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Unexplained Railway Accidents—Or Unexplained Aspects Of Otherwise Explainable Accidents

Cochise

Priest of the cult of the Dog with the Broken Paw
Joined
Jun 17, 2011
Messages
8,474
Railway accidents have always been a fascination of mine since I bought L. T. C. Rolt's 'Red for Danger' when I was about twelve. i will try and put on here descriptions of several puzzling accidents, and also some tales surrounding other accidents. (Yes, there will be ghosts.)

Bear with me, I will try and put up one a day.

I have access to the original investigative reports on these accidents, so don't expect sensationalism.
 
The one that springs to mind is Moorgate.
I have read a fair bit on it.
One thing that sticks in my mind is that the father of Laurence Marks (co-writer of Shine on Harvey Moon, Goodnight Sweetheart, Birds of a Feather) died in the crash, and Laurence Marks believes the cause was that the driver intentionally crashed the train.
I won't write more yet...will wait until you post about it @Cochise as I have a little inside knowledge about the crash.
 
The one that springs to mind is Moorgate.
I have read a fair bit on it.
One thing that sticks in my mind is that the father of Laurence Marks (co-writer of Shine on Harvey Moon, Goodnight Sweetheart, Birds of a Feather) died in the crash, and Laurence Marks believes the cause was that the driver intentionally crashed the train.
I won't write more yet...will wait until you post about it @Cochise as I have a little inside knowledge about the crash.
Yes, I'm aware of that and I've read Laurence Mark's article. Moorgate won't be one of the first I do, but I'll just add that a recurring theme in the most mysterious cases is the drivers were seen by witnesses motionless just before the disaster. Grantham and Bourne End for example.

Having said I'll do this I realise to make it interesting to any non-railway enthusiast who might be reading I'll have to cut the technicalities to a minimum, so apologise to anyone well informed on the subject who thinks I've over-simplified, but it's not my intention to describe the actual crash more then is necessary to bring out the puzzling aspect of it. When I get the first one up of course any suggestions will be welcome. It probably won't be until Wednesday because I've a lot to do today and tomorrow and the wee doggie is off to hospital again on Tuesday.
 
I haven't forgotten this, it's just when I tried to write up my first case I found some rather alarming differences between the contemporary original report and the 'classic' descriptions in books.
 
Yes, I'm aware of that and I've read Laurence Mark's article. Moorgate won't be one of the first I do, but I'll just add that a recurring theme in the most mysterious cases is the drivers were seen by witnesses motionless just before the disaster. Grantham and Bourne End for example.
Target fixation.
Mixed with shock when you realise your going too fast and it's too late.
 
Quinitnshill

I’ve changed the accident I intended to start with, which was a ‘mysterious cause’ case. I’ll start instead with the worst ever accident in the UK. In this case it’s not the causes of the accident that are mysterious, rather some details about the consequences.

First, some brief description. A typical UK mainline railway has two tracks, like a typical single carriageway A road. Down (away from London) is on the left if you imagine yourself stood in London, Up is on the right.

At Quntinshill there was a lay-by on each track so faster trains could overtake slower ones.

It is early morning Saturday, May 22nd, 1915. At this distance from London (Quininshill is just over the Scottish border north of Carlisle) the line is actually quite busy. There are overnight trains from London heading north, coal trains both empty and full concerned with supply to the Royal Navy in the far north, and a troop train heading south to embark two companies of the Royal Scots at Liverpool bound for the Dardanelles.

In among all this important traffic is a somewhat dilatory down local train. Unusually it is headed on this day by a particularly large locomotive, an express engine running in after overhaul. This train is being overtaken by an express from the south. Unfortunately at Quintinshill both the lay-bys are occupied by coal trains. So the signalman then on duty (whose relief is on the local) decides to shunt it across from the down line to the up line. His relief jumps off the local as it is reversing across, goes up to the box, and takes over duty. Meanwhile the troop train is approaching on the same (up) line. No problem, the signals are set to danger.

