And as for the poor bastards who do the work
http://www.contractoruk.com/news/004107.html
A hideous step.
http://www.contractoruk.com/news/004107.html
A hideous step.
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A touch of irony here 8) :
1978: Labour opposed ID cards to curb illegal immigration
Kaya Burgess
The Labour administration in 1978 believed the introduction of ID cards would be “unacceptable” and “objectionable” in the fight against illegal immigration, confidential documents released today show.
The comments were in a draft statement due to be given to the Commons by Merlyn Rees, the Home Secretary, who wrote that the introduction of identity cards “would require major changes in practices and powers reaching far beyond immigration control”.
He added: “In the past such changes have been contemplated only in war: the Government does not believe they could be justified on immigration grounds alone.”
The comments were later edited out of the final speech he delivered to the House, as a struggling Labour Government tried to resist the calls from Opposition leader Margaret Thatcher for more draconian measures to tackle illegal immigration.
In a secret discussion between Prime Minister Callaghan and the Whips on March 8 1978, a Downing Street aide wrote: “It was claimed that many Asian immigrants were very frightened.
“There was bitter opposition to the tactics adopted by Mrs Thatcher... and that resentment should be exploited by the Government.”
Ministers stuck by their pledge not to introduce quotas on immigration as they did not want the “objectionable” measure of requiring everyone to carry identification papers.
The confidential Government documents also discussed ways to expose “the fraudulent nature of Mrs Thatcher’s approach”, although a personal note written by Mr Callaghan warned that the Government’s response to Select Committee recommendations was too lacklustre.
He said: “We seemed to be accepting few recommendations – mostly ones to do nothing.”
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/p ... 415760.ece
1978: Labour opposed ID cards to curb illegal immigration
Kaya Burgess
The Labour administration in 1978 believed the introduction of ID cards would be “unacceptable” and “objectionable” in the fight against illegal immigration, confidential documents released today show.
The comments were in a draft statement due to be given to the Commons by Merlyn Rees, the Home Secretary, who wrote that the introduction of identity cards “would require major changes in practices and powers reaching far beyond immigration control”.
He added: “In the past such changes have been contemplated only in war: the Government does not believe they could be justified on immigration grounds alone.”
The comments were later edited out of the final speech he delivered to the House, as a struggling Labour Government tried to resist the calls from Opposition leader Margaret Thatcher for more draconian measures to tackle illegal immigration.
In a secret discussion between Prime Minister Callaghan and the Whips on March 8 1978, a Downing Street aide wrote: “It was claimed that many Asian immigrants were very frightened.
“There was bitter opposition to the tactics adopted by Mrs Thatcher... and that resentment should be exploited by the Government.”
Ministers stuck by their pledge not to introduce quotas on immigration as they did not want the “objectionable” measure of requiring everyone to carry identification papers.
The confidential Government documents also discussed ways to expose “the fraudulent nature of Mrs Thatcher’s approach”, although a personal note written by Mr Callaghan warned that the Government’s response to Select Committee recommendations was too lacklustre.
He said: “We seemed to be accepting few recommendations – mostly ones to do nothing.”
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/p ... 415760.ece
OneWingedBird
Beloved of Ra
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And this shows just how not open to abuse these uber databases are. It's not like an ex senior copper would use it to try and find his lost dog, is it? *cough cough cough*
http://www.yorkshireeveningpost.co.uk/n ... 4892758.jp
http://www.yorkshireeveningpost.co.uk/n ... 4892758.jp
Looks like we'd all better get used to that, according to the latest NO2ID newsletter. It seems the Data Protection Act is being dismantled at this moment.
It appears the Westminster government is rushing through a lovely bit of legislation which will mean any minister / govt. department will be able to to make 'Information Sharing Orders', in order to use information obtained for one purpose to be used for another. Even the supposedly confidential stuff.
So, everything ever recorded about you anywhere becomes freely available to any (official - for the moment, see below) body. That's not just 'government'/ crime / tax/ benefit type information, the changes allow for data trafficking between government and private companies (NHS? What about banks, would it include them do you think?) and even foreign governments. :shock:
The important bit is apparently hidden away in the Coroners and Justice Bill, Clause 152. I'm off to see what exactly it says, because this is not looking good for civil liberties in Britain!
It appears the Westminster government is rushing through a lovely bit of legislation which will mean any minister / govt. department will be able to to make 'Information Sharing Orders', in order to use information obtained for one purpose to be used for another. Even the supposedly confidential stuff.
