Toulouse 21 September, 2001: The 'AZF' Disaster

[Analis]

.........

Claude C., SNPE in front of build. 370 : explosion - smoker's shelter falls - 5 to 10 sec - cloud black column - electric arc - explosion / D4848 ;

André C., route d'espagne, before Door A AZF : explosion uplifting car - horizontal lightning - explosion / D5203 ;

Roger G., 5 rue des Landes, on the roof (900 m W) : dome of white smoke 10° to the right of red tower - 4 sec - cannon blast - 4 sec explosion - black cloud 3° to the left / D5223 ;

Jean-Claude G., driving avenue Jean Rieux : small explosion - 10 sec - explosion / D5312, 5314 ;*

Frédérique G., lycée Gallieni : explosion - lightning - 7 sec - explosion / D5313, D6138, D6139 ;*

Alain D., SNPE, build. CO south-east boiler room : brown-rose squall - thrown to the ground - a few sec - ochre column - schockwave / D5354 ;*

Maryse L., 12 chemin du Mirail (3000 m NW), 7th floor : is phoning - explosion - black cloud hurting the building - green tower aflame and catapulted - explosion - schockwave / D5362 ;

Colette L., 112 boulevard Déodat de Séverac 5th floor (2000 m N) : sound - a few sec - streaked lightning -a few sec - black cone - tremors - explosion - smell of sulphur / D5365 ;

Anna M., 14 rue Daniel Decour (1300 m SW) : great streaked lightning - small explosion -a few sec - huge flash - low-pitched sound - gound shakes - atomic mushroom - explosion / D5366 ;

Antoine C., EDF 34 avenue du général Decroute (3400 m W) : tremors 4 to 5 sec - 1 sec - detonation - protects himself - 5 to 6 sec - explosion - black columns with a red chore / D5373 ;

Latra B., school André Dasté (1600 m NE) : cracklings - 1 to 2 sec - flash above pole - explosion -schockwave / D5384 ;

Chantal P., road towards Tarbes along the pole : strong acid and acrid smell from the pole / D5398 ;

Alain M., Gironis stadium (1000 m W) : sound like gun shot - thrown to the ground - 1 sec - weaker explosion - 1 to 2 mn - sound of helico / D5568 ;

Gérard C., Gironis stadium : sound of helico - dark sky over AZF - lightning over chemical pole - explosion / D5572 ;

Pierre M., 11 impasse de la Faourette (1300 m N) : small explosion - 2 to 3 sec - small explosion - 2 to 3 sec - explosion / D5866 ;

Laure P., 2 rue Alexandra David Néel (2500 m SW) : flash above green tower - 1 sec - grey mist - 2 sec - ground vibrates - 1 sec - window breaks - 1 sec - explosion / D5875 ;

Raymonde C., Villefrance de Lauragais (30 km SE) : deflagration - 10 sec - explosion / D5876 ;

Christian T., CNES Rangueil : power cut - 1 mn - rumbling - light earthquake - 30 sec - explosion / D5877 ;

Yvette W., 35 boulevard des Recollets (800 m), 3th floor : explosion from below - 6 to 8 sec - explosion / D5879 ;

Marie-Thérèse C., lycée polyvalent, avenue Jean Baylet (2800 m NW) : explosion - 10 sec - explosion / D5881 ;

Guy C., road between two bridges : light smoke from red tower - wind pushing the smoke - detonation - horizontal lightning above red tower - explosion / D5897 ;

Lionel C., SEMVAT : weak detonation - power cut - 3 to 4 sec - power back - 5 sec - explosion / D5898 ;

Jean-Jacques D., Boulanger shop, route d'Espagne : small explosion - 3 sec - power cut - stands up - 3 sec - explosion / D5902 ;

Jean-Claude B., Coubertin bridge (3 km N) : straight lightning slightly oblique - a few sec - explosion - tremor / D5906 ;

Marie-Hélène M., 7 allée du Pr Camille Soula (2300 m NE), 1st floor : explosion -power cut - 2 to 5 sec - schockwave - the previous days 4 police officers were monitoring / D5907 ;

Paul T., SNPE east build. 302 : lightning - a few sec - explosion - 2 to 4 sec - explosion / D5908 ;

Claude O., AVS Concept, rue Sainte-Cecile (1 km NW) : flash - slamming - protects - 2 to 3 sec - explosion / D5912 ;

Hughes M., Thalès avenue Eisenhower (2800 m W) : subterannean tremor - 2 to 3 sec - flash - 5 sec - explosion / D5914 ;

Daniel D., SNPE near phosgen area : flash directed downards - colleague says it's a lightning - throws himself to the ground -schockwave / D5915 ;

Marie-France B., 9 rue Joseph Jacquard (4 km W) : explosion - 2 sec - explosion / D5917 ;

Michel B., 1 rue René Cassin (8 km SW) : voltage drop of computer - 30 sec - explosion / D5921 ;

Paulette B., market of La Farouette : horizontal luminous beam waving 1 cm wide 5 m long - 10 sec - explosion / D5928 ;

France B., 28 bis chemin Peyrau, Villeneuve-Tolosane (8 km SW) / lighing - a few sec - lightning - explosion - schockwave / D5929 ;

Pierre- Bernard K., 8 rue Notre-Dame, 1st floor (3500 m NE) : is phoning - rumbling - tremors - 5 to 6 sec - huge explosion / D5930 ;

Danielle P., driving, just south door C AZF : flames behind a buiding - stops - explosion - explosion / D5932 ;*

Patricia D., driving near Door C AZF : flames erupting from a building - explosion - people running out - explosion / D5933 ;

Hervé C., driving near Empalot bridge : luminous flash - 3 to 4 seconds - explosion - GSM out / D5953 ;

Marc P., SEMVAT : sharp sound - whistling - 4 sec - looks out - power cut - 2 to 3 sec - explosion / D6044 ;

Renaud K., hostel Hotan 80 route d'Espagne : power cut - deafening high-pitched whistling - 5 to 6 sec - explosion / D6047 ;

Renée P., 6 avenue Gutemberg (2300 m SW) : computer out - a few sec - low-pitched sound - seismic effect - 5 to 6 sec - explosion - a few sec - ground shakes - mushroom / D6054 ;

Delphine V., société Paul Boyé 1st floor : strong whistling - explosion - windows explode - walls vibrate - walks on 50 m - explosion / D6533 ;

Laurence S., CNRS Rangueil : explosion - 5 to 10 sec - explosion / D6536 ;

Claude C., Route Empalot : whistling in the sky W-E - 10 sec - explosion - a few sec - blue flash - mushroom / D6537 ;

Simone M., tow path Ramonville : dark grey propeller plane flying very low - 1 mn - explosion - 7 sec - explosion / D6550 ;

Adrien V., Lycée Déodat de Séverac : ground shakes - schockwave - explosion - 1 mn - dark helico / D6552 ;

Marie-Claire B., Cégétel : sound of military plane - 10-20 sec -explosion - yellow-orange cloud / D6553 ;

Antoine M., stade Marcel Cerdan (2800 m NW) : cannon blast - yellow smoke - 1 to 2 sec - explosion - fell - black smoke - black helico in it / D6554 ;

Jean- Pierre C., postman : helico with a rope ladder / D6564 ;

Marie L., Centre petite enfance rue d'Ox (1600 m N) : helicopter 2 or 3 mn after explosion / D6566 ;

Fernande M., 14 rue Saint-Luc (3000 m NE) : drone shaped like a potato 10 mn before explosion - lightning and smokes in a line with Ramier islet / D6568. ;

Frédéric D. : sound of helico, Ecureuil or like, 1 to 5 mn after explosion / D6571 ;

Eliane C., SEMVAT : sound of aircraft - 10 mn - tremors - 5 to 10 sec - explosion / D6572 ;

Séverine R., 58 rue Fieux (1400 m N) : dark helico less than 5 mn after explosion / D6577 ;

Frédéric A., collège Bellefontaine : ground shakes and rumbling - 10 sec - explosion - 5 mn - dark AS350 helico / D6620.


List of witness statements :
http://www.azf-10h18.com/JUD_TEMOINS.html
http://www.azf-10h18.com/TEMOINS/LISTE/

 

[Analis]

End 2003 and early 2004, France was upset by a terrorist cell calling itself AZF, who threatened to cause havoc if authorities did not pay them. The name would make of this case a mere side story to the AZF affair. But it is possible that the connection is more consistent. References : http://www.azf-10h18.com/PGR_GROUPE-AZF.html , http://www.webzinemaker.com/admi/m7/pag ... &id=274516 ; book from Elise Graland and Romain Icard, Suzy contre mon gros loup :Que cache le mystérieux groupe AZF (2005).
Officially, the terrorists contacted the government using three ways :
- letters, received on 10 or 11 Decembre 2003 (1st) ; 29 January 2004 (2d) ; 11 February 2004 (3rd) ; (17 February 2004) (4th) ; 21 February 2004 (5th) ; 27 February 2004 (6th) ; 11 March 2004 (7th) ; 17 March 2004 (8th) ; 25 March 2004 (9th) ;
-through the press, via a series of coded ads in Libération ; the terrorist group using the pseudonym 'Mon gros loup' (sic), the government 'Suzie' ;
-through phone calls, from phone boxes, numbers being given through the ads and a special cell phone line being established. The phone contact from AZF was seemingly always the same woman.

The goal of the terrorists was to retrieve a ransom. Still imprecise in the first letter (about 4 millions euros), it became 4 millions dollars plus 1 million euros in the fifth. They threatened to blow up trains if their revendications were not met. They made clear they wanted to speak directly to the authorities, and wished no outside meddlong. They depicted their action as a new kind of terrorism, despite that posing bombs under a railroad has nothing original (3rd). Their method would be "either harmless either very deadly" (1st), "mild or deadly" (3rd letter). If they refered to a double threat, the deadly being the bombs, they never precised what the other, "mild", was. They confirmed in the sixth letter that they weren't an ordinary terrorist group, and that their goals were "radically different". In the fourth, they wrote that after the first explosion, they would end their mediatic silence.
Until then, both the group and the government had tried to remain discrete. The Ministry of Interior had sent to the press on 2 March a request not to divulge the existence of the AZF group and its threats. The bloods were spilled one day later by La Dépêche du Midi. The same paper heavily involved in subserviently supporting the official version. Obviously, the revelation had been made under control.

In their 13 Feb. letter, the blackmailers had revealed they had buried nine bombs under railroads, and two more in 'sensitive' places. On 21 February, following their instructions, one bomb was found on the railway Paris-Toulouse, near Folles, 30 km to the north of Limoges. The device was so well hidden that it could never have been found without their instructions. It was sophisticated and powerful. A ball was released, through a clock mecanism, at a precise and preprogrammed date. Vibrations from a train were enough to slip the ball until it stroke the detonator. Some investigators related they had never seen anything like that. The origin of the device remains unclear (the group reported in their letters that they used foreign operators). The government understood that the blackmailers were serious and not amateurs. Negiociations began immediately, while an investigation was conducted by the Direction Nationale Anti-Terroriste (DNAT), directed by anti-terrorist magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguière, who did his best to prevent any connection with the first AZF affair.
After the fifth letter, when the blackmailers gave the exact amount of the sum they wanted, an agreement was reached for the ransom to be delivered on 1 March from a helicopter. It was a good illustration of the precautions took by the blackmailers. A helicopter was readied to take off with the ransom from the military airport of Vélizy-Villacoublay, near Paris. The police was called by their contact, who ordered them to go to a precise location at the airport of Montargis (Loiret). There a message told them to drop the ransom on a blue tent, visible only from the sky. They won't find it, notably because the night was coming. It will be located only the following day, at appro. 20 km from the airport. The terrorists had left the place. No incriminating trace could be found.
Two local pilotes will be suspected and interrogated, mainly because the terrorist had to have a good knowledge of the region. This lead will be quicly proved a dead end.
On 24 March, a second bomb was found near the railway station of Montiéramey by SNCF employees. Its position was marked by a damaged tree. It was similar to the first one. Six days earlier, a gas bottle with the message "don't touch me" had been found on a railroad near Garge-les-Gonnèsses ; on 15 March, a terror alert had taken place at Rosny-sous-Bois following a tract mentioning 8 bombs ; no connection of these two incidents with the group could be established.
The other bombs won't be found. They won't be mentioned anymore by the government and a press lacking curiousity. The case was soon forgotten.