It is 6:27 am.

At 6:47, the relief signalman who has travelled on the train now parked on the up line right outside the signalbox clears the signals for the up troop train. The results are catastrophic. The troop train hits the local at 70mph, and the down express runs into the wreckage seconds after. The coaches (mostly) are wooden and have gas lights, the gas cylinders rupture and are set alight.

The death toll is 227. Of 500 Royal Scots only 54 could be mustered at a roll call, the rest dead or seriously injured.

The mysteries
  • Unidentified Victims. We will come across this again. There were 4 (some say 5) sets of remains that were never identified. A woman and three children. There were contemporary suggestions that they were Belgian refugees that had stowed away. That makes no sense. It would be a fairly deranged person that would wish to return from Glasgow to Belgium in 1915.
  • Desertions. The fire was so fierce that about 50 of the Royal Scots were listed as ‘missing’ . Contemporary rumour has it that at least some of them, either deliberately or through shock, deserted. Officially this is denied.
  • Mercy Killings. Allegedly some soldiers trapped in the wreckage were shot to prevent them from further agony because they could not be saved from the fire. Certainly some soldiers had limbs amputated to free them from the wreckage before they were burnt alive.
  • The relief signalman. A couple of contemporary references suggest he might have been subject to fits. I myself think that this – if true at all - was a response to the accident rather than a cause – there were other people in the signalbox with him who would surely have noticed? But of course medical checks in 1915 would be much less rigorous than today.
  • It took 4 hours before the Carlisle fire brigade (10 miles away) arrived at the scene, by which time the fire was totally out of control.
Only relatively minor mysteries in the overall scheme of things, but still chewed over by investigative authors until this day – there was a book published in 2013 called “The Quntinshill Conspiracy’.
 
Quinitnshill

I’ve changed the accident I intended to start with, which was a ‘mysterious cause’ case. I’ll start instead with the worst ever accident in the UK. In this case it’s not the causes of the accident that are mysterious, rather some details about the consequences.

First, some brief description. A typical UK mainline railway has two tracks, like a typical single carriageway A road. Down (away from London) is on the left if you imagine yourself stood in London, Up is on the right.

At Quntinshill there was a lay-by on each track so faster trains could overtake slower ones.

It is early morning Saturday, May 22nd, 1915. At this distance from London (Quininshill is just over the Scottish border north of Carlisle) the line is actually quite busy. There are overnight trains from London heading north, coal trains both empty and full concerned with supply to the Royal Navy in the far north, and a troop train heading south to embark two companies of the Royal Scots at Liverpool bound for the Dardanelles.

In among all this important traffic is a somewhat dilatory down local train. Unusually it is headed on this day by a particularly large locomotive, an express engine running in after overhaul. This train is being overtaken by an express from the south. Unfortunately at Quintinshill both the lay-bys are occupied by coal trains. So the signalman then on duty (whose relief is on the local) decides to shunt it across from the down line to the up line. His relief jumps off the local as it is reversing across, goes up to the box, and takes over duty. Meanwhile the troop train is approaching on the same (up) line. No problem, the signals are set to danger.

It is 6:27 am.

At 6:47, the relief signalman who has travelled on the train now parked on the up line right outside the signalbox clears the signals for the up troop train. The results are catastrophic. The troop train hits the local at 70mph, and the down express runs into the wreckage seconds after. The coaches (mostly) are wooden and have gas lights, the gas cylinders rupture and are set alight.

The death toll is 227. Of 500 Royal Scots only 54 could be mustered at a roll call, the rest dead or seriously injured.

