n’a été porté à la connaissance du juge que le 10/6/04.
Trois ans après la catastrophe, ne serait-il pas opportun que le secrétaire lève le secret : comment furent décidés ses affirmations et ses silences de l’époque ?

Paroles de procureur de la République

On a lu en introduction la déclaration du procureur rapportée dans Le Monde du 28/9/01. Dans le journal de France 3, lundi soir 24, le procureur s’exprimait en des termes moins surréalistes mais aussi énigmatiquement péremptoires : « Les chances qu’il s’agisse d’un accident sont majoritaires et ne laissent que très peu de place à un acte de malveillance qui avait pu être envisagé au départ ». Il convient de souligner que le procureur, tout comme le secrétaire général, focalise a priori l’attention toute entière sur AZF ; dés le 21 septembre, il donne mission d’expertise en ces termes étrangement circonscrits : « Vu l’explosion s’étant déroulée le 21 septembre dans les locaux de la société AZF… requiert, Monsieur Daniel Van Schendel et Monsieur Dominique Deharo en vue de déterminer les causes et les origines de l’explosion s’étant déroulée le 21 septembre 2001 dans les entrepôts de la société AZF ».
Trois ans après la catastrophe, ne serait-il pas opportun que le procureur nous procure la clef de ce mystère : comment furent décidés ses affirmations, ses ordres et ses impasses de l’époque ?

Où « la police » et la préfecture ne perdent pas de temps

Moins d’une heure après la catastrophe les médias reçoivent la dépêche suivante : « Une seule explosion d’origine indéterminée a été recensée vendredi matin vers 10 h 15 à l’usine pétrochimique AZF… a déclaré la police » [AFP, 11 h 14]. Alors que les Toulousains sont encore en train de compter leurs abattis, voilà que « la police » trouve pertinent de communiquer à propos du nombre : « une seule explosion » et du lieu : « AZF »… Pourquoi ?
Aussitôt après la catastrophe, le site internet automatisé du Réseau National de Surveillance Sismique (RéNaSS) publie l’information suivante : à 10 h 17 mn 56 s, il s’est produit à Toulouse un séisme de magnitude 3,4 sur l’échelle de Richter. N. B. : l’épicentre ne peut être situé à moins d’un km près.
Le lundi 24/9/01, remarquable diligence, la Direction Régionale de l’Industrie, de la Recherche et de l’Environnement (DRIRE, service préfectoral) passe commande d’un rapport à un laboratoire de sismologie toulousain : l’Observatoire Midi-Pyrénées (OMP). Pourquoi cette commande d’État à un laboratoire universitaire, non chimiste, était-elle si urgente ? Pourquoi la commande n’émanait-t-elle pas de la Justice ? Qu’attendait le préfet de ce rapport ? Seul le préfet pourrait répondre… et ce n’est pas sûr. Voyons plutôt ce que contient ce rapport et à quoi il a servi.

Paroles de sismologues toulousains

L’OMP rend son rapport dés le 26 septembre. Remarquable célérité. Concernant l’origine des données, on apprend que le sismomètre « qui apporte les informations les plus importantes » est un « appareil au rebut, dont une des composantes était hors service », qu’il « n’était pas installé avec le soin requis pour des mesures sismologiques, en particulier, il n’était pas enterré, pas orienté, et pas relié à une base de temps de référence ». Puis, dans un style qui semble destiné à un usage médiatique, les auteurs se posent eux-mêmes (ou bien est-ce le préfet ?) la question suivante : « De nombreux témoignages relatent deux « bangs ». Peuvent-ils être dus à une explosion unique ? ». Et ils répondent : « Une explosion unique peut expliquer les deux « bangs » perçus par la population, en tenant compte de la propagation dans la Terre, et à condition que le délai entre les deux « bangs » augmente avec la distance à l’explosion, ce qui semble être le cas, d’après les témoignages recueillis. Si le délai entre les deux « bangs » ne variait pas avec la distance, il s’agirait de deux explosions distinctes. Dans ce cas la première explosion n’aurait pas été détectée par le sismographe de l’OMP-Toulouse à cause de sa trop faible énergie, ou de son faible couplage avec le sol ».

Fautes de méthode et de raisonnement

Le rapport de l’OMP comporte au moins deux graves erreurs de méthode.

1) Au moment où il est signé (26 septembre), les auteurs ne disposent pas de faits précis permettant d’affirmer que « le délai entre les deux « bangs » augmente avec la distance à l’explosion » ; ce 26 septembre, ils n’ont pas connaissance des enregistrements des deux « bangs », par divers magnétophones, qui apparaîtront plus tard ; à cette date, personne, n’a procédé à des reconstitutions sérieuses, consignées, vérifiables, avec des témoins disposant de repères temporels tangibles permettant de chiffrer les écarts observés » ; le rapport ne réfère à aucun recueil formalisé de témoignages, ; or, il s’avèrera que, contrairement aux présupposés, les délais observés entre les deux « bangs » n’augmentent pas « avec la distance à l’explosion » ! [voir encadré n° 1]

2) Le rapport ne comporte pas ce que les scientifiques appellent un état de l’art : il n’exhibe — et pour cause — aucun exemple académiquement attesté d’explosion unique engendrant deux « bangs » espacés de plusieurs secondes, entendus par de nombreuses personnes.

En outre, le rapport comporte au moins deux graves erreurs de raisonnement.

1) Au prétexte qu’une seule trace sismique a été recueillie, il est abusivement conjecturé qu’il n’y a eu qu’une explosion alors qu’il est patent que certaines explosions, malgré des effets destructifs considérables, ne sont pas détectées comme séismes [voir encadré n° 2].

Après cette conjecture arbitraire, le rapport propose un raisonnement par l’absurde : il s’agit de montrer que s’il s’était produit 2 explosions, on aurait dû faire tel constat, alors qu’on a fait un constat contraire. Mais ce raisonnement est raté de bout en bout ; en effet, il est affirmé que dans le cas de 2 explosions l’écart entre « bangs » doit être constant et comme il est présupposé (sans données sérieuses et finalement à tort) que l’écart « augmente avec la distance », il est conclu à l’unicité de l’explosion. En fait, le rapport préjuge, sans le dire, que les 2 explosions ne pouvaient se produire qu’en un même endroit (et ce en dépit des informations disponibles qui poussaient à considérer l’hypothèse de 2 explosions en des lieux distincts).

En définitive, le rapport a négligé d’envisager la question de bon sens, inéluctable, suivante : « Deux explosions en deux endroits distincts peuvent-elles expliquer les deux « bangs » perçus par la population ? ». La réponse est évidemment oui.

2) Lorsque l’idée est venue que le sismomètre pouvait ne pas avoir détecté une explosion parmi deux, le rapport a préjugé que l’explosion non détectée devait être « la première ». Il fallait envisager aussi que ce fusse la deuxième.
Et justement : on verra plus loin [voir encadré n° 3] comment Jean-Marie Arnaudiès, professeur de mathématiques, a prouvé que le séisme détecté à 10 h 17 mn 56 s par le RéNaSS correspondait à la première explosion, tandis que l’explosion du hangar 221 d’AZF ne s’est produite que 8 à 9 secondes plus tard et n’a pas été signalée comme séisme.

Le rapport de l’OMP apparaît donc comme dénué de valeur scientifique. Rappelons qu’il fut commandé par un service préfectoral, non par l’autorité judiciaire, et observons qu’il tend à valider le prompt avis préfectoral [15 h, France 3 : « une explosion »] et l’ultra précoce information de « la police » [11 h 56, AFP : « une seule explosion »].



[Encadré n° 1]
THESE DE L’EXPLOSION UNIQUE :
QUELQUES CONTRADICTIONS

Le rapport de l’OMP du 28/9/01, en retenant des vitesses moyennes de propagation du son de, respectivement, 340 m/s dans l’air et 2400 m/s dans le sol, estimait qu'à 500 m du cratère d’AZF, l’écart entre les deux bangs devait avoir été de1,3 s, 2,5 s à 1 km et 5 s à 2 km. Tout simplement parce que l’écart E, en secondes, s’exprime en fonction de la distance D, en mètres, par E = D/340 – D/2400 ? D/400.

Des témoins situés à moins de 500 m ont observé un écart bien supérieur au plafond de1,3 s annoncé par l’OMP. Par exemple, une dame était en voiture arrêtée à un feu rouge, à moins de 250 m du hangar 221. Elle a entendu un 1er bang, a démarré et parcouru un peu moins de 50 m, ce qui lui a pris environ 7,5 s (selon reconstitutions sur le lieu) avant de percevoir le bang énorme et l’onde de choc de l'explosion d'AZF. Par exemple encore, une employée d’AZF est en réunion à 50 m du hangar 221 (elle a survécu par miracle, son chef, l’ingénieur Mauzac, a été tué) ; après le 1er bang son chef a continué à lui parler pendant plusieurs secondes avant que parvienne, énorme, le 2ème bang.

A 4 km la thèse de l’OMP conduirait à un écart de 10 s et à 20 km de 50 s. Jean-Marie Arnaudiès a retrouvé 7 témoins qui 1) se trouvaient à plus de 20 km, 2) ont entendu les deux bangs et 3) ont accepté de déposer en Justice. Ni eux ni aucun autre témoin entendu n’estime à plus de 10 s l’écart entre les deux bangs. Entre moins de 10 s et plus de 50 s, ce ne sont pas les 7 témoignages qui sont à contester, c’est la thèse de l’OMP qui n’est pas pertinente.

L’OMP tablait sur des écarts entre les deux bangs croissant avec la distance par rapport au cratère d’AZF. Les témoignages humains précédents contredisent ce présupposé. Le tableau qui suit donne les écarts relevés sur 4 enregistrements audio de la catastrophe fournis au juge. Le rapport entre écart E et distance D porte aussi à contester la relation E ? D/400, donc la thèse de l’OMP.

Distance du magnétophone au cratère actuel Écart entre les deux bangs
? 2 700 m ? 10,3 s
? 3 300 m ? 7,7 s
? 3 800 m ? 8 s
? 4100 m ? 10,3 s


[Encadré n° 2]
MYSTÉRIEUX CRATERES

Le 9/3/04, en Espagne, près de Barracas, un camion transportant 25 t de nitrate d’ammonium est entré en collision avec une voiture, s’est renversé, a pris feu ; le gasoil s’est répandu sur le nitrate ; après demi-heure d’incendie, une explosion est survenue : 2 morts et 5 blessés. Un cratère s’est formé, d’environ 20 m de diamètre et 5 m de profondeur. Pas de trace sismique (sur les réseaux national et internationaux), pas de double bang signalé. A noter : huit jours plus tard, sur la même route espagnole (à quelques dizaines de kilomètres), un camion chargé de 22 t de nitrate d’ammonium (venant de France !) s’est renversé mais sans départ de feu, sans explosion.

Le 22/4/04, en Corée du Nord, à Ryongchon, 2 trains transportant des carburants, des combustibles et du nitrate d’ammonium sont entrés en collision ; un incendie se déclare qui conduit à une explosion : très nombreux morts (entre plusieurs centaines et plusieurs milliers, selon les sources). Un cratère s’est formé d’environ 100 m de diamètre et une vingtaine de m de profondeur. Ni trace sismique, ni double bang.

Le 24/5/04, en Roumanie, près de Mihailesti, un camion transportant 20 t de nitrate d’ammonium s’est renversé ; après demi-heure d’incendie, une violente explosion est survenue : 18 morts et 10 blessés. Un cratère s’est formé d’environ 15 m de diamètre et 10 m de profondeur. Ni trace sismique, ni double bang.

Le 30/7/04, en Belgique, à Ghislenghien, un gazoduc explose :16 morts, 125 blessés. Un cratère s’est formé d’environ 10 m de diamètre et 4 m de profondeur. Ni trace sismique, ni double bang.

A Barracas, Ryongchon, Mihailesti, du nitrate d’ammonium a explosé mais en présence d’hydrocarbures et après de relativement longs et violents incendies. A Barracas, Ryongchon, Mihailesti, Ghislenghien : un cratère, pas de trace sismique, un seul bang. A Toulouse : un cratère, pas d’hydrocarbures, pas d’incendie préalable, une trace sismique mais deux bangs. L’exception toulousaine ?

Une conclusion certaine : des explosions peuvent creuser des cratères importants sans trace sismique notable et sans double bang, alors qu’à Toulouse, des experts ont préjugé que le cratère AZF correspondait à l’unique trace sismique retenue par l’OMP. Et même, se sont acharnés à associer ce cratère et les deux bangs.

On démontrera plus loin [encadré n° 3] que le cratère d’AZF ne peut être l’épicentre du séisme repéré par l’OMP et que seul le 2ème bang a été engendré par l’explosion d’AZF, Après analyses donc, de cepoint de vue, le cratère toulousain ne diffère pas des cratères espagnol, coréen, roumain et belge. Voilà un mystère de moins.

Reste une question légitime : une explosion qui laisse une trace sismique de 3,4 sur l’échelle de Richter peut-elle ne pas creuser de cratère ? La réponse est oui : par exemple une explosion souterraine.
Et une précaution tout de même : qui peut garantir, au vu des anomalies de la gestion de crise et des retards de l’enquête, qu’il n’y a pas eu de cratère causé par la 1ère explosion, aussitôt comblé ?


Mauvais rapport, bonne diffusion

Le 1/10/01, une technicienne de l’OMP a cru bon de diffuser sur internet, à titre personnel mais avec adresse d’origine dans le campus scientifique, l’avis suivant : « Subject: explosion de l'usine AZF: conclusions des analyses sismologiques :- les multiples pics… s'expliquent parfaitement par des phenomenes de propagation dans la croute et le manteau d'ondes rayonnees par une source unique.- le second pic… est probablement du a une réfraction… Il n'a rien a voir avec une hypothetique seconde explosion.- les deux "bangs" entendus par de nombreux temoins peuvent s'expliquer avec une explosion unique: le premier correspondrait a l'onde P (premiere arrivee) , transmise par le sol (et donc "entendue" par les pieds), et le second a l'onde acoustique aerienne. ».

Ce message a beaucoup circulé. A l’heure où j’écris ces lignes (27/8/04) on pouvait encore le trouver intégralement recopié, sans aucune considération critique, sur l’unique site internet de l’association « Plus Jamais Çà »
[http://perso.wanadoo.fr/plusjamaiscacroixdepierre/Index.html],
association qui a joué un grand rôle dans la canalisation de la colère des Toulousains.

Ce rapport OMP a objectivement facilité la mise sur orbite de la thèse de l’explosion unique. Survenue au hangar 221 d’AZF bien sûr. Car, si l’explosion était unique, chacun pouvait inférer, stimulé par certains médias peu regardants, qu’elle avait eu lieu à « Grande Paroisse » puisque là, à la place du hangar 221, béait un vaste cratère.


[Encadré n° 3]
QUELQUES PREUVES
DE L’OCCURRENCE DE DEUX EXPLOSIONS
— AVEC DATATIONS —

Les datations ci-après sont en temps local légal. Les preuves originales, plus circonstanciées, sont dues à Jean-Marie Arnaudiès.
Les partisans de la « thèse de l’explosion unique » (comprendre : à AZF, avec trace sismique, avec 1er bang « entendu.par les pieds » et 2ème par voie classique) estiment que cette explosion a eu lieu à une heure H = 10 h 17 mn 56 s (nous ne précisons pas les fractions de seconde : c’est sans conséquence quant à la justesse des raisonnements présentés ci-après). D’où tirent-ils H ? Ils adoptent l’heure associée à la trace sismique unique signalée par le RéNaSS : c’est cohérent avec leurs présupposés.

Constat à la SETMI
Selon EDF, l’usine SETMI a été privée de courant à 10 h 17 mn 56 s et une fraction de seconde, c’est-à-dire environ à l’heure H.
Instantanément un voyant s’est allumé. Le directeur a alors accompli une suite précise d’actions. Le juge a fait procéder à des reconstitutions. Il apparaît que le directeur a perçu le 1er bang environ 9 s après l’allumage du voyant, et le 2ème environ 7 s après le 1er. Donc il a perçu le 2ème bang à environ 10 h 18 mn 12 s.
Selon la « thèse de l’explosion unique », le 2ème bang marque l’arrivée à la SETMI du son émis par l’explosion d’AZF. Or il n’a fallu qu’un peu plus de 7 s pour que le son parcoure (à environ 340 m/s) les 2 500 m environ qui séparent le cratère AZF de la SETMI. Donc l’explosion d’AZF a eu lieu à l’heure 10 h 18 mn 12 s diminuée d’un peu plus de 7 s c’est-à-dire un peu avant 10 h 18 mn 5 s. L’écart très grand — de l’ordre de 9 s — entre H et 10 h 18 mn 5 s assure la validité du schéma de raisonnement présenté ici, en dépit des fractions de secondes négligées.
Autrement dit : l’explosion d’AZF a eu lieu entre 8 et 9 s après l’heure H. Donc le séisme constaté par le RéNaSS, à l’heure H, de magnitude 3,4, doit être associé à une autre explosion survenue avant celle d’AZF. La proposition « l’explosion fut unique » est donc fausse.
Donc, il était incorrect d’attacher la trace sismique à l’explosion d’AZF.
Si les 2 explosions avaient eu lieu au même endroit, le délai entre l’allumage du voyant et la perception du 1er bang eut été aussi d’un peu plus de 7 s. En fait, la 1ère explosion a eu lieu à 3 100 m de la SETMI (distance parcourue par le son en 9 s).