 

[Analis]

The blackmailers were very determined and self-assured. They adressed the government by using the word order : "We urge you strongly to convince yourself of the strong seriousness of the orders we'll adress you soon under the name AZF, and to take all necessary steps from today for our letters to be transmitted without delay to people you'll designate to be in charge." (1st) Similar phrasing will be used repeatedly in following letters.

They told they were not motivated only by greed, but followed an ideological agenda : "AZF is a terrorist group secretly created inside a secular/laic fraternity with a political and ethical goal. We are determined to strongly increase the means and efficiency of the fraternity" (1st). Were they affiliated with some kind of masonic lodge ?
They intend to "retrieve important sums which were advanced by some of us" (1st). This phrase suggests that some of their members were involved in financial operations with the government, or some kind of badly remunerated act. They confirmed in the sixth letter that they weren't an ordinary terrorist group, and that their goals were "radically different".

While their presentation did not detail which circle of influence they came from, some of their ideological motivations could be guessed through their depiction of political institutions :
"responsible citizens are driven to despair by the way the world and our country are ruled." (denotes a distinction between responsible citizens and others)
"Politicians more interested in the conquest of power and to stay there than to be devoted to their true task."
"An education made to train people to be obedient rather than creative."
"The de facto collusion between medico-social, food-processing and cultural organisations intended to lower the physical, intellectual and spiritual health of the people."
"A complicit mediatic machine made to lower rather than to educate individual and collective consciousness."
This portrayal of the media as subservient was confirmed in the 3rd letter, when they warned the authorities not to try to influence the AZF group through the media.
This is a hard while realistic critic of the state of democracy. But they don't seem to consider institutions as illegitimate. Only the way current rulers use them. Which seems to rule out radicals. Politicians should be "devoted to their true task", institutions should "serve responsive and sovereign individuals". The use of the expression "just backlash" ("juste retour de bâton") if the government doesn't comply with their requests suggests they're interested in justice. Their mention of "active minorities" ("minorités agissantes") is indicative that they believe in militantism.

The general tone, strict and straightforward, denotes people accustomed with a hierarchical organisation. In accordance with their very strict conception of democracy, their expertise on explosives and their modus operandi, suggestive of true professionals, it suggests they were from the military or high public administration. It is to be noted that negotiators who spoke to the AZF contact were under the feeling she was a military officer.
Their profile is very different from a leftist or New Age group. Only their reference to new energies and medicines could be reminiscent of this obedience. This mention was convenient for the authorities and the press to promote the claim that the AZF group was connected to them, and to put the blame on some people who had affiliations to this circle of influence.

With the three last letters, the tone became suddenly very different. They congratulate their negociating partners (7th). They asked higher ransoms, 6 millions (7th) then 8 millions euros (8th), their motives seeming now only financial. They precised their mining team had been repatriated. They denigrate themselves. They write that they will be much more careful, that their equipment was rustic and low grade, that the make up of the letter was different because one of them lost his nerve and got confused, and finally that they renounce because of their incompentence and (" [we're now] aware of our technogical and logistical weaknesses") ! Seemingly not the AZF group who had succesfully defied any attempt to locate them, and had displayed a great professionalism. They specified at the end of the 9th letter that the contents of the previous mails remain valid. In case a reader would have a doubt. This casts suspicions that these letters were not written by the AZF group.

 

[Privateer]

So, it was, perhaps, orchestrated by disillusioned elements of the French military? A small but well-equipped group only able to commit acts like this, would you say, or a group with enough clout to make a coup a realistic possibility? Or is the whole thing an elaborate false-flag operation by the government itself?



Oh, and from waaaaay back: 'Taught' only rhymes with 'Fort' if you insert an 'r' into one or remove it from the other!

 

[rynner2]

Oh, and from waaaaay back: 'Taught' only rhymes with 'Fort' if you insert an 'r' into one or remove it from the other!

Really? What dialect of English do you speak?
Where I come from, taught rhymes with Fort (and with taut, bought, caught, snort, etc... 8)
(No wonder foreigners get confused!)

 

[GNC]

Oh, and from waaaaay back: 'Taught' only rhymes with 'Fort' if you insert an 'r' into one or remove it from the other!

Really? What dialect of English do you speak?
Where I come from, taught rhymes with Fort (and with taut, bought, caught, snort, etc... 8)
(No wonder foreigners get confused!)

Well, where I come from (Scotland in Britain) taught rhymes with hot and Fort rhymes with court.

 

[Analis]

It comes to their identities and deep goals. Various hypotheses have been put forward. The government and the press spread the opinion that they were amateurs linked with anti-globalisation left. Members of the Ucer, a new age association, were interrogated under police custody end of 2004. Another false lead. Two more people with links to this circle were suspected : psycho-sociologist Christian COTTEN and former intelligence officer Pierre-Henri BUNEL. The latter had his office searched, but investigators will have to clear both of them. Maybe these accusations were intended as intimidation, as both are considered by the authorities as thorns in their side.

Their feats were not suggestive of amateurs, but of professionals. Such skills are difficult to find, then the suggestion that they were governments operatives, or former government operatives, came easily.

So, it was, perhaps, orchestrated by disillusioned elements of the French military? A small but well-equipped group only able to commit acts like this, would you say, or a group with enough clout to make a coup a realistic possibility? Or is the whole thing an elaborate false-flag operation by the government itself?

These two takes have been put forward. That it was part of a strategy of tension operation was supported notably by... Christian Cotten, who believes it was included in a larger scheme involving the Madrid bombings http://www.lepost.fr/article/2009/02/26 ... adrid.html . He was not afraid to incriminate Sarkozy.

Or that if it was indeed the making of insiders, it was a cabal from people from the militaro-industrial complex, the military or the secret services. A group within the DGSE (Jean-Charles Duboc), rogue operatives from various agencies and countries, including CIA agents (Jean-Pierre Mayer), or officers affiliated with masonic lodges. Supported notably by Pierre Grésillaud, who suspects that they threatened to reveal what happened on 21.9.2001.
After all, this is logic. It would explain why they called themselves AZF, which they never gave a reason for. From this point of view, there was a double blackmail : one 'classic', using bombs. The second using the threat of divulgation. It would account for the mention of a deadly and an "harmless" threat (though not harmless at all for the government), and why they said they would end their mediatic silence after the first explosion. They knew the government would never denounce them.
That they had devastating information, and implicitly threatened to release it, is suggested by their mention of new energies ; and their cryptic reference to OBL, in the last sentence of the first letter : "Que dira-t'on de Mr Ben Laden (?) dans quelques décennies ?" - "What will be thought of Mr Ben Laden (?) in a few decades ?". Why this mention of OBL ? Do they try to suggest a link ? And why the (?) ? Do they doubt his existence, or of the threat he poses ?
If so, negociations were conducted behind the scene, the ransom was probably paid. On 1st March or on another occasion.
In any case, it is likely that the last letters were not from the AZF group. But emanated from the Ministry of Interior, and were intended to reassure the public. Sign that an agreement had been reached, and the threat was over ?

On 18 April 2006, another bomb was found on a railroad near Saint-Sylvain d'Anjou. While it was roughly similar to the former ones, the press reported there were somes differences. The AZF group did not come forward at the time. It was long after a number of other AZF groups had emerged. They had tried to ransom a number of big companies, mainly from the food-processing industry, like Coca-Cola. The most active, which made itself known in July 2004, was usually refered as AZF Coca-Cola group, or AZF-3 group.
Like the first AZF group, they issued their threats via letters, and asked to answer through ads in the press. 8 firms were targeted, including Coca-Cola, Nestle, Danone etc... According to Garland and Icard, the companies were under heavy pressure from the police not to answer, but some of them chose to comply to the rules of the blackmailers.

Some of those letters included a number of ideological references. Despite that the targeting of the food-processing industry seemed to refer to some sentences from the first AZF group, differences were blatant. Notably, this time the tone was clearly anti-globalisation leftist. They criticized Total harshly, as a symbol of greedy corporations. Their discourse was simply parotting the official version. But curiously, their actions never targeted Total, or any other oil company.
Some blackmailed companies lodged complaints. The OCRB, Central Bureau of Repression of Crime, conducted the inquiry, not the DNAT. Nothing came from these investigations. Despite that it seems no ransom was paid, the groups never took action. Like their predecessor, they fell into oblivion.
These various (?) groups are good candidates for a state manipulation. They were possibly used to muddy waters, and distract from the first AZF group, suggesting that they were a leftist cell among others. And maybe to frame independant investigators. Both Jean-Christian Tirat and Pierre Grésillaud were accused of being involved, their offices were searched and some of their computers seized.
Or in a strategy of tension. These last years, a new official discourse has been trying to promote the threat of a new terrorism from the radical anti-globalisation left. The recent accusations against Julien Coupat, in another train sabotage case (although it is more mere malevolence than terrorism), are a good example of their attempts to build this new threat at any cost, despite lack of evidence.

 

[Analis]

NOUVELOBS.COM / 19-11-2009 / 16:52

The criminal court of Toulouse ordered the discharge to the benefit of the doubt of the defendants, former director of the factory Serge Biechlin and Grande Paroisse (a subsidiary of Total), at the AZF trial, while denouncing "organizational mistakes inside the plant".
It judged also that the summonses of Total - holder of AZF - and its former president-general director Thierry Desmarest was inadmissable, and cleared them at the end of the trial of the explosion of the AZF factory which caused 31 casualties et thousands of wounded on 21 September 2001.
Thomas Le Monnyer, president of the court, declared that "the company Total and Thiery Desmarest will be completely discharged".

"No new evidence"
Following a direct summons from plaintiffs in September 2008, which had caused their appearence, the oil firm as a legal entity and its former exectives, despite that they were never indicted, had to join the dock to explain themeselves on the 'negligences' the plaintiffs accuse them of.
The prosecution had recommended the inadmissibility of this summons and hadn't demanded their conviction. "Total's responsibility is not involved", had concluded Patrice Michel, deputy public prosecutor of Toulouse, adding that these summonses "had contributed to no new evidence" to the debate.

Involuntary manslaughter and wounds.
The industrial disaster, the most important in France since the Second World War, resulted in 31 deaths and thousand wounded.
Judiciary experts attributed the disaster to the accidental dumping on ammonium nitrate from warehouse 221 of a few kg of an incompatible compound (DCCNa).
The office of prosecution demanded three suspended jail years and a fine of 45 000 euros for Serge Biechlin, 225 000 for Grande Paroisse. He mentioned a "severe mishandling in the handling of waste and the use of subcontractors (...) and the mixing of incompatible compounds".

A pseudo-conclusion for a pseudo-trial.

 

[OldTimeRadio]

Well, where I come from (Scotland in Britain) taught rhymes with hot and Fort rhymes with court.

It works that way in Ohio, too.

 

[OldTimeRadio]

Wasn't September 21, 2001, also the day that the torso of poor, slaughtered "Adam" was discovered in the Thames?

 

[Analis]

Is it that ? :
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adam_(unso ... urder_case)

Good to see you back, OldTimeRadio.