The mysteries
  • Unidentified Victims. We will come across this again. There were 4 (some say 5) sets of remains that were never identified. A woman and three children. There were contemporary suggestions that they were Belgian refugees that had stowed away. That makes no sense. It would be a fairly deranged person that would wish to return from Glasgow to Belgium in 1915.
  • Desertions. The fire was so fierce that about 50 of the Royal Scots were listed as ‘missing’ . Contemporary rumour has it that at least some of them, either deliberately or through shock, deserted. Officially this is denied.
  • Mercy Killings. Allegedly some soldiers trapped in the wreckage were shot to prevent them from further agony because they could not be saved from the fire. Certainly some soldiers had limbs amputated to free them from the wreckage before they were burnt alive.
  • The relief signalman. A couple of contemporary references suggest he might have been subject to fits. I myself think that this – if true at all - was a response to the accident rather than a cause – there were other people in the signalbox with him who would surely have noticed? But of course medical checks in 1915 would be much less rigorous than today.
  • It took 4 hours before the Carlisle fire brigade (10 miles away) arrived at the scene, by which time the fire was totally out of control.
Only relatively minor mysteries in the overall scheme of things, but still chewed over by investigative authors until this day – there was a book published in 2013 called “The Quntinshill Conspiracy’.

It being 1915, there will likely be a War Diary for the Scots Guards unit. Do you happen to know a) whether it has been consulted/cited, and b) which battalion this was?
 
It being 1915, there will likely be a War Diary for the Scots Guards unit. Do you happen to know a) whether it has been consulted/cited, and b) which battalion this was?

Seemingly not. Nothing at the National Archives.

Nominal Rolls normally accompany diaries and that was said to have been burnt in the crash.
 
Target fixation.
Mixed with shock when you realise your going too fast and it's too late.
When I get to writing it up I'll be interested in your comments. There are both pro's and con's to that argument (as of course there are to any other explanations of Moorgate). In general I intend to refrain from 'explanations' and let y'all come up with your ideas :)
 
My opinion, and that's all it is as I'm not an expert in the operation of railways past or present, is that human error was the main cause. The procedures followed in that particular signal box were quite lax, and the number of people coming and going from it prior to the accident wouldn't have helped. The railway company was certainly culpable as well, amongst other things the lines approaching Quintinshill from either direction were very busy, hence the slightly complex manoeuvres required to move trains off a busy mainline and on to the passing loops. A major factor in the number of deaths has to be that the troop train consisted of wooden, gaslit carriages which should have been withdrawn before then. I'm not convinced about the unnamed children, it's possible that the smaller coffins contained bits of bodies rather than small bodies.

As an aside there is a memorial at Larbert Station, where the soldiers boarded the train. It was erected by a certain Councillor Billy Buchanan. Quintinshill.jpg
 
This 2013 book claims that there was a conspiracy to load all of the blame onto the relief signalman, and that lax operating procedures were to blame.
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Sco7BAAAQBAJ

It's difficult to enter into the safety culture of a railway company so far in the past, but it seems very likely to me that the attitude at the time was split between a very strict and inflexible rule book, and a company-wide attitude that the staff knew their job better than the book. The previous signalman should have placed a locking collar on the frame to remind his relief that there was a train in section; of course, having just got off the train, the relief man should have known about the train in any case.

Although the relief man made a terrible error, it was compounded by the error of the previous signalman, and by lax procedures (these locking collars were rarely used, and the inspectors do not seem to have insisted on them). The whole safety culture of the Caledonian seems to have been at fault.

On the modern railway these sorts of lapses are very rare, since every movement is electronically monitored (except where the old boxes are still in place); but wiring foul-ups (as at Clapham) sometimes take the place of forgetfulness.
 
Unidentified Victims. We will come across this again. There were 4 (some say 5) sets of remains that were never identified. A woman and three children. There were contemporary suggestions that they were Belgian refugees that had stowed away. That makes no sense. It would be a fairly deranged person that would wish to return from Glasgow to Belgium in 1915.