Constats via le téléphone
Le juge dispose de témoignages accompagnés de relevés de France-Télécom qui permettent d’établir aussi que l’explosion d’AZF a eu lieu 8 à 9 s après l’heure H.
Par exemple, un témoin a raccroché « plusieurs secondes » après avoir entendu le 1er bang et « 3 à 4 s » avant d’entendre le 2ème ; la coupure est enregistrée à 10 h 18 mn 2 s ; comme il se trouvait à un peu plus de 300 m du cratère actuel, le son du 2ème bang n’a mis qu’environ 1 s à lui parvenir (bien moins que « 3 à 4 s ») ; donc il avait raccroché avant l’explosion d’AZF ; donc celle-ci a eu lieu sans aucun doute après 10 h 18 mn 2 s et non à l’heure H. Plus finement : la 2ème explosion a eu lieu environ 2 à 3 s après 10 h 18 mn 2 s, soit entre 10 h 18 mn 4 s et 10 h 18 mn 5 s. En outre, la théorie de l’OMP ne peut expliquer qu’à 300 m du cratère l’écart entre les deux bangs soit de « plusieurs secondes » augmentées de « 3 à 4 s ».

Constat sans témoignage humain
Selon EDF-RTE, un câble d’une ligne électrique aérienne s’est rompu à 10 h 18 mn 7 s, soit environ 11 s après l’heure H. Or le point de rupture est environ à 200 m du cratère actuel. Est-ce un projectile issu de l’explosion du hangar 221 qui a coupé le câble ? Dans ce cas un calcul balistique montre qu’il a fallu de l’ordre de 2s pour qu’un projectile vienne frapper le câble ; donc l’explosion du hangar aurait eu lieu à 10 h 18 mn 7 s moins 2 s, soit à : 10 h 18 mn 5 s.

Ainsi, par trois voies indépendantes, on trouve que l’explosion d’AZF n’a pas eu lieu au moment du séisme détecté par le RéNaSS (heure H) mais 8 à 9 s plus tard.

Paroles d’experts

Le rapport de l’OMP, quoique dénué de valeur scientifique, a servi de fondation aux « premières conclusions d’étape » enfin rendues le 5/6/02 par trois experts (Daniel Van Schendel, Dominique Deharo, Jean-Luc Geronimi). Ces conclusions débutent ainsi : « La catastrophe industrielle survenue le 21 septembre 2001 sur le site AZF résulte d’une seule explosion ». Les experts n’étayent aucunement cette affirmation. Après quatre pages de considérations superficielles, ils se contentent de recopier, sous le titre : « Effet sonore et acoustique », le passage du rapport de l’OMP que nous avons présenté plus haut et dont nous avons mis en évidence les principales fautes de méthode et de raisonnement. Les experts, sans citer le rapport OMP du 26/9/01, recopient mot pour mot, faute pour faute. Ils écrivent donc aussi : « à condition que le délai entre les deux « bangs » augmente avec la distance à l’explosion. Ceci semble être le cas avec les témoignages recueillis ». Sur quels « témoignages recueillis » s’appuient les experts ? Ils ne le disent pas. Le 6/2/03, la directrice de l’OMP expliquera qu’elle s’est contentée d’interroger des personnes de son entourage et qu’elle en a « déduit qu’il y avait des présomptions pour que les deux bangs lorsqu’on était à plus d’un ou deux kilomètres soient effectivement le signal sismologique et le signal acoustique. Lorsqu’on était moins loin c’était confus ».

A signaler : le rapport de l’OMP a servi de base pour un Compte-Rendu à l’Académie des Sciences, hâtivement publié en mars 2002, dans lequel l’ « appareil au rebut, dont une des composantes était hors service » est devenu « un appareil en test ».

Que penser d’experts qui plagient un rapport léger, écrit quelques jours après la catastrophe, pour constituer leurs « premières conclusions d’étape » 8 mois plus tard ? A signaler : ils donnent 4,3 pour magnitude du séisme détecté par le RéNaSS, au lieu de 3,4 (l’échelle de Richter étant logarithmique cette erreur est très importante).

Les conséquences tirées de ces tardives « premières conclusions d’étape » sont graves. Ayant proclamé qu’il n’y avait qu’une explosion, les experts en sont venus à imaginer un nouveau scénario (voir paragraphe suivant). Une semaine après sa communication au juge, 13 personnes sont mises en examen. La suite confirmera que ces mesures étaient non fondées. Les experts ne parvenant pas à étayer leur scénario, le juge prononce, le 15/9/03 puis le 8/7/04, 11 non-lieux malgré l’opposition farouche du procureur. Au 27/8/04, il restait deux mis en examen.


[Encadré n° 4]
UN ELEGANT RAISONNEMENT GEOMETRIQUE
POUR SITUER LA 1ERE EXPLOSION

Le juge dispose de plusieurs enregistrements audio des deux bangs. On peut donc connaître avec une assez bonne précision l’écart entre les deux bangs perçus en différents lieux. Dés décembre 2001, Jean-Marie Arnaudiès, professeur de mathématiques a proposé d’appliquer un raisonnement géométrique qui, connaissant les écarts E1 et E2, perçus en deux lieux L1 et L2, le site A de la 2ème explosion (cratère AZF), la vitesse du son V, détermine que le site X de l’autre explosion appartient à une branche d’hyperbole dont les foyers sont L1 et L2.

On peut avoir une très bonne précision sur les coordonnées de L1, L2 et A. Plus difficilement sur V, E1 et E2. L’imprécision amène à considérer un faisceau d’hyperboles (comme une hyperbole dont le trait serait épais).
A partir d’un 2ème couple de lieux de perception, on obtient un 2ème arc d’hyperbole,. L’intersection, si elle existe, de ces deux arcs détermine le site X. Le choix (autant que faire se peut) des couples de lieux de perception influe sur la précision du résultat.

Avec les données dont il disposait, Jean-Marie Arnaudiès a circonscrit une zone d’un à deux hectares, à l’Est du territoire d’AZF. Naturellement il appartient à la Justice de prendre les moyens pour conférer à ce raisonnement une efficacité maximale.

Jean-Marie Arnaudiès a démontré que toutes choses étant égales par ailleurs, on obtient le même arc d’hyperbole en considérant que la vitesse du son varie d’une quelconque manière au début de sa propagation (jusqu’à un seuil inférieur aux 2 distances entre l’émission et les 2 récepteurs).
L’arc d’hyperbole change, légèrement, si on prend en compte le vecteur de la vitesse du vent le 21 septembre.

La zone circonscrite reste à l’Est d’AZF.

Les hyperboles sont des courbes socialement utiles, qu’on se le dise ! Pour les lecteurs aimant, étudiant, pratiquant, ou enseignant les mathématiques (voire les quatre), voici une formulation plus précise.

On note tA la date (connue ou non, peu importera) de la 2ème explosion (en A), tX la date (connue ou non) de la 1ère explosion (en X), E1 l’écart entre les 2 bangs perçus en L1, E2 l’écart perçu en L2. On note AL1 la distance entre A et L1, de même XL1, AL2 et XL2.

En L1, la date de perception du 1er bang est tX + XL1/V ; celle du 2ème bang est tA + AL1/V. Donc E1 = tA – tX + (AL1 – XL1)/V. De même : E2 = tA – tX + (AL2 – XL2)/V. D’où E1 – E2 = (AL1 – AL2)/V + (XL1 – XL2)/V. On voit que tA et tX ont disparu ! Il vient : XL2 – XL1 = V.(E1 – E2) + AL2 – AL1. Le 2ème membre est une constante, disons k. Le lieu géométrique des points X dont la différence des distances XL2 – XL1 à deux points fixés L2 et L1 vaut k est une branche d’hyperbole de foyers L2 et L1.


Souvent experts varient… et journalistes suivent

Le 28/9/01 Daniel Van Schendel et Dominique Deharo remettent une « note expertale » de 12 pages. Les décombres fument encore mais déjà ces experts affirment, sans preuve, que : « L’épicentre de l’explosion se situe au milieu du tas formé dans ce bâtiment 221… la totalité du tas entreposé a pris le régime explosif ». Ces deux assertions se révèleront fausses. Toujours sans conditionnel, ils assurent que : « Le nitrate d’ammonium a été mis au contact de corps organiques (fuel, huiles, matières plastiques), d’oxyde de fer, de chlore et de végétaux, sans compter ce qui a pu migrer par la terre, voire par infiltration par la nappe phréatique tout [si¢] proche ». Ils déclarent que « le cas de l’acte volontaire a été, et même en premier lieu, envisagé » mais « cette hypothèse s’est toutefois écartée d’elle-même au fur et à mesure de l’avancement de nos travaux, de nos découvertes et de ce que nous avions établi au niveau du cratère et de la cohérence avec le milieu de l’entreposage ». Ils assurent que : « le tas de nitrate d’ammonium n’aurait pu exploser que s’il avait été amorcé très correctement en plusieurs endroits et à cœur » ce qui nécessite « de la part de l’opérateur ou du concepteur de très bonnes connaissances en matière d’explosif » et « quinze à vingt minutes ». Et ils terminent par : « A ce jour, de nos exploitations et interprétations, l’explosion découle d’une origine accidentelle, liée aux mauvaises conditions de stockage et à l’hétérogénéité du nitrate d’ammonium entreposé ». Donc, en moins d’une semaine, les experts considèrent qu’il n’y a plus lieu à enquêter sur un « acte volontaire », car la difficulté d’amorçage serait plus élevée que dans le cas d’une pollution accidentelle ?

La Dépêche du Midi, unique quotidien de la région toulousaine, soutient la thèse initiale des experts pendant trois mois. Le 21/12/01, elle explique encore : « Nouvelle confirmation de la thèse évoquée dés le départ par les experts judiciaires indépendants [voir encadré n° 5]. Celle d’une « auto-inflammation » du tas de nitrate… A l ‘épicentre de l’explosion précisément localisé à ras-de-terre, sous les 300 t de nitrate, des traces de soufre ont été découvertes dans un sous-sol saturé d’humidité et oxydé par le ferraillage des armatures en béton. Du soufre mais aussi du chlore, des hydrocarbures et des pollutions organiques diverses qui ont été autant d’ingrédients pour une « soupe chimique » explosive ».

Mais, ne pouvant étayer leur affirmation initiale (« auto-inflammation »), les experts, sans reconnaître leur échec, échafaudent une nouvelle thèse. Aussitôt relayée par La Dépêche et d’autres.

Le 27/12/01, le Nouvel Observateur réussit un scoop : « Les enquêteurs ont pu établir que du chlore, sans doute provenant des laboratoires de la société AZF, a été chargé sur le site dans des bennes ». Certes, c’est grande pitié que dans un hebdomadaire aussi cultivé on confonde l’élément chlore, gazeux à pression atmosphérique normale, avec un composé chimique contenant du chlore et se présentant sous forme solide, donc pouvant être « chargé dans des bennes »...
Le 29/12/02, La Dépêche emboîte le pas : « Une demi-heure avant la déflagration, une benne contenant probablement du chlore, avait été déversée dans le sas d’entrée du bâtiment 221 ». Et précise : « La semaine dernière, les deux experts ont fait un rapport d’étape aux juges d’instruction… Un simple compte-rendu oral. Pour l’instant, ils n’ont pas écrit une ligne ». Alors que Le Nouvel Observateur avait prétendu que : « Les deux juges d’instruction chargés du dossier ont, depuis mardi 18 décembre, entre les mains, un nouveau rapport d’étape, dressé par les enquêteurs du SRPJ et les experts judiciaires ».
« Entre les mains » un « compte-rendu oral » ?

En fait, les experts mettront encore près de six mois à coucher sur papier leurs « premières conclusions d’étape ». A la fin des 13 pages rendues le 5/6/02, quelques lignes leur suffiront pour exposer ce nouveau scénario (qui va fonder les mises en examen 6 jours plus tard) : « versement accidentel, environ 15 minutes avant l’explosion, dans le sas et sur un tas d’une dizaine de tonnes de nitrate d’ammonium industriel, d’une benne blanche contenant au moins 500 kg d’un produit non identifié, pouvant être du DCCNA ».

En toute logique, la nouvelle thèse des experts aurait dû relancer l’attention pour la piste de la malveillance tout autant que pour la piste de l’accident. Car s’il suffisait que du DCCNA soit déversé sur le nitrate pour le faire exploser, ne devait-on pas envisager autant un déversement volontaire de DCCNA qu’involontaire ? En toute incohérence, le procureur déclare le 16/1/02, lors de la rentrée judiciaire à Toulouse : « Je maintiens, persiste et signe : la thèse de l’attentat, de la malveillance, qui n’a été corroborée par aucun élément objectif de l’enquête judiciaire, n’est plus du tout d’actualité, elle ne résiste pas à la logique pas plus qu’au travail des experts ».

Or s’il est vrai qu’il a été trouvé un sac plastique vide étiqueté DCCNA,

1) l’employé chargé d’approvisionner le hangar 221 a toujours nié y avoir amené autre chose que du nitrate d’ammonium,

2) les tentatives de reconstitution des 9/10/02 et 11/10/02, ont prouvé qu’il était impossible de déverser du DCCNA sans provoquer un dégagement gazeux suffocant,

3) il a été impossible en laboratoire de faire exploser du nitrate d’ammonium en y déversant du DCCNA dans les conditions physiques qui existaient au hangar 221.


[Encadré n° 5]
DES EXPERTS INDEPENDANTS ?

Dés le 28/9/01 les deux premiers experts désignés (noter : par le procureur, le 21/9/01), MM. Daniel Van Schendel et Dominique Deharo, signent une « note expertale » choquante par ses préjugés et ses lacunes.

Qui sont ces experts capables de délimiter le champ d’étude, si précisément, si vite ? Mais qui ne portent aucune attention aux événements concernant la SNPE ni aux carences préfectorales (qui pourraient pourtant aider à « déterminer les causes et les origines de l’explosion s’étant déroulée le 21 septembre 2001 dans les entrepôts de la société AZF ») ?

Ne pas rester au fond du cratère

Dominique Deharo est responsable de la section Explosion Incendie au Laboratoire de Police Scientifique à Toulouse. Ce statut assure-t-il qu’il soit indépendant de la SNPE ou de la préfecture ?

En sa qualité de responsable à la Police Scientifique, ne devait-il pas, entre autres, plaider immédiatement pour la collecte systématique de tous les témoignages sur les évènements et leur chronologie (témoignages humains mais aussi enregistrements audio, vidéo, électriques, téléphoniques, sismiques, informatiques…) dans toute la Zone chimique ? La « note expertale » ne reflète en rien une telle préoccupation.

Leurres et écrans de fumée

Dans le cadre de l’enquête, Daniel Van Schendel se présente comme Expert près la Cour d’Appel de Toulouse, en Incendie-Explosion. Il a aussi longtemps exercé comme. Directeur du Laboratoire d’Essais de la société Lacroix,. Dans le Journal Officiel [n° 2 du 4/1/00, page 14] on lit que, par arrêté du 23/12/99, les ministres de l’intérieur et de l’économie ont nommé comme membre d’une « commission technique relative aux artifices de divertissement » au titre de « représentant des fabricants », « M. Van Schendel (Daniel), société Lacroix-Ruggieri ». Il a occupé ce poste jusqu’au 10/7/03.

Lacroix-Ruggieri ne vit pas que de pétards festifs.
En 1999, son chiffre d’affaires se répartissait comme suit : un tiers pour « les feux d’artifice », plus de la moitié pour « la défense civile et militaire », le reste pour « l’industrie ».
Selon Éric Dourel [l’Humanité, 22/1/00], elle est « fournisseur officiel de l'armée française dans la fabrication des leurres et écrans de fumée, indétectables aux radars et aux infrarouges. Virtuose dans les procédés de camouflage d'avions, bateaux et chars d'assaut, elle a mis au point toute une série de systèmes de défense très rentables… ».
Le 21/12/99, la SNPE vend à Lacroix-Ruggieri « l’activité contre-mesures », avec brevets, matériels, logiciels. Cette opération place Lacroix-Ruggieri « en position de monopole dans la production de leurres pour la défense militaire ».

Les fonctions occupées par Daniel Van Schendel assurent-elles qu’il soit indépendant de la SNPE ou de la préfecture? Il est permis de s’interroger.

Par ailleurs, est-il bien convenable qu’un expert judiciaire, propose au juge d’instruction pour lequel il enquête, de recourir aux prestations de la société dont il est l’un des hauts cadres ?