 

[Analis]

Here is a file written by V921, an association of scientists and investigators crated to shed light on the events of 21-9-2001, summarizing the main elements. They list non-exhaustively various inconsistencies, omissions and lies from the trial that held between 23.2 and 30.6.2009. They also draw from the judiciary files (acccessible to private parties and whose whole parts were released on internet) ; files that were uncannily ignored by magistrates ; and data gathered by independant researchers.
(with comments from mine)
http://www.verite921.com/indexFrame.html (DOSSIER)


------------------------------------------------------------------
Problems relating to judiciary procedures from 2001 to the trial :
-Why was the opening of the inquiry based on a violation of security rules that was nor observed nor defined ?
-Why wasn't the usual procedure for involuntary manslaughter used (as was the case in the recent Carling accident) ?
-Illegal refusal of contradictory procedure when confronting M. Rolet's contributions (exemple), who deposed in front of the judge under oath ?
-Experts and contributors were not allowed to answer despite that they were frequently cited during the trial (M. Hecquet, M. Arnaudiès, M. Rolet).
-Important changes in the prosecution's thesis, imposed after the end of the instruction, and revealed only during the trial.
-New expert's reports from the defendants revealed only during the trial, and strangely not leading to a reopening.
-Private parties uninformed of these changes and new expert's reports.
-Fraud from the expert Bergues observed during the trial on photos of the prilling tower (depiction of its shape was untrue), not exposed by the court.
-Private parties who not represented by a lawyer were forbidden to speak at the trial.
-Written questions from the private parties, asked to the president of the court just after the contributors' accounts, were not transmitted back, without explanations.
-Absence of answers from the court to written requests from private parties during the trial.
-The court refused to accept subpoenas of witnesses who were frequently mentionned during the trial.
-private parties were not informed of the conditions limiting subpoenas of witnesses (18 February 2009 as ultimate date was not communicated to them).
-CD Rom of the judiciary files were not completely communicated to private parties (CD 10 and 11, new accounts at the trial).
-Contradictions between police commissionner Saby and the prosecution about early CEI procedures were not explained.
-Why didn't the court interrogate M. Daoud who didn't go to testify when summoned by the police ?
-Why M. Fuentes wasn't heard about his 21-9 testimony, while he too was summoned to this intent [D0243] ?
-Why did assistant prosecutor Claude Viaud close suite the investigation relating to the Valmy Stadium as soon as 22-9-2001 ? (1)
-Why didn't judge Perriquet resume this inquiry after new precisions were transmitted ?

Seismological problems :
-Unexplained absence of seismic datas from nuclear plants : all including Golfech at 77 kms.
-Unexplained absence of seismic data from CEA-DAM : curves, amplitude, precise dates.
-Unexplained absence of seismic data from RéNaSS : amplitudes, curves after 10.19 am (complaint closed without justification).
-Inconsistencies about average speeds of Pg waves between stations for an epicenter at the crater at 10h17'55''455.
-Contradiction about amplitude of OMP curves : the equivalent TNT charge was ridiculous as compared to the 3.4 magnitude observed.
-No study of RéNaSS data : there was no demonstration of their lack of interest as compared to those from the OMP.
-No serious study of correlated data from RéNaSS and CEA-DAM (+ Spain and Swiss stations), why ?
-Contradictions relating to the interpretation of seismic coupling to the ground (strong for 3.4 magnitude and weak for 2004 tests).
-CEA-DAM frauds during the 2004 tests : Pn waves reach EPF station before Pg waves, the 1/1000 precision is unproven.
-CEA-DAM frauds at the trial : the amplitude of acoustic wave supposed during M. Feignier's account was excessive.
-Refusal from the court to take into account during the trial researcher's Alain Joet's article published by the Academy of Sciences.
-The comparison between data from 2001 and 2004 tests relied on too few elements and was geographically restricted.
-Why didn't the defendants denounce these many inconsistencies and frauds? Did Total have an agreement with the State and the CEA-DAM (2) ?
-At the trial, François Gros said he had a recording of a seismic sound. Where is the follow-up of the request for more information [about his assertion] ?

Problems with aircrafts :
-Many testimonies of aircrafts, seen and heard, were left unexplained by judiciary experts.
-The helicopter filmed by M6 between 10.23 and 10.26 pm at Bellefontaine school remains unidentified.
-Airports lists of flights on 21.9.2001 remain very incomplete (Castres, Blagnac... are missing) !
-Pilot Serge Delga gave to the SRPJ of Toulouse an inconsistent diary (flies to Francazal and not Muret on 21.9) [D5572] !
-The checking of listings relating to a fighter jet heard are insuffiscient (flight of an Alpha Jet detected at Tarbes).
-The flight of a S330 F-ZLAU from the Centre Essai en Vol coming from Istres and going to Pau shows an inconsistency.
-Inconsistencies relating to the trajectory of the gendarmerie's helicopter were left unexplained.
-The timetable of the pilot of the EDF-RTE's helicopter was not satisfactorily checked (notably relating to its take-off).
-The study of testimonies of an helicopter with a roppe ladder did not envision the possibility of a low-frequency radio mast.
-The witnesses of a "8"-shaped red drone were not interrogated in order to identify the model as a Canadair CL 227 (?).
-The photos of a plane shot by witness Léon Caillaux just prior the explosion were not studied [D5195, 5209].
-The sound of an helicopter recorded by France 3 at Bellefontaine school remains unexplained. (3)
-The BEA [Bureau Enquêtes Accident] refutes the experts' version about the kind of flight involved and Puma pilot's Denis Heitz's explanation, with no consequence (?).
-Inconsistencies relating to the timetable of the Puma landed at Francazal remain (duration of the ground roling, exact time...).
-The behaviour during the trial of the pilot Denis Heitz and the help he had from the chairman of the court require explanations.
-Flight of a special escort Alpha Jet stationned at Cazaux, in radio contact with Tarbes at 10.12 (with who ?).
-Statements of a fighter jet were not studied despite that the presence of an Alpha Jet was detected at Tarbes at 10.12.
-Why couldn't Blagnac airport inform the justice about every flight (data was worryingly delated) ?

Problems relating to EDF and RTE :
-EDF-RTE didn't provide any 21.9 data relating to numerous lines linked with the Lafourguette transfo.
-No checking was conducted to verify the genuineness of 9 parts of ruptured cable from the 63 kV Pont des Demoiselles line (4).
-No checking was conducted to control the removal of damaged cables by EDF-RTE, why ?
-Aerial photos from the EDF-RTE's helicopter shot at 13.45 were not subject to a detailed study, why ?
-No explanation was given about the electrical incident at the Mouillone transfo (Auterive), at 10h17'56''93.
-No aerial checking of attempts to put a fibre optics cable on an high power line from 17 to 21.9 at Palamini.
-No explanation of very anterior power cuts (Marchand hospital, Auzeville, CNES transfo...).
-No exhaustive data was provided relating to the 20 kV power grid of Toulouse urban area.
-No mention of the secret emergency supply between the Lilas transfo (chemin des Etroits) and the SNPE, despite that it is tied to the 13.5 kV grid !
-Why didn't EDF inform the justice that the Lafourguette transfo was one of the most leaking of France ?
-Why did EDF use a two-way helicopter flight from Toulouse to Bordeaux to go and take gas masks (supposedly their true motive) ?
-Why did it go to Bordeaux and not to Golfech as it was initially planned ?

Problems relating to the electric array at the Chemical Pole :
-What was the path of the 6.2 kV lines before the footbridge and at the time of the ONIA and the great powder factory ?
-As a whole, no precise and localized data was provided about the history of the electric grid.
-What of the detailed study of cable parts between T24 and T36 transfos ?
-What of the contents of the T36 transfo seemingly stolen in the early days ?
-Why didn't the justice use as soon as 2001 the electric recordings of the AZF pertubation recorders ?

Problems about the video filmed by the gendarmerie's helicopter :
-The datation of aerial pictures shown at the trial remained imprecise, and even wrong !
-No explanation of the very great dark trace on the ground to the North-West of the crater (the existence of this phenomenon was denied despite that it was filmed).
-Why was the video seized so late (March 2004) and why was there no study before the trial ?
-Why were other aerial pictures shot later attributed to this video during the trial ?
-No explanation of the access path dug by Cassin TP exactly on the trace as soon as 16.00 on 21.9.2001.

to be continued........

 

[Analis]

......
Problems relating to the sightings of luminous beams :
-No technical answer for witnesses who were very close to the crater and sighted beams much before.
-The study of Mrs Delmont's testimony [D0589] on 24.9.2001 was dropped without justification, despite that she was officially summoned.
-No technical answer about M. Corenson's statement [D2803, 3353, 5451] despite that it was officially checked in situ at the request of the instructor judge.
-No study of M. Najar's testimony D1973 [D3727] (blue beam saw locally, rue des Amidonniers, 4 km to the north) (5).
-No answer to statements of horizontal beams sighted in numerous places among the urban area (Luzzi [D1273], Baritaud [D5928] (6)...).
-No search of links with the electrical array, notably the 20 kV array, despite a number of curious coincidences ?

Problems relating to the studies of statements, which were put in evidence during the trial :
-As a whole, studies of depositions were weak or nonexistant, as the trial confirmed.
-The chairman of the court assessed that there were contradictions between some testimonies, while there were not (M. Crouzet, Mme Grimal [D5313],...).
-Expert Coudriau's study about time intervals between the two sounds are twisted due to a very distorted graph.
-The Chairman's technical considerations about M. Borg's statement (relating to Faraday effect) [D1419, 2108] are wrong.
-Expert Van Schendel's analysis of testimonies is appallingly stupid and in bad faith, why ?
-Why did experts accuse a huge number of witnesses to be mistaken and confused ?
-Why did they never try to dig their statements further before to accuse them of such mistakes ?
-The Chairman of the court had a very partial and abnormal attitude when he denigrated testimonies that were contradicting the official discourse. (7)

Problems about precise phone datings related to testimonies :
-Many statements with France Telecom bills contradict the official dating of the AZF explosion.
-Experts asked to precisely study datings came with no answer, why ?
-No attempts to check with other witnesses who were phoning, why ?
-Technical dated data of incidents from phone operators were not asked.

Problems about NH3 workshop :
-No consistent explanation of the events at the NH3 workshop (alarms, triggerings...).
-Contradictions between M. Dennis' [D0786] and Gamba's [D0343] statements and judiciary experts' theories remain.
-Internal datings of AZF events were not put into question despite these inconsistencies... why ?
-During the trial, expert Couderc and judiciary experts remain witout definitive explanation (further inquiry ?).

Problems relating to synchronization of AZF datings with those from EDF :
-Datings from experts and the defence contradict many testimonies (SETMI director, NH3 workshop...).
-Relies only on a single synchronization with the breaking of the Demoiselles high power line.
-Relies only on a data file that was released only very lately, and analysed with no guarantee of the absence of fraud.
-Weak expertise of the data from perturbation recorders tied to this synchronisation (from Areva T&D, but with no documents or report).
-Relies on a botched and unsustained study (cf # IV) of the broken high power cable from the Demoiselles.
-Why weren't datings of incidents on the water conducts required (they reveal a precursor event at Clairfont) ?

Problems with the role devoted to the AZF-Toulouse employee in charge of their electric department :
-Held the role of a quasi-expert, whose accounts were not even verified, despite that he was involved in the handling of the H221 area.
-Change of attitude between the aftermath (was confined to technical findings in situ) and later after 2002 (acted as an expert), why ?
-Appointed as AZF supplier of data at the request of experts in charge, why ?
-Seemed completely free to do anything he wished on the AZF-Toulouse site for weeks.
-Responsabilities are still not established for the theft of T36 transfo ; this should have been the duty of the police but the defense never put forward this fact.
-His opinions and works were very often used, instead of conducting solid procedures and appraisals (like about synchronisation), why ?