So, everything ever recorded about you anywhere becomes freely available to any (official - for the moment, see below) body. That's not just 'government'/ crime / tax/ benefit type information, the changes allow for data trafficking between government and private companies (NHS? What about banks, would it include them do you think?) and even foreign governments. :shock:
The important bit is apparently hidden away in the Coroners and Justice Bill, Clause 152. I'm off to see what exactly it says, because this is not looking good for civil liberties in Britain!
Analogue Boy
Bar 6
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Yesterday, Radio 4's Today had a report on data protection and the general view was there isn't much regard for protecting data within government itself.
There was a brief review of the blunders we've already covered here but it's worth making the point again about the statement that the drive is on the amount of data officials collect and not its accuracy.
On this, there was a report from a woman who'd been asking the NHS to get her postcode right for years. She and a neighbour have to swap correspondance. Rather nasty if you DON'T get a letter from them saying you need an operation urgently.
There was a brief review of the blunders we've already covered here but it's worth making the point again about the statement that the drive is on the amount of data officials collect and not its accuracy.
On this, there was a report from a woman who'd been asking the NHS to get her postcode right for years. She and a neighbour have to swap correspondance. Rather nasty if you DON'T get a letter from them saying you need an operation urgently.
Analogue Boy
Bar 6
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Here's a little more detail on my previous post.
Full thing here...
http://www.publicservice.co.uk/news_story.asp?id=8324
Full thing here...
http://www.publicservice.co.uk/news_story.asp?id=8324
OneWingedBird
Beloved of Ra
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Analogue Boy
Bar 6
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I was watching the news last night....did I really hear it right? Was one of the disgraced members of the House of Lords given cash to promote legislation changes by the company Experian - a key player in the steamrolling ID Card/ database system? It seems so.
It's been debatable whether the ID Card scheme is a true conspiracy theory but when such large amounts of cash are alleged to have been handed over at a tea and cake ceremony, it seems those with a vested interest in this hideous piece of legislation are a step ahead in getting what they want.
http://richardwilsonauthor.wordpress.co ... r-to-make/
It's been debatable whether the ID Card scheme is a true conspiracy theory but when such large amounts of cash are alleged to have been handed over at a tea and cake ceremony, it seems those with a vested interest in this hideous piece of legislation are a step ahead in getting what they want.
http://richardwilsonauthor.wordpress.co ... r-to-make/
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The first ID cards are here - but no one can read them
Thousands of ID cards have already been issued to foreign residents in the UK as part of the government's £4.7 billion scheme, but no one can read the details stored on them
Murad Ahmed, Technology Reporter
The first biometric ID cards have now been issued in the UK, but no one has a machine that can read them.
Thousands of foreign residents in the UK were the first people to receive ID cards late last year, as the UK government began to implement its £4.7 billion identity card scheme. But the Identity and Passport Service (IPS) has admitted that not one police station, border and immigration point or job centre has a machine that can read the card's biometric chip.
The revelation is the result of a Freedom of Information request made by the technology site silicon.com. According to the report, there is still no firm timetable for the introduction of card readers. A government minister said that it would be up to police forces to decide when to invest in the technology, and that readers would be given to immigration officials over time.
Last November, the first cards were issued to some foreign students and people applying to renew visas issued on the basis of marriage. 50,000 cards are expected to be issued to foreign nationals by April. The Home Office estimates that three million foreign nationals will carry a card by 2010.
The cards store various personal details, such as name, date and place of birth, sex, nationality and whether the holder has access to publicly funded state benefits or services. However, fingerprint scans can only be accessed by reading the biometric chip embedded in the cards.
Shadow home secretary Chris Grayling said: "Once again ministers have shown that the ID card project is absolutely farcical. What is the point of spending billions of pounds on cards that can't be read in the UK?”
http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol ... 675223.ece
Thousands of ID cards have already been issued to foreign residents in the UK as part of the government's £4.7 billion scheme, but no one can read the details stored on them
Murad Ahmed, Technology Reporter
The first biometric ID cards have now been issued in the UK, but no one has a machine that can read them.
Thousands of foreign residents in the UK were the first people to receive ID cards late last year, as the UK government began to implement its £4.7 billion identity card scheme. But the Identity and Passport Service (IPS) has admitted that not one police station, border and immigration point or job centre has a machine that can read the card's biometric chip.