Paroles d’inspecteurs généraux de l’environnement

Au lendemain de la catastrophe, le ministre de l’environnement a chargé l’Inspection Générale de l’Environnement (IGE) d’enquêter. Le 24/10/01, l’IGE a rendu un épais rapport [disponible via : http://www1.environnement.gouv.fr].
Il y est affirmé : « La SNPE a subi des dégâts notables dans ses installations générales… toutefois aucune installation technique n’a été endommagée, aucune fuite ne s’est produite ».
« Aucune fuite » ? C’est plausible. Mais «aucune installation technique endommagée » ?
J’ai visité la SNPE le 23/10/01 puis le 17/11/01.
Malgré la grande réticence du directeur à permettre l’accès à certains secteurs, j’ai pu constater que l’enceinte qui assure le double confinement des 5 cuves de phosgène avait été « déchirée » (expression du directeur) par l’onde de choc. Elle était encore en réparation plus d’un mois après la catastrophe.
L’atelier de phosgénation était gravement endommagé. La cheminée haute de 85 m qui surplombe cet atelier et l’enceinte des cuves avait perdu ses paratonnerres et balises pour avions. Pendant plusieurs mois l’usine a continué à être survolée par un tiers du trafic aérien toulousain, sans que ces balises soient replacées (ni les paratonnerres). Pourquoi ?
J’ai appris — mais en janvier 2004 seulement, malgré ma curiosité — que le chemisage intérieur de la cheminée était fissuré sur plusieurs dizaines de m. N’a-t-on pas risqué une chute sur les cuves, le 21 septembre et après (ce qu’on appelle un suraccident) ? Qui était au courant ?
En outre, les portes de l’enceinte de confinement réservée au dépotage des wagons de chlore avaient été soufflées. L’énorme cuve de méthanol (1500 m3) a été gravement abîmée.
De tout cela le rapport IGE ne dit mot.
Par contre, il se félicite « d’une façon de faire [à la SNPE] qui tient aux précautions appliquées aux poudres et explosifs. Elle tient en trois principes : le fractionnement, le cloisonnement et la surabondance de sécurités. ».
Et pousuit : « On peut noter par exemple que les réservoirs de phosgène du site sont fractionnés, enterrées [sic] et confinées [sic]. Ils ont pu résister à une agression majeure comme celle du 21 septembre… On notera aussi, que la canalisation de phosgène, à double paroi traverse le bras inférieur de la Garonne sur une passerelle parasismique et que sa sécurité de fermeture aux vibrations a fonctionné le 21 septembre. ».
Non : les 5 cuves de phosgène n’étaient pas « enterrées ». Ni séparées : elles étaient côte à côte (4 cuves de 10 t, 1 vide), dans la même petite enceinte légère, « déchirée » lors de la catastrophe. L’IGE ne semble pas au courant.
La SNPE disposait en outre d’un stock de conteneurs et bouteilles (144 t de phosgène autorisées sous cette forme) que l’IGE ne mentionne pas ; le 23/10/01, j’ai compté une soixantaine de conteneurs (950 kg chacun) comme d’habitude couchés sur le sol, en plein air, aucunement enterrés. Je n’ai pu m’en approcher. Le percement d’un seul de ces conteneurs pouvait entraîner la mort de milliers de personnes ; à titre indicatif, eu égard aux concentrations mortelles, on peut dire que le phosgène est 10 fois plus toxique que le chlore, ou 100 fois plus toxique que le gaz ammoniac.
L’IGE ignore la longueur de « la canalisation de phosgène » (1,7 km, donc très exposée) ; et qu’elle a reçu des projectiles : le cordon-capteur de vibrations a été sectionné. L’IGE le sait-elle lorsqu’elle affirme que la « sécurité de fermeture aux vibrations a fonctionné » ?.

Trois ans après, peut-on espérer que l’IGE ré-inspecte son propre travail ?

Paroles de responsables de la SNPE

Donc, le 24/10/01, le rapport IGE a affirmé que la « sécurité de fermeture aux vibrations a fonctionné ». Le 28/11/01, Bernard Fontana, directeur général adjoint du groupe SNPE, accompagné de Daniel Surroca, directeur industriel SNPE-chimie fine, confirme devant la Commission parlementaire d’enquête [voir http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr] : « Les mécanismes prévus ont parfaitement fonctionné, en particulier le « pipe » qui relie la SNPE à Tolochimie… Ce « pipe » a été fermé par un automatisme déclenché par une détection de vibrations… C'est une des sécurités prévues. Ainsi, si cette sécurité n'avait pas fonctionné, il se serait fermé par défaut d'alimentation électrique ».

Le 3/1/02, dans La Dépêche du Midi, Jean-Louis Galamel rapporte qu’ « une secousse tellurique… aurait eu pour effet d’activer les clapets de sécurité sur les vannes de phosgène de la SNPE voisine [d’AZF] trois secondes avant l’explosion [d’AZF] ».

La SNPE, qui a l’habitude de contrecarrer toute information qui pourrait lui nuire [voir http://www.snpe.fr/fr/recherche], ne réagit pas à l’article, si précis, de La Dépêche. Ni, au rapport, à caractère officiel, de l’IGE. Ni au rapport de la Commission parlementaire ; alors que chaque transcription a été soumise, pour validation, à chacune des personnes auditionnées.

Dix huit mois après la catastrophe, Daniel Surroca est entendu par le juge. C’est un grand technicien et un cadre expérimenté de la maison. Sa fonction du moment est « directeur de la SNPE-Toulouse ». Son audition est très attendue car la SNPE doit fournir, enfin, des documents concernant la chronologie des évènements. Malencontreusement, dans cette grande usine dont l’IGE a dit tant de bien, beaucoup de mémoires informatiques ont disparu, soit qu’elles aient été détruites notamment par « coupure électrique » lors de la catastrophe, soit que par la suite les appareils supportant ces mémoires sont tombés en panne ou ont été « recyclés ». Il ne reste aucune trace, sur papier ou informatique, du fonctionnement des protections du « pipe . Du fait des coupures électriques le personnel n’a pu rien voir sur les écrans. Les documents de suivi des lots de phosgène, pour le 21/9/01 ont été détruits. Cependant, on dispose d’une copie d’écran, capturée à Tolochimie qui indique que la dernière livraison de phosgène aurait eu lieu à… 7 h 53, soit 2 h et demie plus tôt que ne l’avait déclaré Bernard Fontana. Le directeur explique que les informations émanant de la SNPE ont été mal comprises ou déformées. Par le journaliste, les inspecteurs IGE, les parlementaires ? Doit-on prendre ce propos de Daniel Surroca pour argent comptant ?

Si oui, comment expliquer la cohérence entre La Dépêche, l’IGE, la Commission et la passivité de la SNPE pendant un an et demi ?

Et si non ? Quel mobile ? Dissimuler que le séisme (dont la date aurait pu être enregistrée par le détecteur de vibrations) a eu lieu plusieurs secondes avant l’onde de choc (éventuellement datée par un autre dispositif, par exemple réagissant à la coupure d’alimentation) ? Ou bien, « simplement », dissimuler que la canalisation de phosgène n’a pas été fermée et qu’un grave danger a été encouru ?


MYSTERES DE LA GESTION DE CRISE

Trop peu d’attention a été portée aux carences et anomalies concernant l’alerte du 21/9/01, les mauvaises conditions de mobilisation des services de secours, les mesures de sécurisation trop circonscrites. Toutes les citations d’officiers présentées ci-après sont tirées des rapports d’intervention remis en janvier 2003 au juge par des responsables de sapeurs-pompiers.

Pourquoi tant de retard à appliquer le PPI ?

Entre le 30/6/89, date de sa promulgation, et le 21/9/01, le Plan Particulier d’Intervention de la Zone chimique Toulouse-sud (PPI) avait fait l’objet de plusieurs centaines de réunions de travail, notamment avec des représentants des 3 usines (AZF, SNPE, Tolochimie), de la préfecture, des services d’ordre et de secours. Le PPI stipulait qu’en cas de sinistre dans la Zone, menaçant le voisinage, il était du devoir de n’importe lequel des 3 directeurs de déclencher illico les sirènes PPI ; il était du devoir de la préfecture d’appeler immédiatement la population au confinement et lancer le PPI.

Selon le colonel P. : « Dès 10 h 24, la salle opérationnelle de la préfecture est activée… à 10 h 42, la demande de déclenchement des sirènes PPI est effectuée - le PPI est déclenché, à 11 h 15, les mesures de confinement sont demandées ». Une demi-heure pour demander le déclenchement des sirènes et lancer le PPI lui-même, près d’une heure pour appeler au confinement (avec un vent de 7 m/s, où en était la diffusion des fumées au bout d’une heure ?)…

Qu’est-ce qui a retardé (fait hésiter peut-être) la préfecture (voire le gouvernement) et les directions des 3 usines ?

Pourquoi le procureur n’a-t-il pas encore diligenté une enquête à ce sujet ?

Qu’ont su exactement les pompiers accourus à la SNPE ?

Le commandant H. évoque son « arrivée devant l’entrée de la SNPE où l’un des cadres de l’usine nous indique que l’explosion provient bien de la SNPE ». Quel est ce cadre « de l’usine » ? A-t-il été entendu ? Pas à ma connaissance. Le commandant ne consacre pas une ligne à expliquer ce qu’il a su ensuite (confirmation/infirmation) de cette « explosion [qui] provient bien de la SNPE ». Pourquoi ?

Le colonel P. rapporte : « Dès que la secousse sismique et le double bruit d’explosion sont ressentis, le directeur… l’adjoint opérations… le commandant de la compagnie de Toulouse… se rendent au CTA nord… SNPE : 4 officiers sur place dont deux dans les 20 minutes… L’action consiste à faire le tri des blessés, à organiser leur évacuation… à l’exception de 10 cadres et ouvriers restés sur place pour sécuriser le site. Cette évacuation sera décidée suite à une information donnée par un cadre de l’usine indiquant une possibilité d’explosion. Une fois l’évacuation terminée, le capitaine T. reste à la SNPE afin d’assurer la liaison industriel sapeurs-pompiers pour tout problème d’évolution de la situation et de sécurisation du site ». Quel est ce « cadre de l’usine » qui a indiqué « une possibilité d’explosion » ? A-t-il été entendu ? Pas à ma connaissance. Le colonel n’approfondit pas. Pourquoi ?

Pourquoi les pompiers n’ont-ils pu pleinement inspecter la SNPE ?

Le capitaine T. précise : « Entre 10 h 25 et 10 h 30 : départ vers SNPE (lieu présumé du sinistre). Arrivée à la SNPE vers 10 h 50 — 11 h 00. Prise de contact avec officiers présents sur place ». Mais le capitaine ne dit rien de ce qu’il a fait, vu, su à la SNPE. Pourquoi ?

Le colonel P. explique : « La sectorisation géographique a consisté à considérer deux grands secteurs, l’un regroupant les installations situées à l’intérieur de la limite de propriété d’AZF, l’autre à l’extérieur, englobant le tissu urbain de proximité… L’activité chimique ne s’appliquait que sur le secteur AZF ». La sécurisation de la SNPE n’est aucunement considérée alors que c’est là que se trouvent les stockages de très loin les plus dangereux : ceux du phosgène (outre du chlore, des perchlorates, etc.). Pourquoi ?

Le commandant F., principal expert en « Risques Technologiques » parmi les secours intervenant, raconte : « Deux explosions ressenties à la faculté Paul Sabatier de Toulouse où je donne des cours de sécurité industrielle… J’essaie de rejoindre la SNPE en traversant la passerelle reliant les deux établissements. Deux pipe-lines empruntent cette passerelle : celui du phosgène et celui de l’hydrogène. La protection anti-intrusion m’empêche d’atteindre la SNPE ». Finalement, le commandant-expert ne mettra pas les pieds à la SNPE. Pourquoi ? Il ne fait aucun commentaire à ce sujet. Pourquoi ?

On a vu précédemment que les installations techniques de la SNPE avaient subi de graves dégâts. Et que les risques de « suraccident » méritaient considération. Pourquoi les pompiers ne sont-ils pas venus en force à la SNPE pour la passer au peigne fin ?

Pourquoi la procédure de gestion des personnes décédées
a-t-elle été changée ?

Le colonel P. insiste sur « un problème de gestion des décédés qui… a déstabilisé la chaîne des secours. Il s’agit d’un changement de la procédure médico-légale en cours d’intervention… Un ordre est venu, identifié comme provenant de la salle opérationnelle préfecture, demandant de laisser les corps sur place. L’effet a été une déstabilisation immédiate des relations sapeurs-pompiers — officiers de police judiciaire liée à une incompréhension de cette procédure nouvelle. Ce n’est qu’environ 3 à 4 heures après que la procédure habituelle a été relancée ».

Le lieutenant-colonel G. et le docteur B., du SAMU 31, se plaignent de même : « Le recensement des décédés a été rendu difficile par le dispatching des corps dans les différents dépositoires de Toulouse plutôt que de les regrouper ».

Pourquoi cet ordre de la « salle opérationnelle préfecture » ? Pourquoi ce « dispatching » ? Ces mesures déconcertantes ont effectivement engendré des troubles. D’une part le nombre des personnes décédées a bizarrement fluctué et suscité beaucoup d’investigations ultérieures. D’autre part, l’identité d’une des victimes reste problématique.



[Encadré n° 6]

CONFIRMATION DES DEUX EXPLOSIONS
PAR DES TEMOIGNAGES VISUELS

Au moins une dizaine de témoins ont non seulement entendu mais aussi nettement vu les 2 explosions, c’est-à-dire les jaillissements de 2 panaches de fumée, à partir de 2 lieux distincts, à plusieurs secondes d’intervalle.

Dans l’émission « Pièces à conviction » du 17/6/04, sur France 3, un tel témoin a été interviewé, impressionnant de netteté.

En recoupant les champs visuels (parfois très étroits) des témoignages disponibles, on peut délimiter une zone, de 2 hectares à peine, dans laquelle la 1ère explosion a eu lieu : elle se situe plusieurs centaines de m à l’Est du cratère d’AZF [voir notamment : Valeurs Actuelles du 2/4/04]. Elle correspond très bien à la zone cernée par l’analyse des enregistrements audio [voir encadré n° 4].



MYSTERES MÉDICO-LÉGAUX

Depuis trois ans plusieurs journalistes d’investigation (de l’Express, du Figaro, de Valeurs Actuelles, de l’Est Républicain…) ont attiré l’attention sur des énigmes relatives à l’identification et au décompte des personnes décédées.

Examen de corps à Purpan

Le 22/9/01, le lieutenant de police L. constate que : « Madame D. [médecin-légiste] débute à 12 h 05 l’examen d’un deuxième corps portant le n° 12… arrivé ici [Hôpital Purpan, l’un des deux grands hôpitaux publics de Toulouse, éloigné du lieu de la catastrophe] le 22 septembre 2001 à 00 h 30… trouvé sur le site N° 5 du cratère… Ses yeux sont noirs… A son poignet droit est attaché un bracelet hôpital marqué « D. J. [en toutes lettres] »… Le corps ne présente visiblement pas de tatouage ou de cicatrices… ». Aucune mention de brûlure.

Autopsie à Rangueil

Le 23/9/01, le capitaine de police B. assiste à l’autopsie du corps n° 12 [à l’Hôpital Rangueil, l’autre grand hôpital public de Toulouse, tout proche du lieu de la catastrophe et d’ailleurs sévèrement touché]. Il déclare que le corps « du nommé J. H. » parvenu du CHU de Purpan le 23 à 11 h 20, « présente plusieurs lésions cutanées sur le corps dues à des brûlures » et il constate « la présence sur sa main droite d’un tatouage bleu ». La couleur des yeux n’est pas indiquée. Un autre rapport, celui des médecins-légistes, Mme A. et M. C., mentionne en outre une « cicatrice d’appendicectomie ».

Incohérences

Comment expliquer qu’à l’hôpital Purpan on n’ait vu ni la cicatrice ni le tatouage observés à l’hôpital Rangueil. Ni évoqué des brûlures ?
Anne-Marie Casteret, médecin de formation, a décrit des photos du cadavre étiqueté H. J. [L’Express, 6/2/03]. Sur celles prises à l’hôpital Purpan, elle témoigne avoir vu « un tee-shirt gris en très bon état ». Sur celles prises ensuite à l’hôpital Rangueil, « les bras, le thorax, l’abdomen apparaissent carbonisés ». Comment le thorax a-t-il été brûlé sans que le tee-shirt le soit ? En outre, sur les photos de Purpan et de Rangueil, les yeux apparaissent bleus. Pourquoi sont-ils noirs selon le procès-verbal d’examen à Purpan ?



[Encadré n° 7]

CONFIRMATION D’INCIDENT A LA SNPE
AVANT L’EXPLOSION D’AZF

Par communiqué du 31/1/02 publié sur son site internet, la SNPE a déclaré : « les informations fournies par RTE confirment que c’est 1 seconde 21 centièmes après l’explosion qu’une anomalie s’est produite sur la ligne éléctrique SNPE ».