Problems about sound recordings :
-No gathering of sound recordings (seemingly not wished) : no early judiciary decision was taken to this task.
-The listening of recordings at the trial was refused by the Chairman despite a request from a private party (justified with a false motive).
-Seismic sound explanation challenged by detection of low frequencies during the 2004 trials.
-No explanation was provided by the defense, excepted hypothesies that had not yet been studied (supersonic plane).
-The refusal by court-appointed experts to take into account the Purpan recording was not supported, including during the trial.
-No study of all possibilities of coupled sounds heard on recordings (case of the Ecole Dentaire).
-Seismic effects of surface waves on buildings, potentially noisy, were not taken into account by the experts.

Problems with the SNPE :
-Surprising lack of any kind of effective electric recorders in a SEVESO 2 site (confirmed at the trial).
-Lack of checkings with other recordings (alarms, phone datings, siren...).
-Lack of data about ONIA arrays and old military structures.
-Lack of any mention of the F2 transfo (13.5 kV), distinct and away from other 13.5 and 63 kV transfos.
-Lack of info about electric grids on the site despite testimonies.
-Why did the executives conceal the existence of the emergency 20 kV line coming from the Lilas transfo ?
-Inconsistencies relating to the exact circumstances of Jacques Zeyen's death (position, conditions of the coming of rescuers, arrival at Rangueil...).
-Why did the managers never mention an abnormally high number of deaths and cancers among their staff since 2001 ? (8 )
-No explanation of testimonies of precursor phenomena at the SNPE (Mrs Duga [D0949] (9), M. Desseille [D2089], M. Leroy [D0947], M. Durand [D5354] etc...).
-Why did the experts control damages inside the factory so late ?
-No study of damages of the white methanol 366 tank despite photos from EDF-RTE.
-No study of damages of the boiler room despite testimonies and photos.
-No explanation of important damages on the East side of 400 and 402 buildings.
-What of the complaint lodged about the death of an unknown man at the SNPE 6 h before the explosion (is there a link with the errors in victims lists) ?

Problems with the official chemical explanation :
-Judiciary experts' experimentations were lacking serious and their conclusions were unscientific.
-Lack of any presence of the defence during the last experimentations.
-Lack of any control of these experimentations, made outside any contradictory procedure.
-The hypothesis that DCCNa was present in the bag sent to H221 rlies on no technical evidence.
-The hypothesis explaining the tipping in a number of successive layers of DCCNa and Industrial AN is completely unrealistic.
-The estimate of the water proportion contained in the DCCNa and IAN in the box is a fraud.
-No evidence that the required presence of water in the AN (>10%) could be reached naturally, through moisture.
-No evidence that the bag contained IAN as supported by the experts, rather than AN intended for agricultural use, despite Gilles Fauré's testimony.
-Why did the body of experts cover the obvious lies from expert Barat (urea instead of AN) ?
-Why was the body of experts reconducted despite this failure, committed as soon as 2002 ?
-Why did the Soulez lawyer office renounce to sur these experts, despite that one of their letters said it was their intent ?
-Why were some files mentioned at the trial still referring to some of the assertions of the first chemical theory (500 kg of DCCNa) ?
-Why was the estimation of more than 560 t of AN for the H221 stack (in the final report) was lowered to less than 460 t during the trial ?

Problems about autopsies and victims :
-Lack of any photos at the scene of the disaster, why ?
-The location of some victims was and is still unclear, why ?
-Lack of clear explanations of the origin of burns on several victims (H. Jandoubi, A. Ratier, G. Préaudat).
-The change of color of H. Jandoubi's eyes is established (photos) and unexplained. (10)
-Only three autopsies were made, despite questions relating to the wounds of several victims.
-As a whole autopsies were uncannily succint, why ?
-The explanation of Alain Ratier's death is not seriously sustained by the examination, and there was no autopsy, why ?
-Symptoms felt by witnesses are left unexplained by the experts (M. Borg, M. Roméro [D0238, 2109], M. Dupont [D2111], Mme Giméno [D0710] (11)...).
-No follow-up of new deaths for the purpose of the investigation (including numerous instances inside the SNPE).
-The contradiction between M. Gildas and firefighter colonel Donin realting to the number of bodies remains unsolved.
-Why did the prefecture order to move the bodies in situ in the afternoon (sent to a second area) ?

Problems related to terrorist leads and/or sabotage :
-The 4 underwear found on H. Jandoubi can't be explained by a complex related to leaness.
-His wife commited lies and inconsistencies during her hearings (her husband's thinness, the destruction of his clothes...).
-No explanation of the change of place of HJ's car this morning, despite that it was close to EM perturbations in the RCU.
-Why were the sealed swipe card readers (SIS DEUX) never examined ? (12)
-Strange words from M. Malon (SRPJ), reported by three police officers ("they want an accident... they'll have one").
-Lack of any safety counter-terrorist measures in the following minutes... why ?
-Why was a plane allowed to take off from Blagnac airport at 10.35 despite that the origin of the disaster was still unknown ?
-Still no explanation of the alert at the SNPE on 1 september 2001 (origin, service involved...).
-The origins of terrorist responsibility claims remain unknown... why ? (13)
-Lack of any verification of the 2003 anonymous letter reporting a sabotage (it mentionned 2 german car registrations, that were not verified). (14)
......
to be continued

 

[Analis]

......

Problems with the military :
-Why were never statements of an abnormal presence of soldiers in the first minutes never studied ?
-Why was the established presence of an armed soldier, wearing a red berret near the crater on 21 sept 2001 around 17.00, never explained ?
-Why did the General commanding the military region say that the Army was called in operation only from 23 september 2001 ?
-Why are some underground military structures under the Pech David Hill still placed under a veil of secrecy ?
-Why was no info about the power supply of old military facilities provided ?
-Are there subterannean paths between the Pech David hill, the chemical pole and the city ?
-Why did the Army protect the chemin des Etroits as soon as 11.00 on 21 september 2001 ?
-Why did the gendarmerie conceal that truck drivers had alerted of the presence of an armed man as soon as 9.00 ?
-Link with the murder of the castle of Pinsaguel who had seen frogmen in the Ariège river on 20.9 ?

Problems with politicians :
-Laurent Fabius' timetable is filled with contradictions : time and place of landing at Toulouse, helicopter path towards Labège ?
-Still no explanation to MM. Jospin's and Chirac's assertion that it was an accident as soon as 21.9.2001.
-Jacques Chirac's timetable is empty until 12.30... Were verifications done ?
-Why did president Chirac refer to his constitutional impunity to refuse to come to testify (which was not necessary) ?
-Why did M. Jospin think that his testimony was useless, despite that he knew some victims and had stated that it was an accident ?
-Many lack of answers to questions asked to prefect Hubert Fournier (big and suspicious memory gaps) ? (15)
-No explanation was given of Jean-Luc Marx's assertion on 21.9 that the N1C tower was involved.


(1) It refers to an event at the stadium of Valmy (near the Bellefontaine school, 2.4 km from the crater, to the west). That could seem of little importance, if not for uncanny contradictions from the depositions of the witnesses, which led Chairman of the court Le Monnyer to use them as an illustration of how witnesses are deluded. In truth, they offer us an illustration of the lack of will from the police and the judiciary to investigate and unearth the truth, and of the reluctance of some witnesses to dispute the official version.
M. Jean-Michel FONTANET and Stéphanes BOURDES reported in the immediate aftermath of the disaster to the gendarmerie that while they were working in a basket ground inside the stadium, they had seen two workers in blue outfit rushing out of a nearby building, shouting that there was going to be an explosion (what was verified a few seconds later...). What they confirmed to the SRPJ of Toulouse via phone a few hours later (D581), and on the evening to the SRPJ of Bordeaux, the urban area they were from (PV 2001/344/2 and 2001/344/5).
They had not heard a first explosion, which is easily explained by their position inside the stadium. What is remarkable is that in this area, the factories of the pole are not visible.How could the men in blue be aware that the pole was going to blow up ? The following day, the SRPJ of Toulouse interrogated Daniel MOULET, caretaker of the facilities owned by the city of Toulouse, and city workers Jean-Claude DUPONT and Patrice BAPTISTE, identified as the men worn in blue (D582, D584, D592). They confirmed the presence of Fontanet and Bourdes, but explained that only one of them was wearing blue outfit, that Baptiste had left the place a few minutes before, and that the two who remained had began to run only after the explosion.
The police simply concluded that the witnesses were deluded and didn't try to investigate their strange inconsistencies. When Pierre Grésillaud later went to see D. Moulet and asked him, he was told a very different and more consistent story. Moulet was one of the men in blue, and he had really shouted that "it was going to explode" before seeing any explosion and feeling the shockwave. He knew that, because he had seen in the direction of the pole a gigantic luminous flash. He located it more precisely above the SNPE, and believed that the wind would push the phosgen towards them. He and Dupont had decided to lie because they had quickly understood that by claiming so early that what happened at AZF was an accident, the French state was determined to enforce this belief. What a RG officer of his acquaintances confirmed to him this very evening, implying that he could be in trouble if he contradicted the official 'truth'. So they were sure that the police would not try to dig their inconsistencies. Later, Moulet added to Grésillaud that shortly after he had spoken to him, a fire was set in from of his door. He suspected that it was intimidation. Politicians are often accused at Toulouse to hire thugs to do their dirty work.
Paranoia ? In a town where a serial killer was protected by authorities, and probably still is, and where rogue experts are allowed to roam free ; no, not necessarily paranoia...
http://www.azf-10h18.com/PGR_TEMOINS-I.html (go to #2)
http://toulouse.azf4.free.fr/forum/viewtopic.php?t=90

(2) About Total's lawyer Daniel Soulez-Larivière and his office : he is a prominent and mediatic French lawyer. His office specializes in cases involving military-industrial firms like Total and the state. The front page of his website starts with this premise : "If you were to ask Daniel Soulez-Larrivière what makes it possible for a lawyer to efficiently and completely handle an important affair of state,..."
http://www.soulezlariviere.com/who-we-a ... re-71.html
His feats of arms include the Habsheim crash and the Rainbow Warrior, where he had defended the "Turenges". Recently, he was involved in another murky affair, the explosion of an AS-350 helicopter near Monaco on 8.6.2004, all crew and passengers lost. Aboard was present controversial businessman Mahdi Elmamun (manager of financial firm Equen, based in Luxemburg), suspected of ties with murky areas of the military-industrial complex (notably the satellites firm Worldspace, recently bankrupted, whose executives William Schneider and Jack Kemp had acquaintances with the world of state-made terrorism). The follow-up of the crash was marked by a strangely slow investigation, lazy attempts to refloat the wreck of the helicopter and opacity (a well-known cocktail when affairs of state are at play). The prosecution was all dedicated to promote the implausible theory of an unknown kind of turbine explosion. As turbine manufacturor Turboméca's lawyer, Soulez-Larivière only lazily fights the accusations, an attitude reminiscent of his defense of Total and Grande Paroisse in the AZF case.
http://www.nicematin.com/ra/cotedazur/2 ... -en-examen
Some investigators support that this incident could be tied to the AZF disaster, via a Worldspace connection. Elmamoun was co-fouder of security firm Authentium with John Sharp, a Worldspace executive.
http://toulouse.azf4.free.fr/forum/view ... &start=100 (3.11.2005 and +).

Currently, Soulez-Larivière's office is involved in the trial of the Concorde accident on 13.2.2000 (begun on 2 February, closed on 28 May, the ruling and the sentence should issued this month or early september), where he defends Air France. They are in support of the prosecution's thesis that it was caused by a metal strip fallen from a Continental Airlines DC-10 plane. Despite that at least 25 independant witnesses, including firefighters and pilots, stated consistently that Concorde was already in fire before it had reached the place where the strip supposedly lied :
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5197016,00.html .
When the judiciary thesis is ruled out by many witnesses, it means that it should be set aside and the inquiry should be reopened. The most likely explanation is that Concorde was overloaded, and that a tyre exploded on a slight irregularity of the runway, damaging the tank. Which puts the guilt on Air France, that had in addition neglected to add efficient deflective coating to protect the tank.
Another feature of this trial is that as it had been early promoted as an occasion to inform the public of the negligence and greed of air companies, it had been widely predicted that it would create quite a stir. Instead it took place in a surprising mediatic quasi-silence. A now familiar scenario... Despite that each piece of the prosecutor's argumentation was refutated in detail, he sticked to it until the end. A familiar scenario again... Why bother with the facts ?
......