(My bolding) -- with respect; I'm not so sure. On wartime / occupation, and general "tyranny" scenes: some people have done and do, make choices and take actions which may seem at first sight, strange and contrary to their own interests -- but it's possible for them to be in situations (particularly, in my perception, to do with loved family members and their circumstances) in which they find it appropriate to act thus. The "under the foreign oppressor's boot" business can be less clear-cut than it may seem to a citizen of of one of the opposing belligerents, who has not experienced it -- assorted shades of grey, may feature.

Or, imaginably, Belgian refugees who, in Glasgow or thereabouts, found themselves in what was for them, an awful situation; and were trying to get to another part of Britain where they figured life might be better for them?
 
...Or, imaginably, Belgian refugees who, in Glasgow or thereabouts, found themselves in what was for them, an awful situation; and were trying to get to another part of Britain where they figured life might be better for them?

I suspect it's something like this.

Given that their identity is unknown it's logical to assume that any suggestion about where they were going is based almost entirely on rumour and surmise. The logistics of domestic travel in wartime could result in highly circuitous journeys. If they were refugees they may simply have made landfall in Scotland and been heading south to London, which was a hub for many refugee communities.

Arguably, there may be little logic in them attempting to return to Belgium - but there are plenty of logical options as to why they might be heading south.
 
On the modern railway these sorts of lapses are very rare, since every movement is electronically monitored (except where the old boxes are still in place); but wiring foul-ups (as at Clapham) sometimes take the place of forgetfulness.

That's quite right. With more advanced safety devices the responsibilities for safety don't disappear entirely, they transfer to different people.

I tried to keep the description simple :). The lever collars were apparently never used in that box. And yes, rules were broken. but I think the Victorian concept of individual responsibility was still very strong at that time. It could strike at the high as well as the low - witness the downfall of Sir Thomas Bouch after the Tay Bridge disaster. (One I won't be covering - there's nothing mysterious about it).
 
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Regarding the desertions, it occurred to me that given the public relations disaster of the accident, the authorities might have decided - if indeed they did suspect desertions - not to follow them up as it would have been embarrassing to have to court martial soldiers who'd experienced the horrors of the accident. But perhaps that is too modern a line of thought for the times.
 
The Tay Bridge event was interesting in one particular; Bouch miscalculated the wind pressure, using data concocted by the (then) Astronomer Royal, George Biddel Airy. Airy's calculations were woefully inadequate.

Airy is often remembered for his discovery of the Airy Disk, the pattern that forms when a telescope or other optical instrument is pushed to the limits of its resolution. A non-trivial number of UAP photos show Airy Disks.
Rubinar-1000_plus_2x_K-1_telekonv_Airy_disk_1.jpg
 
Regarding the desertions, it occurred to me that given the public relations disaster of the accident, the authorities might have decided - if indeed they did suspect desertions - not to follow them up as it would have been embarrassing to have to court martial soldiers who'd experienced the horrors of the accident. But perhaps that is too modern a line of thought for the times.

FWIW, I find it easy to believe the authorities deliberately avoided pursuing the desertion angle. They already had a big PR problem with the public outcry over the accident itself. All but 5 of the identified military survivors were judged unfit to be sent overseas to the war. Any additional survivors who'd slipped away in the chaos weren't likely to have been evaluated as better suited for combat.

The authorities couldn't avoid the PR blowback from the casualties, and it made little sense to open up a second front for potential public dissension. The war effort and associated domestic support for it represented the bigger priority. Whether deserted or dead, the missing soldiers weren't likely to contribute to that effort. I suspect the administrative decision was to close the books on the affair, absorb the blowback they already faced, and move on.
 
FWIW, I find it easy to believe the authorities deliberately avoided pursuing the desertion angle. They already had a big PR problem with the public outcry over the accident itself. All but 5 of the identified military survivors were judged unfit to be sent overseas to the war. Any additional survivors who'd slipped away in the chaos weren't likely to have been evaluated as better suited for combat.