La SNPE voulait prouver par là que les incidents constatés chez elle étaient consécutifs à l’explosion d’AZF.

Or la date de « l’explosion » qu’évoque ce communiqué est celle donnée par le RéNaSS, soit un peu plus de 10 h 17 mn 56 s, puisque la SNPE ne croit qu’à une explosion, celle détectée par le RéNaSS.

Comme il est prouvé que l’explosion d’AZF a eu lieu 8 à 9 s plus tard [voir encadré n° 3], on déduit que : l’ « anomalie [qui] s’est produite sur la ligne éléctrique SNPE » est antérieure à l’explosion d’AZF.

Quelle est donc l’origine de cet incident électrique à la SNPE ?

Une hypothèse évoquée : un effet de cisaillement dans le transformateur d’entrée de la SNPE, résultant de la secousse sismique associée à la 1ère explosion.



MYSTÉRIEUX HÉLICOPTERES

Une preuve matérielle audio

Le 22/3/04, Le Figaro révèle que : « France 3 a enregistré [en fond sonore] le bruit caractéristique d'un hélicoptère, 15 s seulement après la détonation, lors d'un tournage… à 2 km à l'ouest de l'usine sinistrée. Selon les experts du Bureau d'enquêtes de l'aviation civile (BEA), qui ont analysé la bande à la demande du juge… il s'agirait d'« un hélicoptère léger de la famille Écureuil (AS 350 ou EC 130) ou éventuellement d'un hélicoptère lourd de la famille Super Puma AS 332» utilisé par l'armée. ».
Quel est cet hélicoptère ? Que faisait-il là ? Qu’ont vu le ou les pilote(s) et éventuel(s) passager(s) ? Pourquoi ne se sont-ils pas manifestés ? Est-il difficile de les identifier ?

Des témoignages humains

Le 8/4/04, l'association des anciens salariés d’AZF, « Mémoire et solidarité » rend public un ensemble de témoignages récemment transmis au juge. Parmi eux, celui de deux personnes qui affirment avoir vu, au moment précis de la catastrophe, alors qu'elles se trouvaient à 1 700 mètres de la Zone chimique, «un hélicoptère avec une corde pendante» volant à proximité immédiate du site. L'appareil «a été fortement chahuté... il s'est trouvé un moment en péril et l'échelle de corde faisait alors des méandres».
S’agit-il de l’hélicoptère enregistré par France 3 ? Pourquoi une échelle de corde pendante ?

Une preuve matérielle vidéo

Ce même jour M6 Toulouse, retrouvait une séquence dans laquelle, pendant 4 à 5 s on aperçoit un hélicoptère, mais pas son immatriculation, qui semble être un Écureuil 350. La sonnerie d’une école permet de dater les images : environ 10 h 25.
S’agit-il de l’hélicoptère enregistré par France 3 ou celui vu par les témoins ?
S’agit-il de l'hélicoptère de la gendarmerie qui a décollé de la base aérienne, toute proche, juste après la catastrophe et dont le pilote déclare, en juin 2003, avoir survolé AZF à 10 h 26 ? Cela semblerait possible. Sauf que le pilote se trompe : selon le rapport (avec « trajectographie » jointe) émis par la Police Aéronautique de Toulouse le 28/9/01 : « l’hélicoptère de la gendarmerie… s’est rendu au-dessus des lieux entre 8 h 30 TU et 8 h 41 TU », soit à partir de 10 h 30 en temps local.

D’autres objets volants non identifiés

Le 21/9/02, Marcel Gay rapporte dans l’Est Républicain le témoignage de Mme Y. M. qui a « vu un petit avion télécommandé qui semblait faire du sur-place au-dessus d'AZF » au moment précis des explosions. Il fait état d’ « une boulangère de la banlieue toulousaine et une employée d'un laboratoire pharmaceutique [qui] ont également entendu le moteur d'un avion qui faisait « un bruit de crécelle » ».
Et il pose la question : « ce « drôle d'engin » aperçu par plusieurs témoins ne serait-il pas un drône (avion sans pilote) utilisé pour les missions d'observation et de renseignement ? ».
La question semble d’autant plus pertinente que, parmi les témoignages recueillis au printemps 2004 on trouve ceux de deux femmes qui ont aperçu, un quart d’heure avant la catastrophe, « une espèce d'engin de couleur qui flottait dans le ciel au-dessus d'AZF. Il avait la forme d'un huit dont l'extrémité du bas était ouverte ».

REMARQUES DE CONCLUSION

Nous n’avons pas évoqué tout ce qui fait problème dans cette affaire.

Notamment les violations patentes de la législation Seveso dont s’est rendue coupable l’administration d’État dans la Zone chimique de Toulouse : si la légalité avait été respectée la catastrophe n’eut pas été aussi meurtrière et dévastatrice.

Mystères administratifs préalables à la catastrophe, comme mystères postérieurs, il faudra tout expliquer.

Mais ces explications dérangent ceux qui par négligence, si ce n’est par intérêt, ont permis que se constituent en France de nombreux sites aussi dangereux que celui de Toulouse.

Des faits bien établis

On entend dire : « On ne connaîtra jamais la vérité ». Mieux vaut persister à la chercher, prendre acte des progrès accomplis, soutenir de nouvelles investigations.

Aujourd’hui il est établi qu’il s’est produit deux explosions (par précaution, disons principales). La 1ère, à l’origine de l’unique trace sismique publiée, s’est produite vers 10 h 17 mn 56 s, quelques centaines de m à l’Est de l’actuel cratère AZF. La 2ème, 8 à 9 s plus tard, dans le hangar 221 d’AZF.

Il est établi que, 3 semaines avant la catastrophe, les autorités redoutaient une attaque terroriste contre la SNPE; cette inquiétude n’a pu que croître à la suite des attentats de New-York.

Il est établi qu’au moins un hélicoptère était présent au voisinage immédiat du site chimique au moment de la catastrophe. Et que les gens qui savent pourquoi cet hélicoptère était là se sont tus depuis 3 ans.

Le nouveau camp de base pour la recherche de la vérité doit être planté à cette altitude.

Partant de là on peut travailler à répondre aux questions bien fondées (liste non exhaustive) formulées ci-après.

Des questions bien fondées

1) Quelles sont les causes et les circonstances de la 1ère explosion?

2) A-t-elle entraîné l’explosion d’AZF ? si oui comment ?


3) Si non, pourquoi et quelles furent alors les causes propres de celle-ci ?

4) Identité de l’hélicoptère ? Mission ? Informations recueillies ? Pourquoi et comment ce long incognito ?

5) Quelles furent les mesures antiterroristes autour de la Zone chimique à partir du 31 août, puis du 11 septembre 2001 (données, missions, effectifs, moyens, résultats) ?

Répondre aux questions des 4e et 5e groupes n’est qu’une affaire de volonté politique.

Des présomptions à éprouver, des pistes à explorer

L’analyse générale des témoignages conduit à associer les vibrations du sol à la 1ère explosion et l’onde de choc aérienne à la 2ème. En outre la 1ère explosion ne semble pas avoir creusé de cratère. D’où l’hypothèse d’une 1ère explosion souterraine.
Le sous-sol de la SNPE est aussi pollué que celui d’AZF. On a plusieurs fois découvert des fûts chimiques jadis enfouis, oubliés, voire des bombes lâchées en 1944. Le passé militaire de la SNPE pousse à considérer aussi l’éventualité d’anciennes galeries ou installations enterrées. On pourrait donc songer à une lente dégradation chimique et une amorce spontanée ; ou fortuite, par choc mécanique ou électrique, éventuellement masqué par un autre événement.
En d’autres lieux, il est déjà arrivé que d’anciens puisards, des canalisations, d’égouts par exemple, occasionnent des problèmes, par combinaison malencontreuse d’effluents, formation et accumulation de gaz…

D’un autre côté, on ne peut exclure qu’une explosion de surface laisse une trace sismique. Ce cas a été observé lors d’explosions impliquant des nappes de gaz.

Certains lieux de la SNPE méritent une attention particulière. Par exemple: le transformateur électrique 63 kv, la chaufferie, … mais aussi divers bâtiments du Sud de la SNPE qui ont été rasés si vite que le juge s’est enquis des raisons.

Divers éléments plaident en faveur d’une activité policière ou militaire autour de la Zone chimique, avant, pendant et même après la catastrophe. Une telle activité ne pourrait étonner dans les circonstances politiques dramatiques que connaissait la planète à ce moment là. Beaucoup de témoins font état de phénomènes lumineux avant les explosions. Il est donc pertinent d’envisager des scénarios tels que : fausse manœuvre (par exemple : un drone frappant une installation au sol, ou une ligne électrique aérienne, ou deux lignes en même temps), acte préventif justifié ou non, riposte à une agression réelle ou supposée.

Accident, attentat, bavure militaire ?

La catastrophe ne fut peut-être qu’un accident industriel... Dans ce cas, elle n’a pas démarré au hangar 221 d’AZF, comme on a voulu nous le faire croire depuis le début. Il convient alors de comprendre la relation entre la 1ère explosion et la 2ème. Voici des éléments hypothétiques.
Les incidents électriques côté SNPE pourraient avoir été répercutés par le câble électrique à 6,2 kv qui traverse le bras de Garonne séparant la SNPE et AZF. Au niveau du poste électrique auquel est relié le réseau 6,2 kv d’AZF, a été constaté un très grave incident électrique : 18 000 A pendant 900 ms, ce qui laisse supposer un énorme dégagement énergétique pouvant engendrer des phénomènes variés alentour. Dont divers témoignages font état.
Une partie de cette énergie pourrait avoir été captée par une des installations d’AZF, éventuellement la tour de fabrication du nitrate d’ammonium. Selon plusieurs témoignages, cette tour a « décollé » avant l’explosion du hangar 221. Certains experts envisagent que du nitrate fondu, en cours de fabrication dans cette tour, ait été ainsi porté à très haute température, puis soit venu frapper le stock du hangar 221, provoquant l’explosion.

La catastrophe a peut-être résulté d’un attentat… En dépit de certaines préventions irrationnelles, il est légitime d’étudier la piste d’un
 
The english wikipedia article is a little succint. Some of the info is out of date. The French version is more complete (but alas, in French...).

http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catastroph ... e_Toulouse

The forum lesnews is one of the most interesting, as he confronts persons who were directly involved.


The list of hints of a terrorist (i.e. islamist) attacks were numerous. Some, while they can't be tied directly to the disaster, caused alot of ink to flow. Others are difficult to ignore. It would be tiresome to mention all of them.

Among those, the hurried departure from AZF of Samir A., a window cleaner, a little before 10:00. According to him, he had a gastroenteritis, and could barely walk, so decided to go back to his home. His account was contradicted by a number of witnesses, who saw him walk at an alert pace, in an opposite direction.

On 21 September, around 11:30 am, two cars carrying five men are controlled by gendarms near Valence-d'Agen, 100 km to the north-west of Toulouse. One of the cars had its window broken by the explosion. meaning they had left Toulouse at the time of the disaster, which they confirmed. To some, it was significant, because the men were members of the islamist movement Dawa El Tabligh, and had been mentionned in the RG report. They simply claimed they were leaving Toulouse to go to attend a meeting at Tonneins, Lot-et-Garonne. There seems to be indeed something wrong with their account. In January 2002, the gendarmery Major involved told to Marc Mennessier they had controlled the cars to the RG's request (AZFSE p.159-167). A report had been sent to them immediately. The five men were auditionned by the Toulouse SRPJ only in 2003... They explained that they were with their wives, as was usually the case. While no gendarm had mentionned this fact. Their superior confirmed only men were present. But on 21 october 2005, when asked by the SRPJ, a gendarm suddenly remembered (?) the presence of women - but only three, not five...

On 21 sept., at 7:11 am, Miloud A., an employee of a little inn close to AZF phoned police to report a burglary in a storehouse belonging to the city at 3 am, by a group of men with electric torchs. Three police officers came around 2:30 pm, assessed the burglars had stolen nothing, but that two cans of bleach and weedkillers were full of water but still smelled of their former contents. Suggested the burglars had took them. Those two compounds may be used to manufacture explosives. Miloud A. gave later a contradictory version of the burglary, accusing Gypsies. He was mentionned in the RG report. This suggested to some that he may have been aware of a dirty trick, and tried to inform the authorities.
( http://www.azf-10h18.com/PGR_ATTENTAT-II.html (go to#2) ; AZFSE p.186)

Two other occurences. On 15 september, 18 gas cylinders were stolen from a Elf gas station on 103, boulevard deSuisse, near Hassan J.'s home. 10 kg of chrome VI disappeared inside the AZF factory, late July or early August. Some tried to link this theft to Samir A., there's no evidence of that. But this compound can react dangerously with AN. This led the Laboratory of the Police Prefecture of Paris to search chrome on the AZF victims. Some was found, notably on Hassan J.'s and Abder T.'s bodies. But it is controversial because chrome III may be present naturally.

Those occurences may seem anecdotal. More striking is the fact that the Pole was under antiterrorist monitoring.

http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societ ... 90292.html
 
There was an anti-terrorist alert at Toulouse in September 2001. Authorities tried at first to conceal its existence. Then SNPE manager Roger Meyniel admitted to Thierry Deransart (Valeurs Actuelles 21-2-2002) that his factory had been put on Vigipirate (anti-terrorist standard monitoring procedure) on 12 September, when the prefecture gathered a meeting of important local companies. So, after the 11 September attacks. On the same day, the central direction of Atofina warned all its factories. But A.-M. Casteret (L'Express 22-3-2004) revealed that in fact, as soon as 1 September, police, followed by a bomb disposal expert, had come to SNPE to set up counter-terrorism measures, as established by two registers. Tolochimie had been similarly warned. Controls at the gate were then reinforced. Daniel Surroca, a SNPE manager, admitted it to the SRPJ on 3 April 2003. But nor the SRPJ, nor the judges tried to know who those agents were...
Who had warned French services ? The day following the disaster, Le Matin of Lausanne revealed that on the end of August, agents from the DST and the RG had come to the SNPE, following a warning from the CIA. The Swiss newspaper was well informed, except that the visit had taken place on 1 september. The CIA info had certainly been taken seriously.
Was there a warning from Spain ? On 26 July, journalist Alexandre MARTIN wrote in rightist paper National Hebdo that Spanish counter-terrorism experts were worried of the possibility of a terrorist attack on Toulouse soon. The region mixed anarcho-marxist and islamist tendencies. Alexandre Martin added that the RG had sent a notice of alert to their regional agencies as soon as 3 July. Was it a consequence of Bensakhria's arrest at Valence in June 2001 (he was the founder of the Milanese cell) ?
http://toulouse.azf4.free.fr/forum/view ... &start=700

Security was certainly reinforced after 12 september. Large deployments of CRS (Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité) were noticed, notably around the Pech David hill, to the east of the Chemical Pole. A number of men in neat suits were spotted seemingly monitoring the surroundings of the SNPE (AZFSE p.198). On 15 sept, two AZF employees saw two men in a white Kangoo car, parked at the north-east of the plant. When asked what they were doing, the two men answered : "do not worry, we're monitoring" (Casteret, 22.3.2004). M. Mennessier tried to identify them. A DST officer told him they could be only from a private security company. But none of the AZF managers and guards knew of their presence (AZFSE p.198).
According to ambulance drivers and SNPE employees, two unidentified wounded men were found in the factory on 21 sept at 3.00 am and evacuated. One of them supposedly died one hour and a half later and his body was directly (and illegally) cremated. A procedure reminiscent of special units.
http://www.azf-10h18.com/PGR_MILITAIRE-II.html (go to #3)
http://toulouse.azf4.free.fr/forum/viewtopic.php?t=291 (20.11.2008)


There were a number of attempted attacks planned in Europe in the previous months. France was not spared. Bombing of a Christmas market and the European Parliament at Strasburg, planned by the group of Mohammed Bensakhria, had been twarthed in December 2000.
Phone taps of an islamist cell arrested in Milan on 4 April, revealed that on 22 March, its members intended to perform a chemical attack in France.
http://hebdo.nouvelobs.com/hebdo/paruti ... qaida.html

Danger remained present in September. On 21 Sept., seven members of an organisation ruled by jihadist Djamel Beghal were arrested, four more on 5 Oct.. They had planned a bombing of the US Embassy.
http://www.humanite.fr/2001-10-03_Socie ... -un-reseau

On 2 september, Safir Bghiouat opened fire in the streets of Béziers, 200 km west of Toulouse, using a rocket launcher and a submachine gun. He killed one man, before being shot by police. An accomplice was arrested. A weapon's cache was found at his home. Bghiouat shouted he was a "son of Allah" and an "fighter for Islam". He had travelled to Albania and Kosovo. This was highly suggestive of a terrorist group. But the tragedy was attributed to an isolated man, obsessed with weapons, who collected them with a friend, and who simply had a frenzy. Uncannily, the source of the weapons trafick was never seriously searched.
http://www.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/021/article_13704.asp
http://www.humanite.fr/popup_imprimer.h ... cle=249726

On 19 sept, the railroad leading to the AZF factory of Mazingarbes (Pas-de-Calais) had been sabotaged. An accident was narrowly avoided. The local SRPJ could never solve the case.