 

[Analis]

......
(3) Although judge Le Monnyer came with an 'attempt' that is worth reporting : in the midst of the hearing (8.4.2009), he asked Pr Naylor if the depression following the schockwave could not have sucked the sound wave (sic). Hopefully for him, ridicule does not kill !
http://www.verite921.com/PROCES/AZF%202009-04-08.pdf
http://blogazf.ladepeche.com/index.php? ... u-alouette

(4) This evidence was tampered to conceal that the state of the cable was compatible only with a collision from below, establishing that it had been cut by an object in a straight trajectory, dating the explosion at 10h18'05''. And not by a piece of debris that had loosely ascended in a curved trajectory, and fell back 10 sec later.

(5) http://www.azf-10h18.com/TEMOINS/LISTE/A1973.html : "My mother saw a blue lightning coming into our flat, through the window of our living room. After, my mother and my sister hard two successive explosions, first a small and then a big one".

(6) She was at the market of La Faourette, when she spotted a thin ray of light, 1 cm wide and 5 m long. The ray was oscillating. 10 sec later, she heard a big explosion.

(7) While Alain Hodin's deposition on 5 May was ignored, despite that he was the only expert to study honnestly the testimonies. His only 'wrong' was that he demolished the official conclusions. His account only should have led to a reopening.
http://www.verite921.com/PROCES/AZF%202009-05-05.pdf
http://blogazf.ladepeche.com/index.php? ... -de-mhodin

(8 ) Private researchers, and more sparsely some local media, mentionned the high incidence of premature deaths and heavy illnesses among the chemical pole employees after the disaster. Has Toulouse its own equivalent of the WTC illness ?

(9) Her report includes two interesting features. She was in her office near the main entrance (extreme north of the plant). When she heard an explosion ; her computer went off, and she felt the ground vibrating violently. Then she heard a very strong explosion. She thinks she maybe fainted. Hurt, she rose up, put a gas mask, as according to security rules, helped some of her collegues to put theirs, went to her car, drove towards the main entrance and parked her car near it.

A few minutes later, she lived a strange incident, adding to the many anomalies of the day. She was coming back to the gates, where the staff was beginning to flock. She saw a man with a bike, standing at the entrance, who was taking photos of the inside of the factory and of the staff. She called him, saying that taking photos was forbidden. He stopped immediately to shoot photos, and tried to flee riding his bike. She caught him with the help of two men, at least one of them from the SNPE. When the cycler was asked to give his film, he refused. One of the two men grabbed the camera and took the film. She then asked him to decline his identity. The man, who spoke with a foreign accent, answered them he didn't have his ID card, having left it in his car, parked near the old gun-powder factory, and that he was a Swiss citizen. Mrs Dugua was surprized he knew the old gun-powder factory at all, this building being restricted access, having a new name and known only of people interested in history. As a gendarmerie car was getting near them, they handed the photographer and the film over to the gendarmes. When she called the gendarmes a few days later, she was told that the photographer was simply a tourist. The film had been handed over to the national police. Until now, the identity of this most implausible tourist (described as an Arab or a Middle-Easterner) has not been revealed.

http://www.azf-10h18.com/SNPE/Temoin%20 ... 0Dugua.gif
http://toulouse.azf4.free.fr/forum/view ... &start=420

(10) J.-P. Mayer came with an interesting explanation : an electrocution can induce a retarded eye discoloration.

(11) http://www.azf-10h18.com/TEMOINS/LISTE/D0710.JPG
Located in the RCU building, she felt lifted from below, and saw the screen of her computer explode. Then, in a second phase, the building collapsed.

(12) Similarly, security videos were never released (did you say a familiar scenario ?).

(13) A police officer simply explained at the trial that they couldn't trace anymore the origin of the fax received a few days after the disaster because they hadn't tried before... 2005. Phone operators delete their data after one year. And they waited for four years... How silly of them !

(14) It refers to an anonymous letter received by an instructor judge on 4 april 2003. The writer, a so-called witness, described two vehicles with German car registrations parked along the nearby road, one a white Mercédès Vito (he could note its registration number B 7114 LP) equipped with a laser designator, their passengers firing a missile or rocket. D. Dissy in his last book (p.187) states that it is not the best place to fire a missile towards the Pole.

(15) If he didn't know who had visited the SNPE on 1 and 12 September, that was not his only instance of being left in complete shadows. He didn't know who had announced to the press that the cause was accidental, as early as 11.30, despite that his services were in charge. He spent much of his hearing stating that he couldn't remember much of what he had done on 21-9, although his most incredible assertion was that AZF was not guarded because it was not dangerous.
http://www.verite921.com/PROCES/AZF%202009-03-19.pdf
http://blogazf.ladepeche.com/index.php? ... officielle

 

[Analis]

In an interview given to Le Journal Toulousain on 6 October 2010, former anti-terrorist "cow-boy magistrate" Jean-Louis Bruguières came with a striking statement (the translation may seem tortuous, but it tries to be faithful to Bruguière's own style, a bit convoluted).
http://www.premiere-reponse.com/JT/modu ... oryid=1510

......

I WOULDN' T BE SURPRISED THAT IT WASN'T ACCIDENTAL.

At each attack, the europeans capital cities are targetted. But are provinces also targets ?

Yes, completely. Paris being a symbol, it is of course targetted. But remember in 1995 : terrorists networks were relatively not very present there. On the contrary they were in Lyon and Lille. We have also dismantled some logistical support structures which were involved in imitation [of clothes and goods] business for groups linked with the GSPC [Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat]. We found the same thing in Lille, Marseilles, Nice, Orleans, Tours. Every town is involved. It is not necessarily a target but Touklouse is a very big industrial center, with potential symbolic targets like AZF, the SNPE.

Talking of that, what is to be thought of what happened in Toulouse on 21 september 2001 ?

I don't have a deep knowledge of the case. But I note one thing : the court itself has to acknowledge that there is no proof relating to the industrial accident. I think there was a serious fault from the judiciary police of Toulouse, from the prosecutor, to have wanted at any cost, using any means, to have privileged one lead, collaterally neglecting another one. I wouldn't be surprised if today it would be considered the result of an act that is not accidental. I'm not speaking of a terrorist attack, but of a criminal, malevolent act. The tolosan context is very complex with very important leftist movements - Action Directe was born here - classic criminal organisations like everywhere and indisputably radical islamist cores. Once we have opened an inquiry on terrorist structures which were directly involved in the sending of jihadists to Iraq from Toulouse.

Do you believe that an order from above could have been given to privilege the accident theory ?

After 2001, I thought I understood that one wished that in no case things should be viewed in another perspective. That it is so from the politicians, this is one thing, but what seems more serious to me is that technical services, the judicary police and the justice close the leads even without obeying formally to orders. And once more, obviously it seems that many things in the investigation were neglected.

......

Technically, his statements to the magazine are accurate. But while they may look like a breach in a wall of silence, his motives are obscure, to say the least.

A highly controversial figure, he was often suspected of complacency with the powers that be. He was criticized for his harsh and unefficient methods during the bombings of 1995, attributed to the GIA, leading to many arrests and few convictions - a series of bombings suspected to have been the result of a manipulation of the Algerian secret services ; this theory was studied notably by journalists Jean-Baptiste RIVOIRE and Romain ICARD, authors of the documentary Attentats de Paris : enquête sur les commanditaires. Rachid Ramda's lawyer, Sébastien Bono, accused Bruguière of having deliberately ignored these leads. Similar accusations were issued at him in the case of the assassination of the Tibhirine monks by Patrick Baudouin, lawyer of the families of some of the victims.

More recently, he was under more critics when he led a weak and disingenuous inquiry on the attack on the plane of Rwandan president Juvénal Habyarimana and Burundese president Cyprien Ntaryamira on 6 April 1994, killing both of them. With the intent of putting the guilt on the FPR and Paul Kagamé, blaming them dumbly for the responsability of the genocide that took the lives of may be one million of Tutsis and Hutu opponents in four months. He relied on dubious witnesses, one of them admitting recently that he had committed a false testimony. Another complained that Bruguière had distorted his claims. He never asked how a FPR commando could have had access to the surroundings of the airport without being noticed. When former Kagamé's aide Rose Kabuya was arrested in Germany in November 2008, following one of Bruguière's arrest warrants (it seems she allowed deliberatly to get herself arrested, in order to have acces to Bruguière's instruction files), she was transferred to France, interrogated by Bruguière's successors, and quickly released. It seems that Bruguière's attempt to indict Kagamé and his followers is something of the past, the likely solution being that the plane was shot down by Hutu extremists to provide an excuse to begin the genocide (false flag again).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assassinat ... onsibility

When it comes to AZF, until now, he had obstructed any attempt to investigate the case from a terrorist perspective ; prosecutor Bréard could justify his early choices by pointing that the anti-terrorist direction had decided not to handle the case. A fact Brugières conveniently "forgets" to mention in this interview.

 

[Analis]

Interestingly, he is heavily contested in another case, a possible follow-up : the investigation of the Karachi suicide bombing, which happened only a few months after AZF, on 8 May 2002. Directed at a bus boarding employees of the French DCN, (Direction des Chantiers Navals, Direction of Navy Shipyards), it killed 11 French engineers and 3 Pakistanese. This attack was attributed to Al Qaida, and "OBL" claimed responsability to it in a video released on 12 november 2002 (although it was more as an inspirer, as 'OBL' did not ascribe it directly to his own organisation, but to sympathizers).

Bruguière's investigation was in complete support of this theory. But suspicion arouse that it was another false flag attack, due to anomalies in the inquiries. Two islamists, Asif Zaheed and Mohammad Rizwan, were sentenced to death on 30 June 2003, but appealed and were acquitted on 5 May 2009. Leaving the islamist lead with a lack of evidence. Bruguière was again accused of having tried to distract from crucial evidence. Some investigators have suggested that it could have been tied to an important case of corruption, relating to the sale of French Agosta submariners to Pakistan in 1994. While there is no evidence of a link between the two affairs, which seems in any case rather dubious (and it could be a manipulation to send on a false lead), both scandals rely on serious evidence.

This scenario of a false flag attack shouldn't be seen as so surprising. State manipulations are suspected in many terrorist acts in Pakistan. The recent report from a UN Commission of Investigation on the Benazir Bhutto killing unearthed evidence incriminating Pervez Musharaf and general Najeem Ejaz, former director of Military Intelligence. They were notably accused of tampering with the crime scene. Musharaf was also suspected in an attack on a demonstration in support of Supreme Court President Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry on 17-7-2007, at first again attributed to jihadists. According to Courrier International #1018 and The Daily Lahore (6 May 2010), he was facing a pending indictment from the Lahore High Court.
http://iaoj.wordpress.com/2010/04/26/ma ... hamid-mir/
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.as ... 010_pg7_21
http://www.courrierinternational.com/ar ... -musharraf

In a interview given to L'Express #3072 (19-5-2010), Bruguière tried to defend his work. But curiously, in the same interview he revealed a number of facts reminiscent of the other disputed terrorist attacks in Pakistan. They certainly add motives to doubt the official version of an Islamist bombing, and reinforce the ISI lead. Notably, once more, experts seem strangely unable to distinguish very different explosives, a situation similar to the London and Madrid bombings inquiries. Former anti-terrorist prosecutor Michel DEBACQ, who had come to Pakistan two days after the bombing, had already stated to journalists Fabrice ARFI and Fabrice LHOMME, authors of the book Le Contrat, dedicated to the case, that his investigations had been hampered by the cleansing of the crime scene, confirming that it was a common practice of Pakistanese authorities in such cases.
http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/ ... 93012.html

......
I don't deny there were deep links between some Pakistanese organisations close to Al Qaeda and the ISI, who was trying to play them against Musharraf. [...]