The revelation is the result of a Freedom of Information request made by the technology site silicon.com. According to the report, there is still no firm timetable for the introduction of card readers. A government minister said that it would be up to police forces to decide when to invest in the technology, and that readers would be given to immigration officials over time.
Last November, the first cards were issued to some foreign students and people applying to renew visas issued on the basis of marriage. 50,000 cards are expected to be issued to foreign nationals by April. The Home Office estimates that three million foreign nationals will carry a card by 2010.
The cards store various personal details, such as name, date and place of birth, sex, nationality and whether the holder has access to publicly funded state benefits or services. However, fingerprint scans can only be accessed by reading the biometric chip embedded in the cards.
Shadow home secretary Chris Grayling said: "Once again ministers have shown that the ID card project is absolutely farcical. What is the point of spending billions of pounds on cards that can't be read in the UK?”
http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol ... 675223.ece
Wonder how Westminster will react to this? Nice to see those kind folks up the road standing up for themselves. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/7890180.stm
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/7890180.stm
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The shape of things to come..?
Thousands of drivers with photo licence face fines of up to £1,000
Ben Webster, Transport Correspondent
More than 40,000 drivers risk fines of up to £1,000 because they have failed to renew their photocard driving licences.
Many will not have realised that photocards expire after ten years, unlike the old green paper licences, which were valid until the driver was 70. Drivers risk prosecution if stopped by police and may also find that their insurers refuse to pay out on claims they make.
The problem has only emerged in recent months because photocards were first issued in 1998. The first renewals were due in July last year, and between then and the end of January 173,867 photocards expired.
Figures obtained by The Times from the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) show that only 128,987 of those drivers have paid £17.50 and sent in new photos to renew their licences, leaving 44,880 outstanding. Some of those drivers will have died or stopped driving, but the vast majority will have failed to notice the small print on their photocards showing the expiry date.
Related Links
Petrol pump prices rise despite fall in oil
Average speed cameras approved for suburbia
The date is listed on the photocard under “4b”. To find out what this means, a driver would have to turn the card over and study even smaller print in an explanatory list, which says “4b licence valid to”.
To add to the confusion, the photocard also shows another “to” date, the day before the driver's 70th birthday. On a standard car licence, this date is listed seven times beside different categories of vehicle, and a driver might assume the photocard is valid until then.
The DVLA said that more than a quarter of drivers due to renew their photocards had not done so, despite being sent reminders. At that rate, more than a quarter of a million drivers could be risking prosecution by the end of the year.
A DVLA spokesman said that drivers who failed to renew their licences “are still entitled to drive but are potentially committing the offence of failing to surrender their licence. Conviction by a court could lead to a fine of up to £1,000.” He added that the ten-year renewal was necessary because faces changed.
The Association of British Insurers said that drivers with out-of-date photocards might not be covered for claims. A spokesman said: “It's probably going to be a case of insurers looking at each case on its merits. If you can show you made efforts to renew your licence that would probably mean the claim is OK. But potentially there could be an issue if you claim on your own policy.”
etc...
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/drivin ... 741199.ece
Thousands of drivers with photo licence face fines of up to £1,000
Ben Webster, Transport Correspondent
More than 40,000 drivers risk fines of up to £1,000 because they have failed to renew their photocard driving licences.
Many will not have realised that photocards expire after ten years, unlike the old green paper licences, which were valid until the driver was 70. Drivers risk prosecution if stopped by police and may also find that their insurers refuse to pay out on claims they make.
The problem has only emerged in recent months because photocards were first issued in 1998. The first renewals were due in July last year, and between then and the end of January 173,867 photocards expired.
Figures obtained by The Times from the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) show that only 128,987 of those drivers have paid £17.50 and sent in new photos to renew their licences, leaving 44,880 outstanding. Some of those drivers will have died or stopped driving, but the vast majority will have failed to notice the small print on their photocards showing the expiry date.
Related Links
Petrol pump prices rise despite fall in oil
Average speed cameras approved for suburbia
The date is listed on the photocard under “4b”. To find out what this means, a driver would have to turn the card over and study even smaller print in an explanatory list, which says “4b licence valid to”.
To add to the confusion, the photocard also shows another “to” date, the day before the driver's 70th birthday. On a standard car licence, this date is listed seven times beside different categories of vehicle, and a driver might assume the photocard is valid until then.
The DVLA said that more than a quarter of drivers due to renew their photocards had not done so, despite being sent reminders. At that rate, more than a quarter of a million drivers could be risking prosecution by the end of the year.