On 20 Sept., the central police station of Toulouse got an anonymous phone call, claiming that an Algerian bomb disposal expert, tied to islamists, had just come to Toulouse (Le Figaro, 18.6.2004). He supposed he was there to study the possibilities of a bombing. The caller was identified four years later. The supposed bomber's family had ties with Algerian islamists. THe SRPJ claimed they never investigated the lead, that the call had not been transmitted. They seemingly ignored the DST had indeed interrogated some of his relatives in October 2001. Meaning they had been informed, but chose to conceal it.

Some SNPE employees testified that controls at the entry had been reinforced immediately after the disaster. Truck drivers were not even allowed to drive their vehicule inside the plant. Certainly, the authorities did not think of an accident at the time...
http://toulouse.azf4.free.fr/forum/view ... &start=320 (28/8/2006 1:49)
It is confirmed by the fact that SNPE executives present at the prefecture crisis center reported discussions revolved around a bombing until 23 Sept. evening. Then they were told that it was from then on, it was forbiddden to mention an attack.
http://toulouse.azf4.free.fr/forum/view ... c&start=20 (17.9.2006, 3:23 pm)
Add to that that a number of islamists left their flat a few days after the disaster, and came back only two years later. Their rents were paid for all the duration with no delay, while they were supposed to have no income (AZFSE p.166).


An islamist bombing seems an easy solution. But not so easy. The events were complex, it is difficult to give a consistent version accounting all of them. Notably, while authorities vividly tried to deny it, massive evidence lives no doubt of the existence of at least one other explosion, and probably more.
 
Existence of this first explosion is difficult to deny. Due to obstacles, including buildings, or other sounds, notably tremors, some did not notice it, but thousands heard it in a great variety of locations. Hundreds of witnesses testified. A number of them complained they were pressured or threatened to change their claims. But they remain consistent. It was depicted as a snap, a short and loud detonation, usually aerial. At any distance (50m or 30 km), it preceded the B221 blast by 5 to 13 seconds.

This was of course incompatible with the offical version. The first official explanation was that they had felt the shockwave. The blast being a detonation, the shockwave was supersonic. It was estimated at 3600 m/s. But this is true only at very short range. It slows considerably in a mere tenths of seconds. At 600 m, it travels only at the speed of sound. Above 1000 m, the sound wave catches up with the schockwave.
Then they came with an echo. It did not the job, the second explosion being the most powerful... Then they resorted to one of the most incredible "explanations" ever advanced : witnesses had onlmy heard the seism caused by the explosion of the B221. Or the seismic waves, or their refraction, this is unclear as versions shifted. To no avail in any case. The surface waves (Love and Rayleigh) are inaudible to human ear. They induce a powerful rumble, having no likeness to the sound of a detonation. The official experts relied heavily on P waves (transverse body waves), but they are even less suited. They are as silent, and the indirect noise they may cause has no more likeness to an explosion. For a magnitude < to 4, it is rarely heard at all, and when it is, it is more of a humming than a rumbling. As for the subterranean sound wave (sometimes called seismoacoustic), it can be heard only at close range. They tried to confuse those two notions, to confuse the layman. When asked to cite examples, they never came with any.

This theory, doomed to fall soon into oblivion, is just embarassing. In addition, it could not explain how the time lapse remained in the same range at 50 m or tens of km... (And at very close range, the shockwave would be felt before the underground waves) Of course, they tried to explain that witnesses were unreliable and in shock. Which is insustainable given their numbers. And a number of recorders registered two explosions in succession. They were probably not in shock... The recordings are consistent with testimonies.

More seriously, a number of researchers conducted studies. Alain Hodin, a judicial expert on fires and explosions, investigated various testimonies first officially ; his report was simply ignored by the judges ; then on his own. Pr Jean-Marie Armaudiès and Daniel Dissy tried to triangulate the source of the sound (see map of their locations, plus a simulation : http://danieldissy.net/AZF-simulation-explosions.php ; http://www.azf-10h18.com/PGR_SONS-II.html ).
For the La Grande Paroisse CEI, French experts Yves Grenier (from the Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Télécommunications) and Norbert Pheulpin (director of the LATESAC, laboratory of studies of sound recording for criminal investigations) and British Patrick Naylor (from the Imperial College of London) conducted analysies of the recordings.
Some of the recordings here :
http://azf-enqueteassassinee.typepad.co ... .html#more
http://azf-enqueteassassinee.typepad.co ... .html#more

Triangulate the source of an explosion is a difficult task. Experts working for the CEI were more of the opinion that it was above ground. Pr Armaudiès and Daniel Dissy located it probably at the SNPE. In addition, visual testimonies depict more than one explosive event before the B221 detonation, although quasi-simultaneous ; they seemingly point to the SNPE. At least another one took place at AZF. Photographic evidence of damage supports too a plurality of sources.
 
Alain Hodin (who posts as Dr Watson or Antimenteur) notes that this multiplicity may complicate the search for the source. The Union of Physicists had concluded that the origin of the sounds could not be found outside SNPE ; but no precise location could be established. The study was not published because someone on the board required that the study be validated by the SNPE directors. Unsurprisingly, the physicists refused to have managers of a factory as referees...
http://toulouse.azf4.free.fr/forum/view ... &start=180 (4.6.2006, 4:37 pm)


A map of the plant (photo dated 26.7.2001 ; later photos were burried on most sites for national security reasons) :
http://www.azf-10h18.com/PGR_SNPE.html
Each building and facility is numbered ; the phosgen conduct spans the river Garonne in the middle of the photo.

It can't be argued that there is a lack of evidence. The association Mémoire et Solidarité got more than 450 testimonies. They were usually ignored by official investigators. Most of those who had testified to police were similarly ignored, or sometimes altered. Although some of them were indeed studied according to the rule book. Their claims are precise and consistent. Some were sentenced to death on much less. Proper investigation established that prior to the B221 detonation, two pillars of smoke were noticed ; one, mushroom or club-shaped, 130 m (420 ft) high ; clear, then shifting to red-orange ; at least 6 testimonies; may be tied to tank n°366. A second, of dark smoke, ascending very fast, up to 700 m . Two witnesses noticed both (like Eric F., deposition D0890). Their azimuth point towards SNPE : the first may be tied to tank n°366, the second to the phosgenation area.
http://toulouse.azf4.free.fr/forum/view ... &start=360 (30.8.2006, 9:12 pm +)

Details of studies of some testimonies, using standard investigation procedures.
(I'm working on a detailed presentation) :
http://lesnews.org/documentation/FUMEE/FUMEE.html

While it was very difficult to find photographies of the plant, some surfaced :

http://lesnews.org/documentation/Photos ... dites.html

It is apparent that a number of damages do not come from the AZF schockwave.
It's clear on the first two photos : Building 400 and 402 before and after the disaster. They're located app. 250 m to tthe east to the phosgen conduct. 402 is also called called N2, or "phytosanitaire" ; 400 is the phosgenation building (involved in the manufacture of phosgen). They're located app. 250 m to the east to the phosgen conduct. Its western side, facing AZF, is mostly intact, like surrouding buildings. While its eastern side is ripped off and burned, unlike 402's.
(see also http://www.azf-10h18.com/PGR_SNPE-IV.html )

Photos CoCl2.1 and CoCl2.2 show building 371 after the disaster. Its whole roof and walls are destroyed. While buildings just near did not exhibit similar damage. A crucial testimony was given to police on 3 Oct. 2001.
While Jean-Baptiste J. was walking at roughly 40 m to the south-east of B371, facing AZF (to the west), he was suddenly violently pushed backwards (to the east) by a blast. He couldn't notice its origin. But when, a few seconds later, he rose up, still facing AZF, he was watching an AZF AN production tower, called prilling tower ("tour de prilling"). Then he saw this tower ascend vertically and explode, "like a rocket" (a fact corroborated by a number of independant witnesses, evidence of an explosion independant from B221 inside the AZF plant - more on that later). Then he felt a second shockwave (B221 explosion). What is important is that he couldn't have seen the prilling tower if the roofs of B371 were still intact (D0950 : http://www.azf-10h18.com/SNPE/Temoin%20 ... Jurado.gif).
The SNPE got a number of explanations muddled up. First they claimed that there were apertures in the roofs (but the July 2001 aerial photo denies this). Then they simply said that the witness was a nut. Judge Perriquet, for once, conducted a reconstruction on 11 March 2003. While the witness had seemingly been pressured to change his testimony, he finally came to confirm his initial deposition.
A worrying "detail" : B371 is just near the phosgen conduct.

The great boiler room :
http://www.azf-10h18.com/PGR_SNPE-V.html
It displays evidence of an explosion from the inside.
 
http://www.azf-10h18.com/PGR_SNPE-VI.html

The 366 tank is located to the north of the plant. Supposedly contained methanol at the time of the disaster. In the wake of the disaster, it displayed a kind of hole on its upper side, like a bulging. This suggests it bursted, maybe due to a sudden high rise in pressure. The mushroom column may have come from there. Curiously, SNPE admitted that methanol was removed the following day, but did not give the motive.
Its shell consisted of a double containment wall. Its outer layer seemed to have been partly ripped on the eastern side

http://toulouse.azf.free.fr/documentati ... FUMEE.html

The first two photos were shot by J.-C. Tirat 9 seconds after the disaster. They display two clouds, different in color and location.

The detailed following testimonies all come from the instruction files , all seriously investigated.

Witness 1
This testimony was at first ignored by judicial experts. A reconstitution took place later in presence of the judge and an expert geometrician. Experts tried unsuccesfully to destabilize the witness.
C. was located at more than 1700 m (5500 ft) to the south west to B221. He heard a detonation, simultaneously saw a orange, ochre and black pillar, bludgeon-shaped, ascending for 7 to 8 seconds over a roof before him. Its height and azimuth could be estimated thanks to a building left to the roof. The angle locates it in the midst of the SNPE phosgen area, no closer than 600 m from B221. The column culminated at app. 700 m (2260 ft) (D2803, D4128, D5451, D5466, D6046, D6212).
http://www.azf-10h18.com/TEMOINS/LISTE/A2803.JPG


Witness 2
Mr N., a builder, stood on the Pech David Hill at one of his client's home, about 1600 m (5160 ft) to the east and slightly south to B221. He had a partial view of the Chemical Pole. A transformer stood 20 m in front of him. He and his clients felt the ground shaking violently. He saw a white cylinder, behind the transformer, very bright but not blinding, ascending, and broadening to take on a mushroom shape. The column was to the right to the great SNPE phosgen chemney, distinctly higher and larger. This locates it between the boiler room and a pool to the north of tank 366.
Instinctively, N. lied face down, remained so for at least a few seconds, then felt a blast (B221).
When shown a photography shot app. 25 seconds after the explosion, N. vehemently denied it bore any likeness to what he had seen (D4434).
http://www.azf-10h18.com/TEMOINS/LISTE/D4434.JPG

Witness 3
R., a brick-layer, stood on the fifth floor of a building, at a height of slightly less than 18 m, to the west of the Chemical Pole. He had a panoramic view on AZF and an incomplete one on SNPE. Their crest tile was slightly higher than him. A 40 m high crane stood near the window. A long on site reconstitution was conducted by the police, using notably movements reconstruction methods to ascertain lengths.
At first he felt the building violently shaking, at the same time than a first explosion (partially covered by the tremor). He looked towards the possible source of this explosion, and saw a thick grey mist, like water vapor, emerging from a precise location and spreading horizontally. The azimuth was located in the direction of tank 366. It took a second for this crawling cloud to spread over the north of AZF. It didn't come close to the prilling tower and B221. Its height was app. 6 m (as compared to plane trees close to the area).
At the same time, from the same location where the mist emerged, R. saw a perfect white shining cylinder ascending. Its apparent diameter was double or triple that of the phosgen tower. It ascended for 8 to 10 seconds. It suddenly took on a mushroom shape, and its color shifted to brown/ochre. From comparison with the crane and the Pech David Hill, its altitude was estimated at 130 m. R. was clear that the AZF plant was intact when the pillar ascended, notably the prilling tower and B221 (D3727, D3955).
http://www.azf-10h18.com/TEMOINS/LISTE/A3727.JPG
http://www.azf-10h18.com/TEMOINS/LISTE/A3955.JPG

Important note : R. and N. mentionned a seismic tremor. Simultanneous with an explosion on SNPE, not on AZF. It can't be tied to the B221 blast. But maybe official experts did a truly astounding discovery, that seismic waves travel faster than light ! Other testimonies point to the existence of a quake unrelated to the B221 detonation. That such a surface explosion could cause a 3.4 Richter earthquake doesn't stand up to scrutiny.

More examples here :

http://azf-enqueteassassinee.typepad.co ... .html#more
 
They include notably the following statements : Hélène D. was playing golf at appr. 3.4 km south to B221. She saw a cloud of black smoke, she thought from AZF. Seconds later, she heard a second explosion, followed by a huge black cloud. Reconstitution showed the first column was in the direction of the SNPE phosgen chimney, it could be determined by the position of trees. D0882 http://www.azf-10h18.com/TEMOINS/LISTE/D0882.html
Didier C. lived in a flat 3 km north to B221, at the eight floor. He was looking through the window of its kitchen, when he spoted, to the left to the phosgen tower, a sudden bright flash. Almost at the same time, he heard a deflagration, the building shook. He saw an ascending and broadening white smoke, he ascribed to the deflagration. He can't say how long it lasted, as he watched a luminous "arch", seemingly from the SNPE to AZF. Then he saw a second deflagration, to the right to the chimney. D1266, D4263 http://www.azf-10h18.com/TEMOINS/LISTE/D1266.html

Not only were there numerous testimonies and physical damage, the existence of an explosion at SNPE was leaked on the first day. At 2:18 pm, Reuter announced that "according to the SNPE director, a second explosion took place in the neighboring "Poudrerie", without causing victims". A similar statement appears in firefighters reports (Farreny, " Mystères de la gestion de crise") . They were released to the instructor judge in January 2003. Two of them establish that SNPE executives admitted the existence of an explosion inside their factory. Commandant (Major) H. states that when he "came at the SNPE gates, an executive informs us that the explosion indeed came from the SNPE." Colonel P. : "SNPE : four officers present, two in only 20 mn. Their task consists of evacuating the injured... the staff except 10 managers and workers. This evacuation will be ordered following an info from a manager, relating to the possibility of an explosion." It seems the managers were never heard by the police. Nor the two firefighter officers asked what they meant, or what they saw.
Surprisingly, firefighters did not inspect fully the plant. Colonel P. states that they considered only to secure AZF and the surrouding housing area. Not the SNPE. Despite that it was full of phosgen, chlorides, perchlorates, ammonia, UDMH... Risk of a secondary accident was huge, with tremendous consequences. Their main expert on "technological dangers", major F., was not even allowed to set foot inside the plant. A number of testimonies state that it was almost inaccessible after 3:00 pm, including to rescuers.
At least another explosion was spotted inside AZF.
 
Some defend an explosion on a big power transformer, called T20, causing electrical malfunctionnings. There were indeed numerous sightings of electrical or electro-magnetic phenomena, sometimes rather weird. But no testimonies support an explosion there. While there are some claims of a possible puff of smoke on the plant 10 seconds prior to the main explosion, they are fragmentary. On the contrary, the detonation of the prilling tower is well attested.
http://www.azf-10h18.com/PGR_PRILLING.html (intro)

The day of the disaster, a high civil servant from the prefecture, Jean-Luc Marx, explained on two occasions that a production tower had exploded. He has refused to answer any questions since. But a number of consistent testimonies confirmed his claim.
The prilling tower, also called the green tower, stood at 50 m to B221. It was an ammonium nitrate manufacturing unit, using a method owned by La Grande Paroisse. A number of independant witnesses saw its upper part "taking off" vertically a short time before the detonation of B221, one to two seconds, and explode in mid air. This sighting was so striking that a number of them compared the tower to a space rocket.

http://toulouse.azf4.free.fr/forum/view ... c&start=20 (16.9.2006, 12:04 pm, 4:09 pm )
http://www.azf-10h18.com/PGR_PRILLING-II.html (go to #1 )
AZFEA p. 203-204, 247-250

Examples : Nelly C. was working in an office in Marchant Hospital, 870 m (2680 ft) to B221. She was using a photocopier. She heard a loud explosion, like a plane breaking the sound barrier, and felt a violent tremor. She was hurt by a shard of glass from a window. The photocpier stopped, there was a power cut. She looked towards AZF. The green tower was still there, but red smoke erupted around its basement. She immediately laid down, and shortly after felt a powerful blast. (D2804, D2930).
Jean-Baptiste J. was not alone to sight this event from the SNPE. Bernard P. stated to police (on 4 oct. 2001) that he had seen the green tower rising up (D0946 / http://www.azf-10h18.com/SNPE/Temoin%20 ... Piriou.gif ). On the other side of the Garonne, Michel M. (who had earlier heard Hassan J. claim that "today would be the most beautiful day") was riding his bike when its handlebars suddenly vibrated, and he fell to the ground. He immediately was hurt by rubble. As he was standing up again, he heard a noise, like a thunder, and saw the prilling tower rip open. Immediately after, he was engulfed by the B221 blast (D0223, D3522, D4425).