Which of the elements given by the Pakistanese were innacurate ?

First there was the question of the explosive used in the attack. The result of our analyze from samples taken in situ was clear. It was tolite, a military explosive, a component of TNT. For the Pakistanese, it was nitrate, the same explosive that had been used against the general consulate of the United States, in June of the same year. They wanted to convince us that the authors were the same. Faced with these contradictions, they successively presented us four different leads. In April 2003, I issued international rogatory letters and I wished to go directly to Pakistan.

You're going to Karachi only in 2006, three years after. Why this delay ?

I had to face for years a Pakistanese obstruction. There was always a good motive to prevent me to come. One time it was the earthquake in Kashmir, another the scandal of the caricatures [of Mohammed in Denmark], or local elections to come. Finally, when I come to Islamabad and Karachi in March 2006 with some investigators, I am politely welcomed. But as soon as we come to examine the contents of the files, things turn rather badly. We face a flat refusal to reopen the contested expertise relating to the explosives. At the time, attacks happened everyday in Pakistan. Some weeks, there were up to 100 dead. I clearly felt that the 2002 attack was not a concern to them.
......

 

[Analis]

What has become of the Chemical Pole after the disaster ?
The SNPE is still on the same site, with a reduced staff ; but AZF-Toulouse is no more. Where stood the factory, there is now a new medical research center dedicated to the treatment of and research on cancer, called the Cancéropôle. A good way for the authorities to buy a conscience, after all hypocrisy rarely harmed them.
But the area and its surrounding is still endangered by a number of time bombs from the times of the ONIA and the Powder House. Their handling reveals the same treacherous attitude from the various authorities involved in the hampering of the AZF investigation, usually the same who left this dark legacy, evidencing that their policy of lies and opacity will not end soon. Again in a mediatic low key reporting. It gives also more evidence of the collusion between the military, Grande Paroisse, the SNPE, the City of Toulouse and the metropolitan community (Grand Toulouse), all owners or former owners of the areas around the Chemical Pole and Pech David or part of them. Often in a great opacity, it is not easy to assess who owns what exactely.
The biggest environmental hazard is located in an area along the Garonne, to the south-east of AZF, which was a part of it. In this area are notably present four old ballastières, sand quarries dug in the ground. Formerly a military ground, it had belonged to Grande Paroisse until 2001, but had become restricted access again after the disaster of 21.9. The ballastières are currently filled with water and from plane look like ordinary lakes. But they are not : long before, after the First World War they had been filled with thousands of tons of wastes from explosives, gelatinous nitrocellulosis. This dangerous pollutant remains there, and has become a potential environmental hazard.

In addition, it was recently revealed that thousands of untreated sheels had been secretly dumped in a fifth ballastière, now under a wood of poplar trees, some of the shells having seemingly been moved under fields (which led to a scramble between the DGA and the office of the minister of defense).

http://www.lepost.fr/article/2010/06/23 ... ieres.html

Toulouse : thousands of shells concealed by the DGA to the north of the ballastières
23/10/2010

On tuesday 22 June 2010, at 17.00 took place a meeting in the premises of Météo-France in Toulouse. The DGA and the SPPPI * linked with the DREALE ** (formely the DRIRE [/b]***) presented the solution and the companies chosen for the rehabilitation of the site of the four sand-quarries N°1 to 4 located to the south-east of the Canceropôle.

12 importants points are noted in this article. One caught more importantly the attention of some attendants of the meeting : the existence of a sand-quarry called "0", to the north of the 4 others, very closed to the new Cancéropôle and which would contain thousands of whole shells, not properly handled and put there from 1918 to 1922 immediately after the first world war and immediately before the treatment of remains of gelatinous nitrocellulosis was officialized in July 1921. The DGA could not answer to this very serious question and had even projected to use this area for his own study project despite that it belongs to the Grand Toulouse.

1/ First, it is to be noted that only members of associations who had been specifically required to come could attend this "public" meeting organized by the DREALE (former DRIRE) and the SPPPI, as the entrance of Météo France where this meeting was held, a list of names had been imposed and prevented anybody else to come into the great room that so was 3/4 empty. One exception could be allowed to the local association Agir pour les Oustalous which earned the right to attend after 20 minutes of negociations. So the SPPPI felt no concern for the meeting to be public and not even for local associations from streets close from the ballastieres to be informed.

2/ But there is something much more serious.... the media were forbidden to come... which explains the absence of information about this matter ! The 3 journalists who had informed they would come long in advance were barred to attend despite their strong insistance at the gates. They had to wait for two hours and to interview people coming out from the room. No valid motive could explain this scandalous ban on the media for a public meeting. Did the DREALE and the SPPPI obey to orders from the DGA which was redacting the talks for this meeting ? Did they decide to drastically filter unwanted people so that the meeting would have as few mentions as possible in the media ? There again people in charge of this so called "public" meeting revealed to what extent the matter of the sand-quarries ressurected old anti-democratic behaviours.

3/ Since the media could not be present to this so-called public meeting, except "20 minutes" which seems to have had some interest for this matter those last days, the media have made very few mentions of this sensitive matter, concerning thousands of Tolosans.

4/ The group of firms chosen for this feasability study involves :
-PYROTECHNIS (VEOLIA-SNPE)
-SNPE Energie (Poudres et Explosifs, former producer of the wastes)
-ANTEA (a part of the BRGM) in charge of the hydrogeology
-GRS Valtech (VEOLIA) in charge of the biodegradation
-SEDE Environnement (VEOLIA) in charge of the water expertise

We note that VEOLIA is the main beneficiary of this 2.7 millions euros contract and the neighbouring SNPE, a state company whose site is classified Seveso 2, will be judge and jury od his own work.

These two companies have an important networks of underground galleries, some of which remain secret, like the one from the SNPE to the surroundings of the sand-quarries and to the areas of Tolochimie and Sanofi. VEOLIA's own one is connected with the military network under the Pech David hill and more precisely between the former military hospital of Larrey and to the Rangueil hospital.
High executives of the DGA and the CEAT of Toulouse know of course these military underground facilities but have refused to mention them for decades. Their mere existence would justify an immediate cancelling of the cancéropôle project.
Moreover, the Seveso 2 status of the SNPE (SME) already benefits to the coming of new nanotechnological industries, whose waste discharge is much smaller than with usual factories. These companies are settling near the cancéropôle and the sand-quarries, and no study were conducted on the novicity of their new kinds of nano-wastes.

5/ This meeting allowed people who attended it to learn that the DGA intended to use only its own military area surrounding the ballastieres to conduct this study and its tests of degradation of gelatinous nitrocellulosis. So, the DGA will be able to prevent their access to any civilian and potentially demanding scrutiny, in a straight line with the tradition of contempt for the residents of the state agencies linked with the ministry of defense, a tradition that has been lasting for tens of years.

6/ But yet the DGA planned the use of a ground immediately to the north of its sand-quarries to keep the machines of this study work. It seems that this ground does not belong to it anymore and is a part of the area boarding the Garonne, which belongs to the Grand Toulouse...
The meeting was an opportunity for residents like Michel Massou, from the local association Croix de Pierre, and a member of the association Agir pour les Oustalous to ask to the DGA explanations about the existence of a first sand-quarry called "Ballastière 0" in this place, the closest to the new facilities of the Cancéropôle. The DGA was unable to precise the history and the structure of this ground, although letters sent to the Ministry of Defense led to answers from this ministry requiring to conduct studies. The DGA briefly mentioned the possibility of conducting a study of the underground of this location that it intends to deforest for its project, but revealed no detail of this study and so seemed to discover this problem.

7/ About this same Sand-quarry 0, a request was made during this meeting by Agir pour les Oustalous to demand for the thousands of shells dumped from 1918 to 1922 in this ballastiere and so under this wood of poplars, to be put under control. A whole part of military history, before the officialization in 1921 of the processing of nitrocellulosis present in shells, was erased. Old workers had been involved in the transportation of these unprocessed shells and related the story to their children. These thousands of shells were secretely buried under a swamp (1930), then under fields (1940), and then a wood of poplars (1960). The DGA gave no answer about that... The DREALE did not even get interested at first and remained moot during the meeting about this problem. Had the media been allowed to be present at the meeting, it is very likely that this problem would have interested them, since it relates to an important and forgotten danger in the approached study to come, which all by itself could lead to the evacuation of the Cancéropôle for years. It is also to be noted that some shells were found during the building of the Cancéropôle, that bomb disposal experts had to come to handle them and that this little very serious detail seems to have been covered up by the DGA and the DREALE.

8/ The problem of the disposal of the 5000 t of gelatinous nitrocellulosis was also refered to during the meeting, since the estimates have shrunk from 46 000 t to 5 000 t in four years. There, the DGA clearly lied by asserting that in 2000 Grande Paroisse had produced a very doubtful estimate. This first estimation was in fact conducted by the bomb-disposal services of Montpellier, which issued a detailed report that remains unknown to the public. During the meeting, it was requested to produce this report, which seems to severely contest the DGA. It is important to understand how these 46 000 t miraculously became 5 000 t in 4 years.

9/ It was noticed how satisfied of the works of the DGA and the SPPPI was one of the directors of the Pierre Fabre Laboratories, happy beneficiaries of the Cancéropôle... He was alone in this case in the room, given the numeorus questions left without convincing answers by the DGA.

10/ This meeting also evidenced that those in charge of this rehabilitation haven't still even thought of the ulterior phases of this study, which will come to its end in late 2012. No estimate of diiferent possible situations have been made. Knowing that the quantity of various "rubble" containing this nitrocellulosis amount to a minimum of 120 000 t, if we suppose 5 000 t instead of 46 000 t, this gives a picture of difficulties to come in order to rehabilitate this site.

11/ Academics from Toulouse expressed their anger of the complete disdain from the DGA of their possible involvment in the study of the treatment of nitrocellulosis. They were kept out of every debate and scientific study, despite that for years, these specialists could have provided multiple solutions if only small fincing had come to them. But it seems that the authorities prefer to give to VEOLIA and the SNPE, but in no case to local institutions despite that they are competent and close to residents. The DREALE of the region Midi-Pyrénées backed this scornful and exclusive attitude of the DGA, which only resulted in slowness.

12/ In conclusion the general feeling is :

-Continuation of the omerta from the DGA and authorities.
-Pseudo-dialogue, very limited, with the residents.
-Attempts to play for time to do nothing and let the things in the same state, until everybody gets tired and forgets.
-Continuation of a very strict and exclusive control of this military area, so that they could do everything they wish outside of "civilian" scrutiny.
-Contradiction between the DGA and the Ministry of Defense relating to the serious problem with the ballastière 0.
-Outrageous minimization of nocive impacts of rehabilitation projects.

*SPPPI : Service Permanent pour la Prévention des Pollutions et des Risques Industriels (also known as SPPPRI OR SP3I) / Service to prevent pollutions and industrial dangers, a department of the DREALE.
**DREALE : Direction Régionale de l'Environnement, de l'Aménagement et du Logement / Regional directorate of the environment, town and country planning and housing ; a governmental service of the ministries of environment and economy.
***DRIRE : Direction Régionale de l'Industrie, de la Recherche et de l'Environnement / Regional directorate of the industry, scientific research and environment.