A DVLA spokesman said that drivers who failed to renew their licences “are still entitled to drive but are potentially committing the offence of failing to surrender their licence. Conviction by a court could lead to a fine of up to £1,000.” He added that the ten-year renewal was necessary because faces changed.
The Association of British Insurers said that drivers with out-of-date photocards might not be covered for claims. A spokesman said: “It's probably going to be a case of insurers looking at each case on its merits. If you can show you made efforts to renew your licence that would probably mean the claim is OK. But potentially there could be an issue if you claim on your own policy.”
etc...
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/drivin ... 741199.ece
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Flights at risk as pilots refuse to accept 'demeaning' ID cards
Ben Webster
Thousands of flights could be cancelled in a dispute between pilots and the Government over the introduction of identity cards.
The British Airline Pilots Association (Balpa) said that its members – 84 per cent of the commercial pilots in Britain – would not co-operate with Home Office plans to make airside workers “guinea pigs” for the cards.
Manchester and London City airports have agreed to take part in an 18-month evaluation of the benefits of identity cards, starting in the autumn. Balpa has told the airports and the Identity and Passport Service that pilots would refuse to take part. This would mean pilots would not be given airside passes and could not fly.
Balpa said that ID cards would have “absolutely no value” for security and that pilots were being coerced into accepting the scheme.
Jim McAuslan, Balpa's general secretary, said: “Forcing pilots to have ID cards is an affront to the people who for years have been, and continue to be, at the forefront in the battle against terrorist outrages.”
No case had been made to demonstrate that ID cards would improve security, Mr McAuslan said, and he asked what would happen if airport workers refused to register for a card.
“Our understanding from the draft regulations is that the individual will be out of a job. This could be an individual who has served his or her country as a service pilot being told they are not now trusted. This is unacceptable and demeaning and we will resist.”
Balpa said in its submission: “It is clear that the Government's staged introduction of biometric identity cards first to overseas students, then to migrant workers and then for aviation workers, represents a way of picking off what are seen as easy targets.”
The Identity and Passport Service said: “Identity cards will benefit workers – not just by improving security, but also by speeding up pre-employment checks and increasing the efficiency of pass-issuing arrangements.”
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/travel ... 741216.ece
Ben Webster
Thousands of flights could be cancelled in a dispute between pilots and the Government over the introduction of identity cards.
The British Airline Pilots Association (Balpa) said that its members – 84 per cent of the commercial pilots in Britain – would not co-operate with Home Office plans to make airside workers “guinea pigs” for the cards.
Manchester and London City airports have agreed to take part in an 18-month evaluation of the benefits of identity cards, starting in the autumn. Balpa has told the airports and the Identity and Passport Service that pilots would refuse to take part. This would mean pilots would not be given airside passes and could not fly.
Balpa said that ID cards would have “absolutely no value” for security and that pilots were being coerced into accepting the scheme.
Jim McAuslan, Balpa's general secretary, said: “Forcing pilots to have ID cards is an affront to the people who for years have been, and continue to be, at the forefront in the battle against terrorist outrages.”
No case had been made to demonstrate that ID cards would improve security, Mr McAuslan said, and he asked what would happen if airport workers refused to register for a card.
“Our understanding from the draft regulations is that the individual will be out of a job. This could be an individual who has served his or her country as a service pilot being told they are not now trusted. This is unacceptable and demeaning and we will resist.”
Balpa said in its submission: “It is clear that the Government's staged introduction of biometric identity cards first to overseas students, then to migrant workers and then for aviation workers, represents a way of picking off what are seen as easy targets.”
The Identity and Passport Service said: “Identity cards will benefit workers – not just by improving security, but also by speeding up pre-employment checks and increasing the efficiency of pass-issuing arrangements.”
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/travel ... 741216.ece
Analogue Boy
Bar 6
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- Aug 10, 2005
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- 13,572
I've run out of things to say about this ongoing shitshower of data abuse...
The fuller story of what the weak link in the chain of your personal details are up to here...if you can stomach it.
http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/ ... -staff.htm
The fuller story of what the weak link in the chain of your personal details are up to here...if you can stomach it.
http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/ ... -staff.htm
- Joined
- Aug 7, 2001
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- 54,631
A look at the maths:
Spying on 60 million people doesn't add up
Ben Goldacre The Guardian, Saturday 28 February 2009
This week Sir David Omand, the former Whitehall security and intelligence co-ordinator, described how the state should analyse data about individuals in order to find terrorist suspects: travel information, tax, phone records, emails, and so on. "Finding out other people's secrets is going to involve breaking everyday moral rules," he said, because we'll need to screen everyone to find the small number of suspects.