Patrick D. was driving with is father near the ONIA bridge, when they heard a short, strong detonation, and a sizzling or a crackling, and saw a blinding lightning. He stopped his car, saw part of the prilling tower ascending vertically like a rocket and explode. Two seconds later, they felt the B221 shockwave (D2043, D6215).
Thierry Bordas, a photographer for La Dépêche du Midi, used the same metaphor. He was at 840 m to the west to the B221, when his attention was caught by a huge flash. He looked towards AZF, and saw the tower lifting like a rocket and explode. Soon after the whole area got aflame and he was hurt by the blast. He issued two statements to the police. In the second one, he added that he had seen like a huge ball of fire at the tower's basement (D0583, D3578).
 
Those many explosions ask the question of the true danger Toulouse inhabitants were exposed to.
Henry Farreny had tried for several years to make authorities and people aware of the danger posed by the Chemical Pole. For years, they had carelessly let housing estate to be build around it. The authorities had planned a number of emergency plans to ease intervention, in case of a disaster. But the wisest thing to do was not to allow this situation at first.
http://www.pseudo-sciences.org/spip.php?article93
The "danger area" was delimitated at a range of 900 m (2770 ft) around Tolochimie and AZF, 600 m (1850 ft) around the SNPE. The "alert area" was delimitated at at range of 2500 m (7700 ft) for phosgen, 1600 m (4930 ft) for ammonia. Inhabited by app. 16 000 people. Danger was probably underundestimated. Phosgen is heavy, and would reach app. 1 km ; probably resulting in hundreds of dead, and thousands injured. But ammonia, while less toxic, is much more volatile, and could reach easily the whole Toulouse urban area.

Following the disaster, situation inside SNPE was filled with opacity. Officially, everything was all right. On 23 October 2001, a visit, led by the Secrétariat Permanent Pour la Prévention des Pollutions Industrielles (SPPPI), took place at last. Henry Farreny was present as a local councillor. First, the phosgen tanks were not buried as claimed. While the SNPE said their double protective walls had well resisted, Farreny could fortuitously observe they were fractured. The great chimney had been damaged on a 40 m height. Director Roger Meyniel reluctantly conceded this fact to him. The conclusion was that the greatest industrial disaster in France had come very close from being far worse. As usual, the "great" media ignored this revelation. Outraged, Farreny could at last come to investigative TV broadcasting Pièces à convictions, on national resort France 3, to speak to Elise Lucet (on 18 September 2003).
http://vivevoix.site.voila.fr/elements1.html
Obviously annoyed, the SNPE (ie the French government) tried to silence him by suing him for libel. Another attempt at judicial intimidation towards independant researchers from the authorities. They didn't succeed.
http://vivevoix.site.voila.fr/dossier1.html
http://toulouse.azf4.free.fr/forum/viewtopic.php?t=150 (9.28 am )

Farreny immediately gained wide support from associations and local politicians. There was even a support demonstration. And he could produce photos. Faced with proofs and a situation they had not foreseen, the SNPE announced on 12 January 2004 they dropped the suit. But they had discretely asked him to back off. Farreny simply answered that he had been right from the beginning, and would never change his claims.
Fatcs are that phosgen tanks were indeed damaged, and the authorities tried to conceal it. Hence a question : in the case of an attack, was there an intent to cause a maximum death toll ?
 
This may seem as a provocation to those who were homeless for months. But it is possible that this was a failed attack. There is at least one close sighting, from inside the SNPE, of an explosion at the chore of the phosgen area.
http://toulouse.azf4.free.fr/forum/view ... 05&start=0 (18.7.2006, 12:42 am )
In addition to the ochre column near the great chimney seen by others, Witness D. heard a detonation and sighted, close to building 379, a cloud of dust seemingly erupting from the ground (he could not see AZF from his position); there was at its chore a rose glow. He saw the ochre pillar persisting a few seconds after the B221 explosion , consistently with other witnesses.
D5354

If an attack was involved, all of this suggests it was on a wide scale. Was there more than one group ?
The day following the disaster, AIPJ.net site published a supposed interview with a French secret agent, who confirmed a terrorist attack. He thought a rocket had been fired on AZF, as many victims had heard a whistling just prior to the explosion. The "Poudrerie" (the SNPE) had been targeted, but the rocket had deviated and missed its target. This site has a political orientation close to Atlasshrugs ; but the agent mentions of psys were used to influence witnesses and convince them they had not heard or seen what they thought. This was confirmed by a number of them.

Some suppose that at least two projectiles were fired from the nearby Pech David Hill. If they are right, it would be more likely a missile than a rocket, which have a short range. Visual reports are scarce (it would certainly not be easy to spot). There were many ones of "lightnings" or "beams" (more on that later), some have tried to tie them with a missile or a rocket. This is certainly questionnable. Marc Mennessier interviewed Emilie S., and published on 28.9.2001 her testimony of a kind of ligthning, or luminous line directed towards the shed. Her father, a SNPE employee, despicted a kind of projective at roof's height. Her description was consistent. But a few days later, after psychiatrists saw her, her attitude abruptly changed. She refused to answer any more questions. (AZFSE p.222).
Patrick L., who was driving a mini-truck along the Route d'Espagne, to the west, may have spotted a telemetry laser. It looked like a thin light pencil, 1.8-2 m above the road. It was directed towards AZF. He was blinded when he crossed it (AZFSE p.234 ; Le Figaro, 28.9.2001 ; AZFEA p.196 ; http://toulouse.azf4.free.fr/forum/viewtopic.php?t=182 ).

Frederique G., a secretary working at Lycée Gallieni depicted a kind of arch, with a smoky likeness, moving at an estimated speed of app. 80 km/h (D5313, D6138, D6139). Although she couldn't see any solid object. This sighting took place between the two explosions. That she saw a missile is questionnable too, but her report was widely studied. When she came to testify, she complained that the policeman who took her deposition, Brigadier-Major Jean-Pierre B., harassed her to change her claims. Her husband Jean-Claude, a retired gendarme, who had come with her and could hear from the neighbouring room what was happening, wrote a letter of protest to judge Perriquet (he himself contested the officail version, having heard two explosions ; D5312, D5314). B.'s superior, commissioner Romain Paireau stood in support of him. Frédérique and Jean-Claude G. stood to their accusations. But other witnesses who had faced him (and some of his colleagues) issued similar complaints. (AZFEA p. 185, AZFSE p.267 http://toulouse.azf4.free.fr/forum/view ... 0&start=80 22.9.2006, 10:33 pm )

On the other hand, a number of witnesses did mention a whistling, just prior to the B221 detonation, seemingly coming towards the Chemical Pole. Some of them likened it to a reactor. Private investigator Jean-Pierre Mayer (aka emilie) described it as looking somewhat like the sound of a plane. He felt that it came from the nearing air force base of Francazal.
http://toulouse.azf4.free.fr/forum/view ... &start=740 (22.12.2006, 11:10 pm ) (for a similar report, see D6553 : sound of military plane 10 to 20 s before the main explosion).

This leads to sightings of unidentified aircrafts.
 
Sky was busy over Toulouse at the time of the disaster. Many spotted various aircrafts, helicopters, planes, drones. Striking, as flying over an urban area, and especially over the Chemical Pole, is strictly forbidden. But officially, none of them existed, despite that they were sometimes filmed and registered. They and their pilots remain unidentified. For a simple reason : they were never seriously looked for. A common thread in this case. What they were doing remains a mystery.

http://www.azf-10h18.com/PGR_ATTENTAT-II.html (go to #3)
AZFSE p.199 ; AZFEA p.213 + ; Farreny, chapter "Mystérieux hélicoptères". AZF Toulouse Quelle Vérité - AZFTQV - p. 103-105.
Examples of helicopter visual or auditive testimony close to the Chemical Pole, just prior to or after the explosion. Mrs B., working in an hospital near the high school Galliéni, heard a sound looking like an helicopter immediately prior to the explosion. She thought an accident had taken place (D4452). Mrs C. employee for the company Europe Sols, rue de Gironis, facing AZF, heard an helicopter immediately after the blast (D4454). Her colleague Mr B. issued a similar statement (D4455). Mr K., working for the truck company Samat, who stood at the SNPE gates, stated succintly that he saw a white helicopter and one from the gendarmery (the DST has a white helicopter) (D4458) just after the explosions.
Jean-Pierre C., who was 1700 m (5600 ft) to north of the Chemical Pole, saw a helicopter with a rope ladder hanging on its underside, 2 or 3 times the lenght of the helicopter, at the time of the blast. It was violently shaken by the shockwave, to the point it seemed in danger.
http://www.azf-10h18.com/PGR_TRAJECTO-III.html (go to #2) (D6564)

See also : D6552 (black helico), D6554 (black helico caught in cone of smoke from the main explosion), D6566 (helico 2 or 3 mn after explosion), D6571 (sound of helico 1 to 5 mn after explosion), D6577 (dark helico), D6563-D6620 (dark AS350).

A team from the resort France 3 Sud, was filming at school Bellefontaine, 2170 km south-west to B221. When they felt the blast (app. 6 seconds after), the cameraman filmed the cloud of smoke. 15 seconds later, a helicopter was heard. The cameraman could not film it, suggesting it was flying low, but its sound was recorded. It lasted for 18 s. It first became more loudly, suggesting it was coming nearer, then went away. It was not traced by Blagnac Airport radars, which can only detect targets above 500 ft.
http://azf-enqueteassassinee.typepad.co ... .html#more
The BEA (Bureau d'Enquête et d'Analyses de l'aviation) studied the recording. It concluded that it could be an Ecureuil (AS 350 or EC 130), but couldn't rule out a Super Puma.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurocopter_Ecureuil
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurocopter_Super_Puma
Judge Perriquet supposed it could be a helicopter landed on the Francazal base, at 3.2 km (2 miles). This doesn't hold water. No grounded helicopter would be audible at such a distance, with so much obstacles. While Perriquet refused any reconstitution, some were conducted, by J.-C. Tirat and F. Hériot, and by Pr Naylor in Longside, Scotland (AZFEA p.220) confirmed this certainty.

A few minutes after the disaster, a team from M6, located too at Bellefontaine school, filmed briefly for 3 seconds a helicopter. Its sound could be registered for 10 s. It was a Ecureuil. A dark spot along its left side could be a wescam. It was not possible to determine if it belonged to the Gendarmery, or Customs as some suggest.

http://azf-enqueteassassinee.typepad.co ... .html#more
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w75QKoxSDeo
http://www.azf-10h18.com/PGR_AERIEN-I.html
AZFEA p. 225.

It was dated notably with the help of the bell of a nearby school. It was filmed between 10h20 and 10h27.
Judge Perriquet supported it was an helicopter from the Gendarmerie, piloted by Captain Thierry C., who took off from Francazal at 10.27 to have a close look at the disaster area. Finding a worse match would be difficult : the gendarmery helico was located to the south, the M6 helico to the north to the witnesses. Their directions were opposite. As Periquet himself wrote, radar records from Blagnac Airport show that it didn't flight over Bellefontaine school. So, it is not the aircraft filmed by M6 ! Datation does not fit either. The pilot, Th. C., explained he took off at 10.27. This is confirmed by records. Nonetheless,the SRPJ reports it was circling the Pole at 10.25. Was it a time-travelling helicopter ? But the Blagnac Airport traced the aircraft first at 10.30'07'', corrected later to 10.28'43''. In any case, too late to be filmed by the M6 cameraman. So, convergent evidence rules out the Th. C. flight.

Two women had a most unusual sighting a few minutes before the explosions. Véronique S. and Angèle A. were working in Le Mirail area, 3 km to the west/north-west to the Pole. They saw a small red aircraft hovering over the Pole. It was shaped like an 8, truncated on its underside. Official investigators thought they were deluded. But this depiction is familiar to those who are acquainted with unusual drones. It clearly marks it as a Bombardier CL-227 or 237.

http://www.azf-10h18.com/PGR_AERIEN-II.html (go to #1) ; Farreny ; AZFEA P.230
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/row/cl-327.htm
D0883, D0886, D6568.

Yvonne M. sighted what may have been a Seamos drone hovering for several minutes in the direction of the Pole, app. 10 mn before the explosions.
http:// www.azf-10h18.com/PGR_AERIEN-II.html go to #2)
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/row/seamos.htm

A number of witnesses heard what sounded like a jet fighter above them. Danielle D. was on the AZF site, when she saw a white helicopter, followed by what she identified as two military planes, coming from Le Mirail and going to L'Empalot (to the west of the Pole). When she heard a detonation and felt a tremor, saw the green tower rising up, and felt a second, more powerful explosion (D4453, D4841).

There were a number of sightings of small planes, Cessna or drone-like, in the vicinity of the Pole. They were present at least since dawn. Two women saw "a strange small plane, seemingly hovering over ASF, emitting like a rattle sound". Yvonne M. sighted what looked like "a small remote controlled plane, hovering over AZF", at the precise time of the explosions. An employee at Marchant Hospital saw a similar aircraft, emitting an unusal noise, seconds prior to the explosions A patient at Rangueil hospital saw a small plane above the hopsital (2200 m to the east to the Pole) a few seconds after the explosion. (AZFEA p.230 ; Farreny). On the France 3 video, seconds before a helicopter is heard, people are heard saying that there is a plane.

There was a way to verify what had lurked in the sky the morning of 21-9-2001. Contrarily to Blagnac, Francazal has radars which can monitor a target at a very low altitude (less than 152 m). Records from that day would hold the answers. They were asked (but quite lately) their files. But answered that their records from 21-9-2001... had been 'inadvertently' destroyed (AZFTQV p.105, AZFEA p.232). Incredibly, the magistrates did not try to know more. While in a normal inquiry, anyone claiming he had destroyed crucial files would be put into trouble, nothing came. Ad it was possible that Francazal shared some files with the Montaudran Air Force base. That didn't seem to interest them. Last news are that Francazal will soon close.
 
All this evidence would seem to point a terrorist attack. This looks like an easy solution. But the extent of damage would point towards a wide scale attack, more like an act of war. Needing important means, something like a fully equipped commando, in an area under surveillance.

That such an attack could be perpetrated, and Toulouse being a crossroad of many secret services and of the military-industrial complex, some suggested the possibility of a LIHOP. Or of a false flag attack. When looked at closely, in fact, the best evidence points towards this direction.
The supposed kamikazes' behaviour was problematic on many accounts. Jean-Pierre Mayer spoke with a medic involved in H. J.'s preliminary autopsy, who explained him he had a fracture at the base of his cranium. It was mentioned in the official autopsy report, with no other details. He thought it was unlikely to have been caused by a fall, but rather by a blow. So suggesting that H. J. had been knocked or killed before the explosion and let there.
http://toulouse.azf4.free.fr/forum/viewtopic.php?t=51 (29.10.2005, 11:22 am )

As a whole, H.J and A.T.'s aggressive and noisy behaviour was not typical of suicide bombers (or of criminals as a whole). They are usually discrete, they try not to catch attention. In complete opposition to them - the same was said of the so-called September 11 kamikazes, who were so noisy they sometimes endangered their supposed plot.

And there is a crucial point : the lack of surveillance. It may seem a nonsensical assertion. That the Chemical Pole and other important plants in Toulouse (including Airbus and Motorola) were under anti-terrorist monitoring is established. Yes, but there lied a true anomaly. Incredibly, it was not the whole Chemical Pole : AZF was not under anti-terrorist monitoring ! They were never warned by the prefecture or anti-terrorist services (Casteret 22-3-2004, AZFSEA p. 46-53).
The head of Grande Paroisse for France was informed immediately after 11 Sept. 2001. They transmitted the info to their factories, and asked them to contact their local prefecture. In the following days, all of them were put under Vigipirate. Except Toulouse. Serge Biechlin's assistant, René Maillot, had called immediately the prefecture on 12 September . He was answered that there was no risk, instructions would come later. Same answer three days later. No risk, for a Seveso 2 plant ! Instructions never came. The same day took place at the prefecture a meeting of all important local factories, the DRIRE (regional direction for industry, research and environment) and the head of regional security. All important factories, except AZF...
There were rumours of a private warning from a "CIA informant". Serge Biechlin claimed that on 15 Sept., an acquaintance of him, living in Provence, whose daughter studied in Toulouse, had been called by one of his friends. Who told him to ask his daughter to leave Toulouse immediately (AZFSE p.49, http://toulouse.azf4.free.fr/forum/view ... &start=540 (15.11.2006, 1:25 pm ). But he didn't inform anyone else before the disaster.