The authorities couldn't avoid the PR blowback from the casualties, and it made little sense to open up a second front for potential public dissension. The war effort and associated domestic support for it represented the bigger priority. Whether deserted or dead, the missing soldiers weren't likely to contribute to that effort. I suspect the administrative decision was to close the books on the affair, absorb the blowback they already faced, and move on.

The British Army always puts three considerations above all others in the wake of an incident with discipline or morale.

1) How best can we prevent this catching on and inspiring more similar incidents?
2) How will this incident affect the morale (and, hence, operational effectiveness) of other men in this unit and in other similar units?
3) How can we act in order to address the above concerns without setting a precedent?

If you have a course of action that accords with these concerns, you may well have the truth.
 
Should have another one up today. It's taken me longer for each one than I expected, because I've found that there are a lot of discrepancies between sources like Wikipedia and even some of the standard written works and the official reports at the time. Possibly some of these discrepancies arrive because the authors have used other sources like newspapers. I haven't. We live in a more cynical age and I wouldn't trust a word in the newspapers. They typically can't even tell the Royal Scot and the Flying Scotsman apart.
 
Bourne End


This relatively little known accident is the seventh worst in the history of British railways.

Bourne End is approximately 30 miles north of Euston (London) on the West Coast main line, one of the UK’s major rail arteries. As this is such an important line, the normal arrangement of tracks is doubled, so there are four parallel tracks, reading from the west Up Fast, Down Fast, Up Slow, Down Slow.

On Sunday 30th September 1945, there was maintenance work going on to the south of Bourne End on the fast lines. As Bourne End was the closest crossover – place where trains could be switched from one track to another - all trains were to be crossed over to the slow lines there to bypass the maintenance works. This crossover is limited to 20mph.

At approximately 9am, the delayed 8:20pm overnight express from Perth was approaching the crossover at or slightly below normal line speed, estimated at 60mph. It failed to slow for the crossover. The loco managed to negotiate the first part of the crossover (switching it off the fast line) but burst through the second part which should have turned it back on to the slow. It went over the embankment into the field below and the first seven coaches piled up on top of it in a 30ft high mound of wreckage. The accident killed 43 including the driver and fireman, and seriously injured 64.

The driver knew of the diversion because it was published in the ‘Weekly Notices’ that every driver is required to study. The driver in question was well known for his meticulous study of these notices.

In addition, while waiting to take over the late running train at Crewe, an inspector had come in to the cab of the engine to update the crew on the expected arrival time of the Perth express, and found the driver actually studying the relevant page.

Even had he forgot the content of the notice or misunderstood, had he obeyed the signals then all would have been OK. It was a fine clear morning. His first warning would have been a colour light signal – like road traffic lights except with two yellow lenses. This could be seen from about 600 yards away. It was showing ‘double yellow’ – caution - which should have caused the driver to start slowing.

At this time double yellow also had a double meaning - it could mean the next signal was at ‘yellow’ – meaning prepare to stop – or that the train was approaching a speed limit, as in this case. The inspector who compiled the report felt this was potentially confusing and should be changed, but he also thought it had little bearing on this accident as the driver knew the route so well.

The next signal was no help, because it was an old fashioned semaphore which said ‘clear’ - again potentially confusing to us. But in this case it simply meant the line was clear to the next signal. The signal after that clearly showed the diversion and was visible from 850 yards away – plenty of time to slow the train if the outer signal had been missed.

Witnesses confirmed that if the brakes were applied at all it was only at the last second.