There is one very significant issue that will always make data mining unworkable when used to search for terrorist suspects in a general population, and that is what we might call the "baseline problem": even with the most brilliantly accurate test imaginable, your risk of false positives increases to unworkably high levels, as the outcome you are trying predict becomes rarer in the population you are examining. This stuff is tricky but important. If you pay attention you will understand it.
Let's imagine you have an amazingly accurate test, and each time you use it on a true suspect, it will correctly identify them as such eight times out of 10 (but miss them two times out of 10); and each time you use it on an innocent person, it will correctly identify them as innocent nine times out of 10, but incorrectly identify them as a suspect one time out of 10.
These numbers tell you about the chances of a test result being accurate, given the status of the individual, which you already know (and the numbers are a stable property of the test). But you stand at the other end of the telescope: you have the result of a test, and you want to use that to work out the status of the individual. That depends entirely on how many suspects there are in the population being tested.
If you have 10 people, and you know that one is a suspect, and you assess them all with this test, then you will correctly get your one true positive and - on average - one false positive. If you have 100 people, and you know that one is a suspect, you will get your one true positive and, on average, 10 false positives. If you're looking for one suspect among 1,000 people, you will get your suspect, and 100 false positives. Once your false positives begin to dwarf your true positives, a positive result from the test becomes pretty unhelpful.
Remember this is a screening tool, for assessing dodgy behaviour in a general population. We are invited to accept that everybody's data will be surveyed and processed, because MI5 have clever algorithms to identify people who were never previously suspected. There are 60 million people in the UK, with, let's say, 10,000 true suspects. Using your unrealistically accurate imaginary screening test, you get 6 million false positives. At the same time, of your 10,000 true suspects, you miss 2,000.
If you raise the bar on any test, to increase what statisticians call the "specificity", and thus make it less prone to false positives, then you also make it much less sensitive, so you start missing even more of your true suspects.
Or do you just want an even more stupidly accurate imaginary test, without sacrificing true positives? It won't get you far. Let's say you incorrectly identify an innocent person as a suspect one time in 100: you get 600,000 false positives. One time in 1,000? Come on. Even with these unfeasibly accurate imaginary tests, when you screen a general population as proposed, it is hard to imagine a point where the false positives are usefully low, and the true positives are not missed. And our imaginary test really was ridiculously good: it's very difficult to identify suspects, just from slightly abnormal behavioural patterns.
Things get worse. These suspects are undercover operatives, so they will go out of their way to produce trails which can confuse you.
And lastly, there is the problem of validating your algorithms, and calibrating your detection systems. To do that, you need training data: 10,000 people where you know for sure if they are suspects, to compare your test results against. It's hard to picture how that can be done.
I'm not saying you shouldn't spy on everyday people: I'll leave the morality and politics to those less nerdy than me. I'm just giving you the maths on specificity, sensitivity, and false positives.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree ... n-goldacre
Spying on 60 million people doesn't add up
Ben Goldacre The Guardian, Saturday 28 February 2009
This week Sir David Omand, the former Whitehall security and intelligence co-ordinator, described how the state should analyse data about individuals in order to find terrorist suspects: travel information, tax, phone records, emails, and so on. "Finding out other people's secrets is going to involve breaking everyday moral rules," he said, because we'll need to screen everyone to find the small number of suspects.
There is one very significant issue that will always make data mining unworkable when used to search for terrorist suspects in a general population, and that is what we might call the "baseline problem": even with the most brilliantly accurate test imaginable, your risk of false positives increases to unworkably high levels, as the outcome you are trying predict becomes rarer in the population you are examining. This stuff is tricky but important. If you pay attention you will understand it.
Let's imagine you have an amazingly accurate test, and each time you use it on a true suspect, it will correctly identify them as such eight times out of 10 (but miss them two times out of 10); and each time you use it on an innocent person, it will correctly identify them as innocent nine times out of 10, but incorrectly identify them as a suspect one time out of 10.
These numbers tell you about the chances of a test result being accurate, given the status of the individual, which you already know (and the numbers are a stable property of the test). But you stand at the other end of the telescope: you have the result of a test, and you want to use that to work out the status of the individual. That depends entirely on how many suspects there are in the population being tested.