On 18 Sept., during a monthly meeting of local plants directors, SNPE executive Roger Meyniel informed him of the meeting on 12 Sept. and that his plant was under Vigipirate.
Astonished, and worried by the Mazingarbes act of sabotage, S. Biechlin ordered the following day to reinforce controls. On 20 September, he phoned the director of civilian security at the prefecture, François Boudin. Who first denied, amazingly, any Vigipirate orders were given at Toulouse, and the existence of the 12 Sept. meeting. Later the same day, he will admit that it had indeed taken place. AZF had been "forgotten". S. Biechlin was answered that he had to wait for orders, like R. Maillot a few days later. Biechlin called too his usual interlocutor from the DRIRE, engineer Delage. Who expressed amazement, and similarly replied that instructions would soon follow.
We are asked to believe that they simply "forgot" to put AZF under Vigirate. While after 11 Spetember, the whole area, and the five other Grande Paroisse plants, were on alert ; and despite that they were asked repeatedly. Unbelievable. This makes no sense, and smells of manipulation. Another sinister scheme.
 
Now, coming back to the suggestion that the intent was to cause a great number of casualties, in addition to material damage. Is there evidence that things might have been set up to facilitate that ? There are certainly motives to suspect such a scheme. Henry Farreny ("Mystères de la gestion de crise") notes an inexplicable delay in the starting up of the Intervention Plan for the Chemical Area (Plan Particulier d'Intervention de la Zone Chimique Toulouse-Sud - PPI). It planned the setting off of firefighters sirens and confinement of the population immediately after an accident. There had been hundreds of training meetings since its promulgation on 30 June 1989, and it was readied to be started up at any time.
"Colonel P. [of the firefighters] states : "As soon as 10.24 am, the operational prefecture cell is activated... at 10.42, the setting off of the sirens is asked - the PPI is activated, at 11.15, confinement procedures are asked." Half an hour to ask for the sirens to be set off and to activate the PPI, almost an hour to ask for the confinement of the population (with a wind of 7 km/h, where would be the smokes after an hour ?)..."

This would suggest the planning, ten days after the attacks of 11 September 2001, of another gigantic strike to be blamed on world jihadism. To manipulate public opinion, and to intimidate the French government (and others). It was stopped, because for some reason, it was a partial failure. But maybe only the visible part was stopped. Behind the scenes, it may have helped to discourage all will to oppose an intervention in Afghanistan among foreign states. That would be consistent with the general framework of worlds events this month, and help to understand some things. Notably why the French government quickly changed its stance. And later, the weakness of their opposition to the attack on Iraq. Why the small village of Le Vernet, south to Toulouse, had a most unusual (and famous) guest, holidaying in August 2002.

Other events surrounding the explosions suggest a deep and complex truth.
 
That pressure was discreetly kept on the French government in the following weeks, then years is suggested by a number of occurences. The modus operandi of the authors of the "Alpha-Bravo" revendications sent on 28-9-2001 asks questions. They used a secure fax line. Not the work of jokers, but of people with many capacities. As for the unusual visit of the then British Prime Minister near Toulouse in August 2002, was it a warning that any attempt to seriously oppose the attack on Iraq would lead to a devastating backlash ?

More recently, suspicion is reinforced by a quote from Khaled Sheikh Mohamed's "confession" in Guantanamo. This document is worthless for a wide range of motives. But it contains an intriguing feature. It lists chronologically the "confessions" as such : 1) the first bombing of the WTC in 1993 ; 2) the attacks of 11 September 2001 ; 3) "censored" by the US government ; 4) the failed attempt by Richard Reid, December 2001 etc... It is clear that the unknown, "censored" attack, refers to Toulouse. There was no other candidate, terrorist attack or disaster, in this time frame.

Given the complexity of the events, any terrorist scenario would suppose an intricate solution. While reluctant to venture on this perilous ground, J.-C. Tirat supposed that a wide-scale bombing might have been perpetrated following two lines : a bunch of manipulated local rogues on AZF, and a team of professionals on SNPE. It may have been made easier thanks to the presence of hidden, classified underground ways.
During the Second World War, the germans had built an underground base with bunkers, and even a heavy water production center. Officially, the heavy water was removed, but the date is unknown. Investigator Pierre Grésillaud (from the College of Nancy) believes that many tunnels remain from that time, and are used by the French military. A witness sent him possible photos of an underground net below the Pech David Hill, linking the SNPE, the Rangeuil hospital and other facilities.
http://www.azf-10h18.com/PGR_MILITAIRE-I.html
There is a case for the existence of secret military facilities in this area. The fact that many photos of the surroundings of the SNPE, the Rangeuil hospital and Pech David were blurred is certainly intriguing ( http://www.azf-10h18.com/PGR_MILITAIRE-II.html ). It suggests the area retained a military use, beyond SNPE boundaries. In his last book, AZF l'Enquête Secrète ( http://danieldissy.net/AZF-enquete_secrete/ ), Daniel Dissy reports that a witness confirmed him the existence of such galleries.

Among many possibilities, one of the most studied was a UVCE originating from the SNPE. It led a number of investigators to consider the possibility of an accident beginning on the SNPE, "transmitted" to AZF. That French authorities would try to cover-up such an event would certainly be plausible. In France, the military and the militaro-industrial complex are almost untouchable, there are many examples of that. But such a scenario would let many things unanswered, and still bumps into the stability of AN. If there was a gas explosion, it would be more probably the result of a sabotage, part of a wider scenario.

J.-C. Tirat and F. Hériot studied this theory in a number of articles published by Valeurs Actuelles, and a chapter of their recent book (p.234). There were indeed numerous reports of mists, smokes, very unnatural crawling clouds and unusual smells around the Chemical Pole prior to the disaster. They began at least around 5.00 am, and culminated about 10 mn before the explosions. AZF was suggested as their origin, but wind patterns point towards the SNPE. Many witnesses compared the smell to ammonia or fish. A similar incident happened more recently, in October 2007. The smell suggests the presence of hydrazin. Or, as not much was stocked inside the plant, more likely one of its compounds, MMH or UDMH. Very toxic, they are used for rocket propellants. Highly unstable, they can form with air explosive mixings. Their photo-decomposition produces nitrogen dioxyd.
In their book they revealed a striking finding, while denouncing another falsification. The Oramip (Observatoire régional de l'air du Midi-Pyrénées, Agency monitoring the quality of air for Midi-Pyrénnées region) wrote in its report that its stations close to the Chemical Pole, "Berthelot" and "Saint-Cyprien ", had been damaged, so that their readings relating to ammonia hd been lost. They had only measured a peak of micro-particles between 10.15 and 10.30 am, at the time of the disaster, no nitrogen dioxyd. But they found that the Institut National de Veille Sanitaire (INVS, National Institute for Health Monitoring), in its report from July 2002, had contradicted the Oramip. It wrote that a peak of nitrogen dioxyde had been detected by the Berthelot station from 10.00 to 10.15 am. Three minutes before the disaster...
 
They noted the presence of a container, numbered BRNU 000385-6, containing 17960 kg of UDMH of Russian origin. Ordered in December 1995, the UDMH was not used because being substandard, and stocked. App. 500 kg had been taken, seemingly for being reprocessed. The tank was mentioned in the inventory released to the prefecture after the disaster, and visible on Google in September 2003. But the inventory from November 2002 mentions only 7510 kg of UDMH. Where the remaining almost 10t went remains unanswered. A mere monkey wrench would do the job...

They mentionned too that in a report on UCVEs to the instructor judge, A. Hodin had studied the strange death of a victim, Alain Ratier, an elevator repairman. He exhibited what looked like superficial burns, and unusual lividness, while lacking deadly wounds. Clearly, the official version can't account for his death. A doctor concluded his injuries were reminiscent of a death from asphyxia. (Funnily, the SNPE criticized their works by claiming that A. Hodin's report had been ordered by Total...)
The main objection is that an UVCE produces tremendous damage ; witnesses compare them to a devastation caused by war. They answered by citing a report from the IAEA, mentioning the possibility of relatively cold UVCE. According to it, they can come as a deflagration as well as a detonation. Gas explosions could account for a number of pockets of fires, that the B221 blast could not explain. Or that all manholes were blown-up in a 800 m radius.

Reviewing the evidence, the existence of at least one gas explosion is a reasonable theory. But they tried an alternative explanation, by attempting to link the whole disaster, including the B221 detonation, to a gas eplosion. There, they've clearly bitten than they could chew, and were widely contested. It is true that the mixing of UDMH with AN produces powerful explosives. Hence their use, alongside aluminium powder, in daisy cutters bombs. But the concentrations needed were certainly not reached, otherwise they would have caused many severe poisonings. Burning gas hitting the surface of the AN stack would not cause its detonation, especially in the case of a "cold" UVCE. In his last book, D. Dissy acknowledges the existence of unexplained fires - alongside other damage the B221 explosion can't explain : notably the destruction of a sports center alongside the Garonne, called l'Escaragol, separated from the B221 by AZF and SNPE buildings ( http://www.usinenouvelle.com/article/az ... ais.159809 ). But he notes these fires were small. They may have been caused by isolated gas pockets, not by a massive explosion. The case of Alain Ratier remains isolated whithin AZF (with the possible exception of Hassan J.), contrarily to what would be expected if Tirat and Hériot were right. Alongside with P. Grésillaud, Dissy notes other bodies exhibited enigmatic burns, but outside AZF and the Chemical Pole. Notably a man found dead in the Etablissements Brossette, to the north to the RN20, north-east to AZF. In addition to an unexplained wound, he had wide large burns, while his clothes were almost untouched. Another explanation would be a electrocution. There were many reports of unusual electrical phenomena. They may be linked. That a UVCE was involved certainly can't be ruled out. But this theory fails to provide a global explanation.
The existence of underground facilities, reports of electrico-magnetic effects added to the unexplained tremor suggested to some different solutions. That experimentations were involved, or the use of non-conventional weapons. The scenario seems even more intricate.
 
My Cousin's First Hand Experience of the Event and After

My cousin, Jay, was driving south, out of Toulouse, after finishing an electrical repair job in the city. The AZF factory was, perhaps, one and a half, to two minutes, behind him, in his little van, when all hell let loose and the explosion's sizeable shockwave blew out all the windows, in the buildings, around him.

He told me, in a phone conversation shortly after the event, that he then, more, or less, blacked out and discovered himself, some time later driving many miles out of the city, in the countryside, a long way from the right direction home, with no memory of the intervening time.

In another conversation, shortly after, when I had made some off the cuff remark, about French bureaucracy, in connection with his attempts to set up his own business, he suddenly went into an extraordinary tirade, in support of the French people, with whom he strongly identified. I knew Jay fairly well and to be a loyal friend, who gave 100%, when he really believed in something, with a family trait of an explosive temper, to match such depth of feeling. As I look back now, I know that that display was still quite out of character for him and I suspect that that Jay was actually exhibiting symptoms of, 'post traumatic stress disorder'.

A couple of months later, I received a phone call, from Jay's mother, my aunt, to let me know that Jay had, that day, run off the road, into a tree and been killed out right. Within the family, there was some doubt, as to the actual cause of Jay's 'accident'. Could it have been self inflicted? Knowing Jay, as I did, I personally found this quite hard to believe.

Sometime later, I did hear, in a BBC Radio4 documentary, of other quite common accidents on French roads, sometimes, possibly, caused by the hypnotising effects of the long lines of trees, originally planted on the orders of Napoleon, to give shade and shelter to the marching columns of his troops. However, I now wonder if, Jay might have had some sort of flash back, partially caused by post traumatic stress and momentarily blacked out, at some crucial point, behind the wheel of his van?

I've no idea what really caused the explosion at the AZF plant. Whether a genuine accident, or if the French Government really did decide to deprive some Islamic fundamentalist lunatics of the 'oxygen of publicity', in which case, I can imagine no better fate for the futility of their gesture.

No amount of speculation will bring my cousin back.
 
Re: My Cousin's First Hand Experience of the Event and After

Pietro_Mercurios said:
Sometime later, I did hear, in a BBC Radio4 documentary, of other quite common accidents on French roads, sometimes, possibly, caused by the hypnotising effects of the long lines of trees, originally planted on the orders of Napoleon, to give shade and shelter to the marching columns of his troops.

This is a controversy coming back every few years in France, at the time of the silly season. A local councillour tries to earn free publicity by proposing a massive campaign of tree eradication. Weird ? Sometimes truth is stranger than fiction...

Coming back to the core of the topic, it had its own share of weirdness. Numerous electro-magnetic effects were reported. Most of them were located in the vicinity of the Chemical Pole (curiously, some took place at Le Verney). Usually between the two explosions, but a number of anomalies seem to have taken place in the minutes before, notably power cuts or computers crashing.
Sightings of gigantic lightnings and laser-like beams form a class of their own, deserving to be treated separately.

Many were similar to what ordinary electrical malfunctionnings would cause. Like lights going on and off, computers or swipe card readers crashing, alarms setting on, power cuts...
Others were more similar to effects caused by lightning, like small electric arcs erupting from a phone, or St Elmo fire -like phenomena, sparks coming from metalic surfaces.
A number involved voltage incompatible with lightning. Notably electric arcs running along the railroad serving AZF.

Others were on a weirder scale. Like electric clocks stopping, suggesting an EMP. A railroad worker, Mr Bo, saw a very short lightning, blue, 2 m long, coming out of metallic loading turet, app. 8s before the B221 explosion. He compared it to a Jedi lightsaber. ( http://toulouse.azf4.free.fr/forum/viewtopic.php?t=269 20.10.2006 10:04 am ). And a number of fire balls.
http://toulouse.azf4.free.fr/forum/viewtopic.php?t=269
Examples : Mr D. was working to the east to building I0, along the railroad curve (100 m to the east to B221), when he spotted a small luminous ball moving "quietly" between two wagons. He then felt an explosion and was left knocked. A woman working for the shop Europe Sols, located 100 m to tthe west to the building AZF112, saw a "top" entering her room before she heard the first explosion.
Mr F. was leaving a locker room, close to the green tower (100 m to the south-west to B221), when he was frightened by a first explosion. Immediately after he saw a "herd" of small "lights" (not fire balls, he insisted on the distinction). They were more like will-o'-the-wisp, they seemed transparent, and were ascending slowly. Only after came the B221 explosion.

A number of witnesses felt "electrified". To some it was relatively benign. But it was not always the case. Sometimes it looked like a true electrocution, with uncanny features. Michèle A., in the RCU buiding, felt electrified on her right side and paralyzed; she heard cracklings (D0243, D2110). Germain M., in the Y2 NH3 building, felt electrified 2 sec after he had heard a sound of thunder coming from the North-East ; 3 sec later, he felt the big explosion (D2805). Damien B. felt a huge electric discharge while he was driving in his car, 100 m to the south-west to B221. Which is certainly unusual, as cars are good Faraday cages (but it is less true nowadays, due to the use of synthetic compounds). It was a violent schock, and he felt tetanized. With much effort, he could open the door, and felt to the ground (D1419, D2108, D5480, D5492). Michel R. related to the police that his hands were "attracted" to a metalic duct. He got a violent schock and felt paralized. It lasted for 3 to 4 seconds, he believed he was going to die, when the blast "fred" him (D0238, D2109, D5493).

But the strangest account comes from Roland D. (D2111, D5495). He stood near building RCI-SIS, on the far north of the factory, only 50m from B221. He wore insulating shoes. They didn't protect him as he was walking on a metallic footbridge. He suddenly felt his whole body and his hands were attracted to a hollow, cylindric "beam", shaped "like a bottle", "as if it was a magnet" ; he at first thought the cylinder was solid, as it was black ; but when he came in contact with it, he felt it was immaterial. Sparks were erupting from its surface. It was not like a small electric discharge. He remained "sticked" to the cylinder for 5 to 8 seconds, his body shaking. While he was feeling no pain, he thought he was going to die. When suddenly it ended. He thinks this was caused by the blast, his shop collapsing. Were they deluded, as official experts suggested ? They did exhibit burns. Are the deaths of the elevator reparairman and the Brossette employee related ? Their symptoms were similar. Were they not as lucky as Michel R. and Roland D. ? ( http://azf-enqueteassassinee.typepad.co ... .html#more , "Après les fumées, les phénomènes électriques").
In any case, electric expert Bernard Meunier, working for La Grande Paroisse, concluded these symptoms were not like ordinary electrocutions. It is certainly not normal for a metal duct to "attract" a human body...
 