J. A. B. Hamilton describes this accident as the most inexplicable of the major accidents. (He was writing before Moorgate)

I quote from the official report:

28. What is so baffling about the circumstances of the train's approach to Bourne End is the fact that visible warning of the diversion (during a period of 20 seconds) should have been conveyed to Driver Swaby between points about 2,616 yards and 2,026 yards respectively from the junction, nearly 1½ minutes before he reached it. This is a long time in which to account for inaction on a footplate to reduce speed from, say, 60 m.p.h. to 20 m.p.h. Moreover, Swaby was a most reliable and conscientious man with an exemplary character, and was supported by an equally reliable and experienced fireman; a second visible reminder should have had effect before the Outer Home signal was passed, namely, when the Inner Home came into view at a point 851 yards from the junction, in which distance the train could even have been stopped by full brake application. On the contrary, it seems at least doubtful, according to the evidence, whether the brake was applied much before the engine reached the junction, and certainly the whistle was not blown. Indeed, Swaby appears to have continued his approach to Bourne End in ignorance of any danger, at any rate until the engine was within a very short distance. This is not a case of delinquency on the part of a youthful, inexperienced, or careless man, and although Signalman Nash, the principal witness, referred to the speed through the junction as having been less than normal for the straight road, any suggestion that Swaby misjudged the low restriction of 20 m.p.h. can hardly be sustained in view of his record nor was this a case of underestimation of speed after running for many miles at 80 or 90 m.p.h.

29. It was established that when he passed Berkhamsted at about 60 m.p.h., less than two minutes before the accident, he was seen by the Signalman to be seated in his normal position. It would have been customary for the regulator to be closed soon after that; namely, when the Distant signal for Bourne End was sighted at YY. “


Note that, as at Moorgate, the driver appeared to be normal but inactive. Also as at Moorgate, the guard was ineffective – at Moorgate he was reading, at Bourne End he was having a cup of tea.

Some commentators have suggested fatigue – however the Inspector went in to that issue and determined that, although Driver Swaby regularly volunteered for Sunday duty where many tried to avoid it, he had observed the rules regarding rest periods. He criticised other drivers who disrupted operations by failing to turn out on Sundays. I think people have been misled in to blaming it on fatigue because, as with the YY signal indication, the Inspector was pointing out issues that could pose a danger in different circumstances – for example with a driver who was less conscientious about observing rest periods - but was not suggesting they applied in this case.
 
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Thanks for these stories, Cochise, and I look forward to reading more of them. The unanswered questions will, in all probability, remain that way, but you are presenting the known facts very clearly.

As it happens, I live only a couple of miles from the site of a serious rail crash - if I say it was in 1955, I suspect it won't take you long to work out where I am!
 
What do we know of the home life of Driver Swaby? It's interesting that he volunteered a lot for Sunday work - to get him out of the house?

I'm fascinated by these stories. I grew up alongside the railways, my dad was a shunter for British Rail from 1960 until he retired in 1993, we lived right beside the railway and I've spent many a Christmas morning in the shunters cabin where my dad - as the person who lived closest - used to go over and stoke up the fire so it hadn't gone out when everyone came into work the next day.
 
Is it possible that poor Driver Swaby had suffered some kind of medical incident that rendered him inactive - a heart attack or a stroke, perhaps?
 
Is it possible that poor Driver Swaby had suffered some kind of medical incident that rendered him inactive - a heart attack or a stroke, perhaps?
Well, the signalman at the box 2 miles from the crash saw him sat in a normal driving position. By this time most of the modern steam engines could be driven sitting down. Of course there could have been something that happened immediately afterwards.

.They did enquire in to his general health and found no problems. They don't seem to have done an autopsy. They also enquired in to his home circumstances and found no problems. There was a previous accident in which they found that the driver's home had just been hit in the blitz and that was considered a factor in his loss of concentration.
 
The driver had worked something like 26 consecutive days, so that may have played a part.
Yes. I think that has been the general conclusion. My doubt is because the Inspector was aware of that, and went quite thoroughly into what rest he had taken during that period, and concluded it was more than adequate.

Also, although of course the Driver is responsible, the fireman and the guard should have been taking note - they were both aware of the speed restriction. The guard can apply the brakes as well as the driver. As mentioned above, the guard was drinking tea. With his mate in the restaurant car. While the guard on a passenger train has many other distractions, you'd have thought (as did the Inspector) that he ought to have been paying attention when coming up to a temporary diversion of this kind.
 
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