If you have 10 people, and you know that one is a suspect, and you assess them all with this test, then you will correctly get your one true positive and - on average - one false positive. If you have 100 people, and you know that one is a suspect, you will get your one true positive and, on average, 10 false positives. If you're looking for one suspect among 1,000 people, you will get your suspect, and 100 false positives. Once your false positives begin to dwarf your true positives, a positive result from the test becomes pretty unhelpful.
Remember this is a screening tool, for assessing dodgy behaviour in a general population. We are invited to accept that everybody's data will be surveyed and processed, because MI5 have clever algorithms to identify people who were never previously suspected. There are 60 million people in the UK, with, let's say, 10,000 true suspects. Using your unrealistically accurate imaginary screening test, you get 6 million false positives. At the same time, of your 10,000 true suspects, you miss 2,000.
If you raise the bar on any test, to increase what statisticians call the "specificity", and thus make it less prone to false positives, then you also make it much less sensitive, so you start missing even more of your true suspects.
Or do you just want an even more stupidly accurate imaginary test, without sacrificing true positives? It won't get you far. Let's say you incorrectly identify an innocent person as a suspect one time in 100: you get 600,000 false positives. One time in 1,000? Come on. Even with these unfeasibly accurate imaginary tests, when you screen a general population as proposed, it is hard to imagine a point where the false positives are usefully low, and the true positives are not missed. And our imaginary test really was ridiculously good: it's very difficult to identify suspects, just from slightly abnormal behavioural patterns.
Things get worse. These suspects are undercover operatives, so they will go out of their way to produce trails which can confuse you.
And lastly, there is the problem of validating your algorithms, and calibrating your detection systems. To do that, you need training data: 10,000 people where you know for sure if they are suspects, to compare your test results against. It's hard to picture how that can be done.
I'm not saying you shouldn't spy on everyday people: I'll leave the morality and politics to those less nerdy than me. I'm just giving you the maths on specificity, sensitivity, and false positives.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree ... n-goldacre
Analogue Boy
Bar 6
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- Aug 10, 2005
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- 13,572
I refuse to do the math. I have faith in the undeniable fact that the database will be secure....ish.
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/03/02 ... se_breach/
And let's be realistic about this. If the Nigerian scam merchants (who also asked for money to rescue one of their guys in a gone-wrong space mission) can manipulate Jack Straw's account, what could a team of proper hackers do to a central database?
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/03/02 ... se_breach/
And let's be realistic about this. If the Nigerian scam merchants (who also asked for money to rescue one of their guys in a gone-wrong space mission) can manipulate Jack Straw's account, what could a team of proper hackers do to a central database?
Analogue Boy
Bar 6
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- Aug 10, 2005
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A clandestine operation but the principle seems widely accepted by the industry. I really can't see any argument for a centralised database as being a beneficial thing, there's just too much to lose.
I imagine the Unions would have something to say about this too.
Ironically, the article publishes a list of those who have used the service.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/mar/0 ... protection
I imagine the Unions would have something to say about this too.
Ironically, the article publishes a list of those who have used the service.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/mar/0 ... protection
OneWingedBird
Beloved of Ra
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perhaps we need a covert database of dodgy consulting people that are approved (or blacklisted) for getting your bad data from
Analogue Boy
Bar 6
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Well, the database is questionable. The accuracy of the data is prone. The security lapses have been reported often enough here, in fact staff in government departments are the worst in losing their cards. The attitude of Government EVEN if you take into account the decisions to sell your personal and medical details to private companies is ramshackle at best.
So what about the bit of plastic itself?
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7925779.stm
Apart from the plastic, I don't think anyone's seen a scanner yet for that matter but if the scanners are anything like chip n pin, someone will be playing Tetris on it within a week.
So what about the bit of plastic itself?
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7925779.stm
Apart from the plastic, I don't think anyone's seen a scanner yet for that matter but if the scanners are anything like chip n pin, someone will be playing Tetris on it within a week.
Analogue Boy
Bar 6
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- 13,572
The retention of your data will cost you more and more...
http://www.publicservice.co.uk/news_story.asp?id=8949
http://www.publicservice.co.uk/news_story.asp?id=8949
A small but important victory for anti- ID campaigners. According to the latest No 2 ID bulletin the government has backed down and dropped Clause 152 from the Coroners and Justice Bill. It seems some MPs have had upwards of 150 letters asking them to oppose it.
As for the lack of ID card scanners/ rise of fake ID/ doubts about the card technology, am I the only one who thinks the cards themselves are a total red herring?