Those effects left their imprint on the many power transformers inside and around the Chemical Pole.

maps of the transformers http://danieldissy.net/AZF-catastrophe/azf-temoins.php
http://www.azf-10h18.com/PGR_ELECTRICITE-II.html (go to #1)

+ new map of the factory : http://azf-enqueteassassinee.typepad.co ... ne/cartes/

Inside the SNPE, the Ramier transformer (63 kV) was seriously damaged, in a way the B221 blast couldn't account for (Valeurs actuelles, 22.3.2002 . AZFES, p.177). It was heavily protected, and its damage was internal. A set of rods fell. A similar incident was reported on another transformer, the F2 (13.5 kV). Inside AZF, the protective cover of transformer T10 melted - the result of powerful arcs.
As for T36, it simply vanished end in October or November 20041 ! It weighed 1 ton, but someone managed to remove it from the scene. Strangely, the investigation could provide no clue relating to the identity of the thiefs, despite that such a removal couldn't be discrete and the site was heavily guarded. Sté Navarra had been in charge of the cleaning of the site, to ease the removal of nitrates, at the request of the prefecture. They denied any involvement. That the prefecture requested the clearing of the site at all is another example of irregularity in the handling of the scene of the crime. It is to be noted that when Roland D. had his strange electrocution, he was only a few meters from T36.
http://www.azf-10h18.com/PGR_ELECTRICITE-II.html (go to #6) AZFES p. 92 - 95.
And there was the Lilas transformer (20 kV), outside the Pole but immediatley close to it : near the Chemin des Etroits, along the Garonne, facing the SNPE. Pierre Grésillaud and Daniel Dissy led their own investigation. A driver, who was very close to it, heard a very strong explosion, as strong as B221. A neighbour saw it destroyed ; while EDF denied any damage, it was curiously done up shortly later. There were reports, notably from ambulance men, that a military cordon was set in its vicinity as soon as 11.00 am.
http://toulouse.azf4.free.fr/forum/view ... c&start=60

Many malfunctionings were registered by electrical recorders, from the state electrical company EDF (and later RTE) or private companies, notably AZF. Their datations generated much controversy, and much technical debates. All were not synchronized. And once more, the SNPE obstructed the inquiry by claiming they had lost all their electrical records. Despite that AZF, while more damaged, retained most of theirs. ( http://www.azf-10h18.com/PGR_ELECTRICITE.html ) As a whole, two waves of incidents were evidenced. The first lasting app. 2 seconds, from 10h17'55'' to 57"5. The second after 10h18'05'', consisting of widespread damage to the general electrical array, notably the entanglement of power lines near the crater.

The logical conclusion is that those two waves were related to different incidents. Curiously, EDF and RTE maintain both were caused by the B221 blast, happening app. at 10 h 17' 55". We are left to wonder how power lines only 200 m away were damaged by the blast 11 seconds later. There is a reason to this strange conclusion : they support the thesis of only one explosion, and it is the official datation, based on the datation of the quake recorded by seismographs. It varied from 10h17'55"20 (according initially to the Observatoire Midi-Pyrénées - OMP) to 10h17'56''40 (according initially to the RéNASS), more recently established at 10h17' 55" 45. EDF tried to fit their datations. Remarkably, EDF modified their datations of the first incidents, to fit to the variations of the seismologists... That this tremor took place in this time interval is likely : it was established in the minutes following the disaster. What comes into question is their assertion that it is the datation of the AZF explosion. It is justified only by their will to link the seism to the B221 blast. There is no possibility that a surface explosion, badly coupled to the ground, leaving a 50 m wide crater would come close to a 3.2 to 3.4 tremor. Not even by a factor of 100. They couldn't provide any similar example, for the only reason that there aren't. They couldn't even seriously evidence that the total energy released in the blast would come close to 100 tonnes of TNT. Most of the AN was dispersed. Reports immediately after the disaster were clear : the surroundings of the Chemical pole were covered with AN. Gardeners had even to cut the grass twice more often than usual in the following weeks ! Pr Lefebvre refused to come with a definitive estimation, but was of the opinion that the amount was probably inferior to 50 t of TNT. Other studies concluded that the fraction which detonated was closer to 40 to 70 t of AN (16 to 28 t of TNT) ( http://toulouse.azf4.free.fr/forum/view ... &start=120 ), or even 30 t (13 t of TNT) as the Environnement Commission (CEI) estimated a few weeks after the disaster. As for the amount which went into the ground to dig the crater, the CEI estimated it at 110 to 150 kg of TNT (equivalent to 1.4 - 1.5 Richter).
The reasoning was circular. As EDF and RTE found no evidence of malfunctionnings prior to 10h17'55'', they supported that all anomalies were caused by the B221 blast... T. Deransart denounced this bias in articles published by Valeurs Actuelles (01.02.2002)
http://toulouse.azf.free.fr/articles/0954.html

Unbiased investigations made things clear : the B221 explosion took place at 10h18'05'' + 1 s. This is supported by a huge body of evidence. The general records of telephone companies, proving phone lines and the AZF exchange went dead at exactely this time. The sonometer of Ramonville, above Pech David (AZFEA p.147). The cutting of the high power line of Les Demoiselles by a metal shard, 200 m to the north of the crater, at 10h 17' 07''. The simultaneous second wave of electrical incidents, caused notably by the entanglement of power lines. The shutting of the AZF ammonia synthesis arrays (http://toulouse.azf4.free.fr/forum/view ... &start=100 23.9.2006 6.24 pm).

An example of evidence from phone call, the crucial deposition of witness M. E.. He was standing on the sixth floor of his building phoning to a friend, when he felt a tremor. A few seconds later, he saw a cloud ascend, from the azimuth of B221 (meaning again that the quake could not come from it). In its core were orange flames (typical of AN fire). One or two seconds later a huge explosion. His phone call was interrupted, the datation and his distance to the shed proved the explosion happened at 10h 18' 05''.
http://toulouse.azf4.free.fr/forum/view ... c&start=20 (16.9.2006, 11.41 am)

- His depiction of a narrow column of black smoke erupting abruptly from the shed, just before it was engulfed in a huge black and yellow cloud, is consistent with others. Notably of M. F., already mentionned, just after he had sighted will-o'the-wisp lights. This column is related to the ignition of the AN stack. Interestingly, its shape (M. F. described it as narrower at the base) suggests there was a hole in the roof of the shed ; caused by what ? -

A crucial incident was properly investigated, and led to the same conclusions : the SETMI incinerator incident (Farreny, "Quelques preuves de l'occurence de deux explosions - avec datations" ; AZFES p. 120-123 ). It was located at 2500 m to B221. Its director noted a fluctuation in power, sign that the SETMI had been cut from the general grid and was supplied by its own generators. App. 9 seconds later (gap drawn from a precise reconstitution), he heard a first explosion. Then 7s later, the B221 explosion. EDF dated the electrical incident at 10 h 17' 56". The director heard the second explosion at 10 h 18' 12". Not only it discounts the dumb seismoacoustic explanation, but establishes the 221 detonation took place at 10h 18' 05" (D2891).

After finding the datation of the big explosion and the two waves of incidents, the next step was to reconstruct a chronology of the electrical disturbances. From there, a number of experts tried to establish the cause of the disaster, notably from the transformers damages.
 
Those various anomalies led to an alternative theory, that the whole disaster was the result of an electrical accident, either a big EDF malfunctionning, or an incident inside the SNPE, probably caused by decrepit equipment. It was put forward by Daniel DEPRIS, aka André Dispeil, a former EDF engineer ( http://depris.cephes.free.fr/azfan1.htm ), and Jean-Pascal Serbera in his first book - nonetheless, none of them ruled out a terrorist attack as the possible source of the disturbance. Total and Grande Paroisse seemingly supported it for a time. Recently, Guillaume D'ALESSANDRO took up this hypothesis in his book AZF : Une vérité foudroyante - une affaire d'Etat. This theory leaves many sides unexplained. But a number of expert electrician attempted to reconstruct the sequence of electrical events, and they saw support in that.

And a team of experts had found an underground electromagnetic trace, not of natural origin, in december 2001, while they were searching for a buried WW2 bomb (a theory dropped shortly after, but it was plausible, as the ONIA had been bombeb heavily), along an west-north-west/east-south-east axe (AZFSE p. 208, http://azf-enqueteassassinee.typepad.co ... .html#more "Une tentative d'explication" ). It extended to the west, through the SIS building towards the Lafourguette transformer - and interestingly, forming a line with the dark scrach, the Brossette shops, and the Escaragol clubhouse. In agreement with police commissioner Roger SABY, the CEI tried to conduct aerial measurements outside AZF, towards the SNPE and Pech David. But on the 11th hour, the prefecture withdraw authorisation to fly over the area. Later, Roger Saby had the nerve to reproach Grande Paroisse not to have conducted the tests, while it was his colleagues' fault ! Another example of duplicity from the authorities.

A group of electrician experts, working for Total within the scope of the civil investigation, could establish a chronology of events. Data was collected from EDF records, and a wide range of reports sent to Total to fulfill compensation files. The debate took on a very technical turn, but Daniel Dissy gave a summary in his last book (p.168 +). They wrote the "JPR Note" ; a former scientific director from alsthom, Pierre Clarenne's works reached the same conclusions. They agreed upon the same chain of events.
Curiously, Total didn't react when they were informed of the results, despite that they would exonerate them... And that they officially supported the electric theory. Or did they just pretend ?
map of electrical supplies : http://www.azf-10h18.com/PGR_SNPE-VII.html
They noted that while the source of power for the SNPE was the Lafourguette transformer, via a 20 kV and a 63 kV lines, the Lilas was to supply it via the F2 and C2 in case of a power cut. Intriguingly, EDF-RTE, the SNPE and the city of Toulouse tried to conceal that. They also uncovered that Lafourguette earthed appliance had been destroyed. They concluded that a calculator TMC 11 MS, used to modulate power from Lafourguette, malfunctionned, because its battery had fallen into disrepair.
Their chronology begins with an earth current on the 20 kV line Lafourguette -SNPE, with a default of 5000 A, blowing it and leading to a power cut, at 10 h 17' 55" 77. The SNPE was immediately supplied via the Lilas transfo.. But the Lafourguette computer did not work. As a result, 2 seconds later (as is the rule for EDF in case of a circuit blowing), the line resupplied the SNPE. So, two 20 kV currents came to the two 20 kV SNPE transfo., and linked by a 13.5 kV line. The 63-20 kV Ramier TRF1 was affected too. Disaster guaranteed... A 63 kV bar falls, then a 13.5 kV bar. One or two transformers explode, causing a sound heard by many Toulousans. Many electrical equipments are affected. The conclusion of the JPR note was that as the Lafourguette, the location of the earthed disturbance and the crater were lined up, the detonation of B221 was probably the result of an electrical arc.
A conclusion similar to the one supported three years earlier. There lies a major difficulty.

They didn't put forward the hypothesis of an underground current, because it had already been ruled out. According to Clarenne's calculations, an earthing of 13.5 kV on the SNPE site would only result in an underground voltage of 1 kV on AZF, and a power of 1.4 kJ near the shed, too small to cause any detonation ; and only if it goes in a straight path and does not disperse. Which it does, in the absence of an underground line or vector ; it would result in fact only in a low voltage. Add to that the obstacle posed by the Garonne. At Total's request, who seemingly supported this theory, a trial was conducted at the SNPE on 29 and 30 october 2003. A current of 5000 A under 13.5 kV was sent into the ground. A voltage of only 32 V on the other side of the Garonne was measured. Another test conducted by EDF In their experimentation center of Renardières reached the same conclusions. But an aerial electrical arc is not more likely. On such a distance, it seems impossible. There were many obstacles. And it is highly dubious that it would detonate the AN, only decompose it. Another weakness was that they couldn't explain how the disturbances began.

Others tried to explain the anomalies as side effects from a terrorist attack or another explosion. Jean-Pierre Mayer, an electrician, supposed that transformer T36, near building I0, was damaged by a first missile. It may have rsulted in the compression of its windings, resulting in an accidental EMP, and a release of high voltage current to earth.
http://toulouse.azf4.free.fr/forum/view ... &start=220
http://www.geopolintel.fr/article23.html
http://www.geopolintel.fr/article190.html
I0, a bagging workshop, was located immediately to the north of B221, separated by a railroad. But there is a lack of sightings of an explosion near I0. Roland D. and Michel R. were near and inside this building when they felt paralysed, but nor they nor anyone else couldn't hear or feel any explosion. There were unexplained sightings of flames inside AZF seconds before the blast ; like Mrs P., who was driving on the Route d'Espagne (just along the plant, on the west side) and saw flames from a roof covered with tiles ( http://www.lepost.fr/article/2009/04/03 ... moins.html ) ; but they were from the southern parts, notably near the ammonia production workshops. Electrical recorders registered early disturbances on T36 and T24 (slightly to the southwest of the sheds), but they would be rather from an overload from an external source. Jean-Marie Arnaudiès came with a similar explanation, but located on the Ramier transformer. It would be more consistent with the chronology. But this theory can't explain many effects. Could this perturbance induce an electrocution hundreds of meters away ? And how to account for their unusual features ? And what of the similar anomalies at Le Vernet ?
 
Other theories explored a completely different direction : the use of non-conventional weapons. In his second book, J.-P. Serbera supposed a e-bomb had been used. The same idea was supported by Daniel Dissy. It could have been detonated underground or released from an aircraft (hence the aerial localisation of the first sound by british experts). Curiously, on his first web site, the page relating to EMP generators had been hijacked... Certainly, many effects were suggestive of an EMP. Including some at Le Vernay, 15 km away - electrical clock, and telephone answering machine stopping, coupled with grid disturbances. Some witnesses were confronted with malfunctionnings app. 10 seconds before electrical recorders recorded anything, suggesting the first effects did not come from electrical grids. On the other hand, some lasted a few seconds, like the electrocutions, while an EMP lasts only a fraction of a second. It can't account either for the sightings of beams.

Pierre Grésillaud, author of the site azf-10h18, was more of the opinion of a directed energy weapon experiment gone wrong. His scenario was of an electromagnetic fire, between the SNPE and Pech David. He noted that the Canadian-French-Swedish-Finnish satelitte Odin was at the vertical of Toulouse at the time of the disaster ( http://www.azf-10h18.com/PGR_SATELLITE.html ) ; and that then minister of industry Laurent FABIUS was waited at Toulouse the same morning. He even gave evidence that despite his denials, Fabius may already have been present ( http://www.azf-10h18.com/PGR_FABIUS.html ). There is certainly a major objection : while rulers may be reckless, it is hard to believe that they would lead such dangerous and secret tests in an area filled with dangerous (and often explosive) chemicals, at the core of an urban area. This is probably why while he is now of the opinion that the explosions were the result of a sabotage. Of a low level and relatively benign test, for example, that someone chose to "boost". In any case, his works certainly annoy the authorities. Like others, he was the target of many intimidation attempts (sometimes legal, but not only : car set ablaze, phone harassment...).

Many firms present at Toulouse are involved in the development of new sources of energy -and of course, new weapons. They form an intricate network of companies linked to militaro-industrial complexes of many countries, and have often shared interests. Alsthom ; Carlyle ; the SNPE ; WorldSpace, one of the leading satellites companies (and to some, a front cover for the Pentagone and the CIA, and their Star Wars plans) ; Areva ; Total etc... For years, there have been claims that some of them are involved in the development of weapons for the Strategic Defense Initiative, like military pulse lasers. Other possible experiment include not only the E-bomb, but micro-wave weapons, seismic weapons, the SPHINX, advanced telecommunications, HAARP, controlled plasmas, etc...
There is no doubt that electromagnetic weapons are studied. Some of them actually exist. There are blueprints for many kinds of EMP devices. Some energy transfer weapons certainly look like death rays from sci-fi. The terrawats lasers, like the french-german Téramobile ( http://www2.cnrs.fr/presse/thema/123.htm ), consist of sending a laser guide, ionising a channel to conduct a flow of electrons or plasma. They could be used to measure atmospheric pollution, to conduct lightnings. Or, on a higher level of energy, as a weapon. In fact, so many phenomena were present that a simple explanation seems unlikely, there may be more than one cause. A sabotage, or an hijacking of one of more secret projects may have been involved. Seemingly coupled with an attack on the Chemical Pole. To answer those questions, we need to know what lies below Pech David. Where seismic data, physical damage and testimonies locate the source of the tremor, appr. simultaneously with or just prior to the first explosion(s), 8 seconds before the green tower destruction and 10 seconds before the B221 blast.
Pr Henry LEHN came with an even more exotic hypothesis : a flow of magnetic monopoles. Citing controversial experiments in Russia (some he was involved in), he defends that magnetons affect polar molecules like AN, and can detonate it.
http://toulouse.azf4.free.fr/forum/viewtopic.php?t=12
http://www.verite921.com/CONTRIBUTEURS/ ... 0Lehn.html
http://www.verite921.com/CONTRIBUTEURS/ ... 0boule.wmv
According to Lehn, Russians would test them as a weapon to fulfill a goal military from many countries long sought, after all other attempts failed : to destroy ennemy stocks at distance. He thinks that they could account for the weird effects noticed.
Now, the lightnings/beams...
 
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