 

[Analis]

An unexplained explosion had been heard from the Chemical Pole around two years before the 2001 disaster. But other strange noises with no satysfying official account have come more recently above Toulouse, and in other regions. These events may fall also in the category of mysterious sonic booms.
Pierre Grésillaud gives here a personal theory, it may or may not be accurate, personally I see it only as a possibility among many others ; but it is a possible lead to the disaster of 21.9. He sees a possible link with the intriguing testimony of Hélène Truschinger (D4820) ; like other witnesses, she spotted a kind of military plane flying over the chemical pole just before the explosions ; in addition, she saw it dropping an object.

http://www.lepost.fr/article/2010/06/29 ... ronde.html

Toulouse : a strange sound of explosion heard on a great distance

29/06/2010 13.28, updated on 30/06/2010 11.51am

This morning, tuesday 29 june 2010, around 9.21 - 9.22 am, a huge sound of explosion was heard in Toulouse and its surroundings.

Like thousands of Tolosans, I was a witness while I was in the urban area of the Oustalous at less than 800 meters to the morth of the AZF crater.

Accustomed to sounds of planes breaking the sound barrier (base of Bricy near Orleans, military air traffic lanes to the south of Sète....) I can assure you that this sound was of a really different kind.

At first its strenght. It was very strong and caused windows to vibrate. This sound was sharp, rather more than a breaking of the sound barrier and seemed to come from a very low altitude. Pressures waves from a plane breaking the sound barrier can cause such vibrations but in this case, the plane is close and the sound is immediatley perceived as coming from the sky just above. Which was not the case this morning.

Many other residents remember a sound very akin to the first explosion that had preceded the AZF explosion seconds before.

But, being often connected to the seismological site of the Military CEA, I noticed a few seconds after the explosion that this website (www.dase.cea.fr) which provides almost live the seismic records from the Lorme station, located near Avallon in the Nièvre, was more than 2 hours late to release them. I had never seen that ! This kind of seismometer can detect seismo-acoustic waves at many hundreds kilometers. This had already been the case with the AZF explosion, but also with strong sounds of plane breaking the sound barrier. It is updated every ten minutes. Today, being 2 hours late is not normal at all. The CEA censored in advance... and unsurprisingly, a few minutes after I had connected myself, the data base slowly made up for its lost time.

A breaking of the sound barrier is unlikely because it waw perceived simultaneously in many places that are not even located in an air traffic lane. The general feeling is rather that the phenomenon expanding radially from a source and reached instantaneously a great area.

On 18 Larch 2010, the same phenomenon had taken place in Rennes. Phone testimonies involving the two speakers perceiving the same sound at different times allowed to locate approximatively a punctual source around 25 km to the north of the town. A witness even saw a strange phenomenon in the sky, like a big elongated smoke shaped like a cigar that dispersed quickly after a few seconds. This day, the seismometer of Lormes had not been censored and had even detected 10 mn before the event a strange seismic phenomenon made of low frequencies, that could not be tied with any officially accounted seismic event. Explanations were asked to the ministry of Defense, which has still not given any answer...!

Today, the delay of more than 2 hours only of the public seismological data of the Military CEA would confirm its intent to cover up also this seismo-acoustic event.

The prefecture of Haute-Garonne explains officially this morning to those who had phoned it that this sound was an accidental bang from a jet fighter... I am very sceptic. The Military CEA had a very unusual behaviour with its seismometers, I doubt that it is only a coincidence. Yesterday evening the authorities changed their version and now say that it was a Rafale deliberately flying to intercept a Boeing 757, a foreign airliner that didn't identify itself while it was crossing the French airspace. It was coming from England and was ging to the Baleare Islands. Why did the prefecture change their version ?

The theory of a very silent craft able to break the sound barrier remains possible, but I am more of the opinion that it was a deliberate punctual aerial explosion intended to test a very fast radial aspersion of isothermic aerosols, able to hide in a few seconds alarge aerial area from radars, thanks to an isothermic atmospheric layer. The weather was cloudy when the explosion took place. Very convenient for everything above the clouds to remain unseen, the only risk being the noise, frightening or not. Since in the region of Toulouse, military electromagnetic atmospheric sensors are numerous (military area of Aussaguel, CEAT, Onera, etc...), it wouldn't be surprizing that this kind of test would be conducted, under the cover of a sound barrier.

But to take such a risk in a region where many Tolosans are still affected by numerous disorders due to sounds of explosions, would require the authorities to act more sensitive. Residents of my street close to AZF were under stress and had to take medics again... the unexpected breaking of this kind of huge noise (a very different situation from a thunderstorm or fireworks which are easy to predict) affects the health of some vulnerable people.

In the summer of 2008, an identical panic had happened in Toulouse. The official explanation had come late but had been the same.

An email was sent to the prefecture requesting more explanations and hoping an investigation even without material damages.

What if on 21 September 2001, the first sound of explosion was also the consequence of a radial aspersion of aerosol to mask the area from radars above the Chemical Pole from an aircraft crossing the site from East to West...!

Could it explain the interruption of radar surveillance for a few seconds that air traffic controllers of Blagnac airport didn't dare to admit to the justice ?

21 Sept 2001... here is the testimony numbered D4820 of someone who was working at the Marchant hospital and who saw a grey plane dropping a long black object a few seconds before the AZF explosion. Other witnesses from different places also mentioned this unidentified grey plane coming from the South-East and going to the North-West a few seconds before the explosion. The justice never wanted to take into account these testimonies and moreover never investigated seriously the radar records from Blagnac. But bizarrely the first sound, which reminds Tolosans of the sound heard this morning, had never been accounted of as a sound barrier... no, officially it was a "seismic bang" (a brand new notion made up by the expert of the OMP-Toulouse Annie Souriau, confirmed by Alain Delpuech, director of the Military CEA). At less than 700 m this first explosion was indistinguishable from the second one... but that is not important to the experts !

D4820
Year two thousand and four
the seventh of may
at sixteen o'clock.

......
"QUESTION : First, might you tell us where you were during at the time of the "A.Z.F." explosion and how you perceived this phenomenon ?
ANSWER : at the time of the explosion, I was in the buiding Delaye part of the Marchant Hospital, in the second floor, at a few hundreds of meters from the "A.Z.F." plant.
The explosion took place around twenty past ten.
Visually, I perceived strictly nothing.
I heard like an internal explosion but that did not touch us then around ten seconds later a second stronger explosion that came with a shockwave that damaged many things like the panes and the uprights of the windows.
I was myself thrown into the corridor.

With my colleagues we came out of the building two or three minutes later, and we stayed in front of the Delaye building before we went to the main courtyard.
But between ten to twenty seconds before the explosion, I clearly heard the engine of a plane.
QUESTION : could you describe this plane sound more precisely ?
ANSWER : of course.
To me it was the sound of a plane that stops its engine or at least that is slowing excessively, and not the sound of a plane that flies normally as we are used to hear them since we are near the air traffic lanes of Blagnac.
And more precisely the engine was seeming to run so low that I thought it was going to crash, or in any case that something abnormal was happening above the area.
I then went to the window and I noticed above the plant, a plane that was flying and I felt such a feeling of danger that I went back to write the mail I was writing when the first explosion took place.
QUESTION : Could you relate us what you precisely saw before you started back to write your e-mail ?
ANSWER : in my memory, it was an airplane and not an helicopter.
This plane was of a light grey colour, looking like a military plane since there were no windows, but I couldn't be more precise, notably about the size or any other feature that could allow to identify it.
It was flying at a few tens of meters high, coming from the south-east and going to the north-east at a rather low altitude.
From the building where I stood, I located above the "A.Z.F." site, above its north side we can see from the office.
I also perceived that a black thing was falling from the plane, again above the plant.
It was a black mass, not big but visible from where I was.
I think that this 'thing' was roughly shaped like a tube and could be around two meters long. It was much smaller than the plane.
In any case this is how the scene got ingrained in my mind.
I precise you that I saw all of this very fast, before I went hurridly back to write my mail, that I intended to send. Because of this feeling of a great dread, I wished to date very precisely the time of my death.
QUESTION : Could you give us a description as accurate as possible of this plane ?
ANSWER : I told you everything I could remember.
QUESTION : To your knowledge, did others than you hear or see this plane, in this case do you know their names and do you know how to contact them ?
ANSWER : one of my colleagues was there but I don't remember who exactely. I will try to find her and I will give you her coordinates later.
QUESTION : more generally speaking, do you have any info that could help us to identify this helicopter [sic] ?
ANSWER : Absolutely not.
I have nothing else to say, except that in my opinion, the overfly of this site by this plane is linked with the explosion of 21 september 2001."

 

[Analis]

Here's the text of an analysis by Jean-Louis Bruguière based on the study of the judiciary proceedings report (available here : http://www.verite921.com/indexFrame.html ), delivered on June 2010 to the counsels of accused and former accused people who were suing the State for damages, notably because they had been badly treated by the police and handed in police custody for unjustified motives. On 6 April 2011 the civil court of Paris staid its judgment until the end of the main proceedings, still pending. The prosecutor's office having appealed of the 19.11.2009 decision, a date for an appeal trial was put on 3 November (very late, as had already been the case with the inferior court, but well, the selection of obedient magistrates may be a long task...).

His motives remain obscure, his contribution is very long (28 pages), sometimes dry, and refers only to the terrorist side of the case. But it is interesting in that he underlines numerous obvious faults of the official inquest, including a few points which are usually overlooked. It corroborates the claims of police officers who contested the handling of the case, as well as the findings of private researchers.

14 June 2010
You informed me through a letter dated 14 May 2010 that you wished to ask me for my personal advice, as an experienced anti-terrorist instructor judge, about the nature and the investigation methods used in the inquest relating to the explosion of the AZF factory.

In order to justify your request, you explained to me, that you were acting as a counsel for Mrs Claire CRUVELIER, Messrs Serge BIECHLIN, Eric Jean-Claude DELAUNAY, Jean-Claude GELBER, Philippe GIL, René Olivier MAILLOT, Richard MOLE, Robert NORAY, George PAILLAS, Stanislas PETRIKOWSKI and Jacques SIMIARD, who are involved in litigation with the judiciary agent of Treasury, director of Judicial matters for the Ministry of Treasury and Economy, assisted by the prosecutor's office, for the motive that the inquest was riddled with heavy faults which were seriously prejudicial to them, arousing from unwarranting police custodies resulting in unwarranted indictments.

In order to help me to provide you my advice in this case, now pending in the Court of Paris, you have provided me a copy of the criminal file relating to the "AZF" case, as it was added to the trial which was conducted at the inferior criminal Court of Toulouse in spring 2009.

I'm confirming to you that as a result of our previous conversations and to answer the letter of yours I have previously mentioned, I agree to give you, as an experienced anti-terrorist investigator, my opinion pertaining to the way the criminal inquest on the explosion at the AZF plant was conducted.

2

You asked me to provide my opinion about some parts of the inquest that are, according to you, constitutive of serious faults according to the L141-1 article of the code of judiciary organization. These parts relate to the lack of investigation of the malevolence lead, the inquiries about the responsability claims, serious lacks in the handling of evidence and the police custodies.

You'll find in the following chapters my opinion relating to these questions, as well as to the way that this inquest was handled in view of rules that investigators should follw in such a judiciary investigation.

I will begin by stating that the AZF inquest, trough its extent, its complexity, its mediatic impact, and its numerous new developments, is of the same kind than many terrorist cases I had to handle when I was directing the anti-terrorist pole.


In this respect, i wish to precise that the more a case proves to be complex, the more one has to be rigourous in his investigative strategy as well as in his strict reliance on the rules of proceedings, notably those which pertain to the gathering of evidence and the keeping of physical traces and hints. As well as it is crucial to never privilege a specific lead. Only the developments of the inquiry justify to follow a lead, which could latter be proven or disproved. To presuppose or to privilege a lead, to the detriment of some other possibilities, will only seriously flaw the course of investigations and to put into jeopardy its results. This rule is all the more important that in such an important case, it is uncommon that a lead is imposed immediately, while often public opinion, as instrumentalized by the media and other factors, notably political or diplomatical, weights on the course of justice to try to impose a direction, following interests opposed to the normal course of the inquiry. The duty of the investigators is to resist such pressure.