The govt. can 'sell' ID cards to many folk as being useful for fighting Terrorism/ Benefit Fraud/ Illegal Immigration/Identity Theft/ Insert Daily Mail keyword of your own choice. This means we all go off arguing about that, and ignore the real purpose of it all; the database behind the scheme.
They don't care that the cards are a useless, expensive imposition on society, they don't want or need to read them. The threat to our civil liberties is not so much that we'll have to carry a tatty bit of plastic to use services, as that the Government and all its' agents will have access to every tiny detail of our lives. Forever. :x
As for the lack of ID card scanners/ rise of fake ID/ doubts about the card technology, am I the only one who thinks the cards themselves are a total red herring?
The govt. can 'sell' ID cards to many folk as being useful for fighting Terrorism/ Benefit Fraud/ Illegal Immigration/Identity Theft/ Insert Daily Mail keyword of your own choice. This means we all go off arguing about that, and ignore the real purpose of it all; the database behind the scheme.
They don't care that the cards are a useless, expensive imposition on society, they don't want or need to read them. The threat to our civil liberties is not so much that we'll have to carry a tatty bit of plastic to use services, as that the Government and all its' agents will have access to every tiny detail of our lives. Forever. :x
Mythopoeika
I am a meat popsicle
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- Inside a starship, watching puny humans from afar
Information is power, which is why the government wants it.
They want to have power over us, and not the other way round.
You're right PaganMoon, the database is what we should really fear, as it brings together all the diverse bits of information about us into one place.
Perfect for manipulation, and coincidentally a gift to fraudsters.
They want to have power over us, and not the other way round.
You're right PaganMoon, the database is what we should really fear, as it brings together all the diverse bits of information about us into one place.
Perfect for manipulation, and coincidentally a gift to fraudsters.
If in fact they can put any of it to use, seeing as the govt. has never been all that good at using technology on a wide scale. Seems like it'll be just another overly expensive bit of rubbish that's outdated by the time it's ready - if it ever is ready.
Analogue Boy
Bar 6
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Jerry_B said:
I dunno about that. Orwell's vision of an efficient state was worrying enough. Slipshod practice and misuse of data will cause more inconvenience, harm or injustice than an efficient system.
That's if it ever gets off the ground. Anyone who's ever had any contact with the various arms of the Inland Revenue will have some idea about how 'efficient' govt. record and on-line systems are. And that's rather more simple in intent and scope than an ID database. Just don't ask the various departments to liase with each other - they don't! So somehow I can't see any of it working. The bits of data from various areas will probably stay where they are and never get anywhere near being a super-pool of information on all of us. I don't think any of it will get the chance to be organised enough to be then abused.
Analogue Boy
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Jerry_B said:
Oh that's alright then. Forget the efficiency of Orwell and let's go Kafka. You've put all my worries of a strange blend of an Orwellian state and a Kafkaesque nightmare at rest there. Except that strangely, all my concerns about mission creep and inaccuracy of data and the politicking of the police continues, as well as the extensive probing of the tech into our daily lives and the constant protests from civil liberties groups which continue on a several-times-daily-basis where it's hard to keep up. I know I'm boring you all with these updates but I'm trying my best to filter out what is relevant in regard to this being the most important issue we'll have to face in the next few years.
You say you can't see any of it working but it is working. Lobby groups promoting the technology have been represented in Parliament. And if you've been watching the news, you'd see a 'disgraced' peer evangelising an interested company behind the scenes. It is being implemented and since you last contributed to the thread, events have moved on to confirm the fears of not just 'lil ol paranoid me' but politicians, civil libertarians, and reporters and commentators from the media as well as the judiciary of the EU.
The fact is I don't think we can't afford your laissez-faire attitude when there's too much at stake. Data once given and stored in the manner they're collating is not safe, is insecure and it cannot be returned to the owner.
Besides all this, there's this weird empowerment of the police to look at ordinary activity through a looking glass of Big Brother.
Irony lesson which sort of proves the point...
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree ... ce-protest
Well, I stand by what I've said. If any of it ever works in any concerted way I'll be very much surprised. But I'm not going to hold my breath about it. And I wouldn't say I have a laissez-faire attitude towards it - that would imply that I think any of it will ever work. Which I don't 
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- 11,990
Jerry_B said:Well, I stand by what I've said. If any of it ever works in any concerted way I'll be very much surprised. But I'm not going to hold my breath about it. And I wouldn't say I have a laissez-faire attitude towards it - that would imply that I think any of it will ever work. Which I don't
They all laughed at Christopher Columbus
When he said the world was round
They all laughed when Edison recorded sound
They all laughed at Wilbur and his brother
When they said that man could fly
They told marconi
Wireless was a phony
It's the same old cry
...
But ho, ho, ho!
Who's got the last laugh now?
:wow:
Some news which could go on both this thread and the Police State thread...
Source
The number of databases used by the government and its related bodies and agencies appears to be overwhelming (300 inherited by SOCA ffs). No doubt a sustained amount of re-engineering could sort a lot of the problems - a properly maintained and secure government IT backbone is required.
However, I suspect that the number of private corporations suckling at the engorged teat of governmental IT contracts will quash any attempts for a sane and unified approach.
Source
The number of databases used by the government and its related bodies and agencies appears to be overwhelming (300 inherited by SOCA ffs). No doubt a sustained amount of re-engineering could sort a lot of the problems - a properly maintained and secure government IT backbone is required.
However, I suspect that the number of private corporations suckling at the engorged teat of governmental IT contracts will quash any attempts for a sane and unified approach.
- Joined
- Aug 7, 2001
- Messages
- 54,631
ContactPoint’s failure is a symptom of a wider disease
Murad Ahmed: Commentary
Technology moves fast. Governments do not. Those in the know are not in the least surprised that ContactPoint has been halted. The Government’s databases are in a mess.
A scathing report, published by the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust yesterday, found that the most of the Government’s databases have “significant problems and may be unlawful”. ContactPoint was one of the systems said to be “fundamentally flawed”. ContactPoint’s failure is a symptom of a wider disease.
The problem is that the Government is rarely at the forefront of technological advances and therefore is liable to be sold shoddy goods. The report stated: “One noticeable effect is that the UK public sector always appears to get sold whatever technology or methodology is just going out of fashion in the private sector.”
Why does this happen? Because Government departments don’t have the staff. The public sector has outsourced so many of its IT contracts that it doesn’t have the experts to spot potential glitches.
A classic example was the failed Child Support Agency database. A damning Public Accounts Committee report in 2006 showed how the agency had handed over the project to its contractor, EDS, and failed to keep a close watch on it. This was in part because it did not have the in-house knowhow, because many of its IT staff had gone to work for EDS.
All of this will continue to happen as long as the Government continues to think that IT contracts and databases can be fully effective and 100 per cent secure. Some problems cannot be fixed with computers. The Rowntree report has the following advice for ministers: “If you think IT is the solution to your problem, then you don’t understand IT, and you don’t understand your problem either.”
http://women.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life ... 962874.ece
Back in the 60s, I worked for Marconi. One thing I picked up was that if you were thinking of computerising some system, a Systems Analyst was needed to study and re-organise the system - and it often turned out that this reorganisation on its own was all that was needed
- no computers were needed!
Murad Ahmed: Commentary
Technology moves fast. Governments do not. Those in the know are not in the least surprised that ContactPoint has been halted. The Government’s databases are in a mess.
A scathing report, published by the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust yesterday, found that the most of the Government’s databases have “significant problems and may be unlawful”. ContactPoint was one of the systems said to be “fundamentally flawed”. ContactPoint’s failure is a symptom of a wider disease.
The problem is that the Government is rarely at the forefront of technological advances and therefore is liable to be sold shoddy goods. The report stated: “One noticeable effect is that the UK public sector always appears to get sold whatever technology or methodology is just going out of fashion in the private sector.”
Why does this happen? Because Government departments don’t have the staff. The public sector has outsourced so many of its IT contracts that it doesn’t have the experts to spot potential glitches.
A classic example was the failed Child Support Agency database. A damning Public Accounts Committee report in 2006 showed how the agency had handed over the project to its contractor, EDS, and failed to keep a close watch on it. This was in part because it did not have the in-house knowhow, because many of its IT staff had gone to work for EDS.
All of this will continue to happen as long as the Government continues to think that IT contracts and databases can be fully effective and 100 per cent secure. Some problems cannot be fixed with computers. The Rowntree report has the following advice for ministers: “If you think IT is the solution to your problem, then you don’t understand IT, and you don’t understand your problem either.”
http://women.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life ... 962874.ece
Back in the 60s, I worked for Marconi. One thing I picked up was that if you were thinking of computerising some system, a Systems Analyst was needed to study and re-organise the system - and it often turned out that this reorganisation on its own was all that was needed
- no computers were needed!