A careful examination of the proceedings files brings into light that in the AZF case, a lead was privieged as soon as the beginning of the inquest.


Relating to the specific parts that you mentioned to me, in view of the files, I may provide you my remarks as follows :

3

1- About the lack of investigation on an act of malevolance.

The main question relates to the JANDOUBI case. It is not my role to give an opinion on his potential involvment in the explosion, especially as the judges of the inferior court couldn't come to a conclusion relating to its causes, but to see if potential leads that his case might have suggested were seriously searched, and to assess the influence of potential miscariages on the due process of investigation and the search for the truth.

That being said, it is indisputable that Mr Jandoubi's behaviour, his situation inside AZF and the first evidence collected or the infos relating to him, required a complete inquiry to be conducted on him, in order to assess his possible role in the advent of the explosion, and so to either validate or rule out this lead.

The main findings that were requiring such a search are :

-The fact that he had been killed by the explosion and that his body had been found on the site.
-The observation that he was wearing many underpants, as do fundamentalist islamists.
-The fact that, as suggested by the investigation, ther day before the events and on the same morning, 10 days after the attacks in the United States, he would have had serious altercations with truck drivers inside the factory, suggesting a strong sympathy for the ideology of the radical salafists close to Al Qaida. According to the statements (Yvan SIMON-D559 ; AVEZANI -D560 who notably reported that Mr JANDOUBI, after having issued threats, had added: "this is a good day, you will remember it" ; BEN DRISS D576 ; PAYSSAN D 558), Mr JANDOUBI had been supporting islamists "oppressed" by the West and expressed very anti-american feelings.
-His personal past history and infos collected that put him in a bad light (D 542 : he had been known for instances of rapes, pimping and theft in 1986 and 1987).
-He was depicted in a RG report as having had ties with the tolosan radical islamist circles.
-The use of a stolen mobile phone, a usual practice of ordinary criminals but also of members of the radical islamist cells that were dismantled in France at this time.

These few findings (a non-exhaustive list) required in-depth investigations to be promptly issued on this suspect and his neigbourhood.

4

These needed inquiries related to the chapters in your leter referenced as 1-2 a) to d), 1-3 and 1-4 pertaining to inquiries on the person concerned and his family, his past record and his supposed links with islamist circles, his timetable during the days before and on the very day of the explosion, and the search for proofs and hints during house searches and technical studies of mobile phones.
......

To be continued

 

[shruggy63]

I'm really impressed by the way you've stuck at this, allez Analis!
Maybe you should write about it?

 

[Analis]

continued

......
1-2 a) et d) hearings of Mr Jandoubi's friends and relatives and inquiries on his personality and his acquaintances

It emerges from the files that Mr JANDOUBI's acquaintances were heared outside of any consistent strategy of investigation, often a minima and with lateness. Yet some of them had been working on the AZF site and Smaïn BRIH (D6640) even acknowledges that he entered it fraudulently many times. The members of his family and his closest friends asserted that Mr JANDOUBI was not a fundamentalist and he had never had any connections with islamist circles. But these claims are contradicted by the RG report that was added to the procedure (D 2209). Although these white notes established by this intelligence service, now integrated in the Direction Centrale du Renseignement Interieur [Central Directorate of Domestic Intelligence] (DCRI) could include infos that were not corroborated and sometimes disputable, it should nonetheless have been subjected to more thorough verifications (see infra). Moreover, Mr JANDOUBI's past records and his double life, put into evidence by the few inquiries conducted on him, demonstrated that the testimonies of his friends' and relatives', notably of his wife's, were at the very least disputable. Even if Mr JANDOUBI's behaviour and his possible parallel activities do not establish his involvment in the AZF explosion, nevertheless they provide to an investigator enough hints to prompt him to look for what the activities of the person concerned really were and to establish the list of this contacts. Indisputably, such further investigations were interesting for the general inquiry, notably pertaining to the possible connections between Mr JANDOUBI and some radical islamist circles in Toulouse, as the Artigat community or some members of teh Tabligh, denounced in the RG report.

This report mentions links between Hasan JANDOUBI and Djilali EL BECHIR and the tolosan islamist circles. According to it, they had fallen under the influence of the "afghan circles", organized around Mohammed REZIGA and the ARTIGAT community. The brothers ABDELOUHAB are mentioned too. Djilali EL BECHIR was interrogated a first time on 23 September 2001 (D534) then on 2 October 2001 mainly about his occupations inside AZF (D1096) and one last time four years later, on 22 November 2005 (D6667) on disparate matters, with no consistency. No attempt to contradict him is made. His brother Sénouci, also mentioned in the RG report, is interrogated in similar conditions. A first hearing on 9 October 2001 (D 1500), a second one on 3 March 2003 (D3881) and the last one on 30 November 2005 (D 6678), again with no consistency. My

5

experience with cases relating to the islamist radical circles I had conducted with the help of the DST shows that hearings that are not prepared and that were not included in a coherent strategy, could not come with any result. Moreover, the evidence available could justify to put the previously mentioned persons in police custody, as relevant to the related dispositions of the code of criminal procedure.

The way inquiries relating to Nadia MORDJIANA, Hasan Jandoubi's wife, were conducted was even more questionable, be it her hearings or the house search at her home (see infra).

In muslim families, especially among salafists, Wives know usually well their spouses' activities, although they are separated from men. The structure of these circles, and the own relationship networks built by the wives, often allows them to become aware of their husbands' occult activities. In the cases I had to know, the wives of the suspects were often a main source of information about operational sides that they should never have knowed. This was notably the case during the investigation on the attempted attack on the Strasburg cathedral.

Even if JANDOUBI' affiliation with a fundamentalist islamic current of thought has not been established, some of his behaviour as related by his wife are consistent with this trend (separation from her husband's male acquaintainces, separate activities). Nadia MORDJANA was keeping numerous links (notably via phone) with her female acquaintances, especially in her husband's circle.It would be surprising that she was not aware of his parrallel activities.

The evidence contained in the files at my disposal suggest that Nadia MORDJANA has concealed the truth relating to some facts (notable about her husband's personal belongings) and that she very likely knew his actitivties, as evidenced by her own use of his phone of fraudulent origin, whose we may reasonably infer that it was used for his hidden activities.

Yet it emerges from the files that nor the detectives of the SRPJ of Toulouse nor the director of investigation shared this analysis, and that inquiries around Nadia MORDJANA were neglected. The orientation of the inquest towards the lead of an accident probably explains this negligence.

Nadia MORDJANA was supposedly heard one first time by officers from the Direction Départementale de la Sécurité Publique [District Direction of Public Security] (DDSP). But no trace of this deposition could be found and the SRPJ of Toulouse could not obtain from the DDSP the slightest relevant information pertaining to this first hearing (D6310). Yet, from the findings of the procedure, it emerges that she would have provided different informations than those she would provide later. Six later

6

hearings followed, from 25 September to 7 October 2005. Like all the previous ones, they were obeying to no investigative logic, despite that she was an important witness. During the flagrancy inquest phase*, Nadia MORDJANA was interrogated only once, on 25 September 2001 ( D 546) ; a short hearing, during which no question was asked her.
......

to be continued

 

[Analis]

continued

......
On 28 September, a house search took place at her home. She will tell spontaneously to the investigators that " she had gotten rid of Hassan's belongings, notably his dress and some documents" (D552). It would be revealed later that her claims were untrue and that she had lied on other issues. She will admit among other things during the same hearing (D 1502) that she had used her husband's cell phone with his "chip", whose fraudulent origin she couldn't ignore as their couple didn't pay any bill.

It is at the very least surprizing that with so many murky areas, apparent since her first hearings, Nadia MORDJANA wasn't interrogated in different conditions. Another option was yet chosen for thirteen employess of Grande Paroisse who were interrogated under police custody, without any objective reason to justify such a decision at this stage of the inquest.

Putting Nadia MORDJANA in police custody, following another strategy, would have probably allowed her to overcome her fear that prevented her to speak and reveal some hidden parts of her husband's life, that had become apparent when the detailed bill ("fadet") of his cell phone had been studied.

Nadia was not heard about this stolen "chip" whose she had yet widely used, according to some depositions (D1514). She was not either really interrogated about a strange call from Hassan to his family which lasted 8 minutes the day before the explosion. A call evidenced by the detailed bill (fadet) of his mobile phone (D 549, 557). Nadia MORDJANA claims again to know nothing of this fact, and nobody in the couple's family circle had any knowledge of this call, not even JANDOUBI's parents, despite that the call was destined to them on their home phone.

JANDOUBI's father was heard only once about this long phone call, whose he claims to know nothing of. Finally, not the contents nor the the motives of this call are known. Yet this communication is uncanny and suspect, especially if we take into account that on the day of the events JANDOUBI was wearing many underpants. Another disturbing fact : the study of communications, using the fadet of Mr JANDOUBI's mobile phone - which was not done according to the judiciary files - reveals that after this 8 minutes-long call, its user changed its SIM card and phoned someone else (see infra). Why ? The fadet allowed the identification of the person he called. It was not used. To justify the lack of further investigation about this

7

matter and notably of a new hearing of JANDOUBI's parents, despite the requests from the defendants, the Toulouse SRPJ put forward their "psychological weakness" as a result of the tragedy they went through and of the press coverage, in the minutes dated from 20 October 2005 (D6653).

1.1 b) the house search at JANDOUBI's home

The study of the files reveals that a house search was made at the couple JANDOUBI-MORDJANA's domicile on 28 September 2001, in the presence of Nadia MORDJANA. The relevant minutes (D 552) state that this operation "didn't result in the finding of any evidence that could be relevant to our inquest". As a matter of fact this T2 flat was empty. Nadja MORDJANA will tell the investigators that she had droped her husband's every personal belonging. Which would later prove to be inaccurate, as she will tell that she had given them to a nephew. For unresolved reasons, she got rid of her husband's belongings that she likely considered as incriminating. Commissioner MALON, who doesn't believe in the malevolence lead, refuses a house search in Nadia MORDJANA's flat and to authorize her hearing in the first days folowing the explosion. There will be a divergence of opinion between the judiciary police officers COHEN and BURLE on the one hand and commissioner MALON on the other hand. On 4 October 2001, commander COHEN wrote to the prosecutor of Toulouse to complain of the instructions that, according to him, commissioner MALON had given him, ordering him not to proceed nor to an hearing of Nadia MORDJANA nor to an house search at her domicile.

The examination of the files put into evidence that during the flagrancy inquiry, among 650 minutes, a very small number were dedicated to the "malevolence lead".

Considered from a viewpoint of investigative logic, commisioner MALON's decision to postpone an hearing of Nadia MORDJANA and a house search in her flat has no justification at all. Either it is considered, from the evidence available, that these acts of investigation are useless and so they are not taken into account anymore, either they are potentially useful to find the truth and so they are conducted with no delay. Especially in the case of a house search. A late house search is rarely useful. It is usually the first act of inquest, as it allows to find evidence. In some sensitive cases (the Beghal case or more recently the Cherifi network) house searches were conducted at night, to find incriminating evidence that could have been destroyed or removed.

Relating to the AZF case, the house search at Nadia MORDJANA's flat led to no result because it took place too late. Didn't Mr JANDOUBI's wife admit that she had gotten rid of her husband's personal effects ? It can't be ruled out that she had destroyed more incriminating evidence. From this standpoint, commissioner MALON's

8

attitude is even more at fault as it results from his will to privilege only one direction of inquest, which, for a lack of evidence, was not validated by the court. Moreover, from the minutes of this house search, it doesn't seem that the prosecutor was informed of this decision of the SRPJ of Toulouse (D552). It is true that the files clearly put into evidence that Mr BREARD, prosecutor of Toulouse, had carelessly favored this same lead, going to such lenghts as to publicly assert "that the cause of the explosion was known at 99% and that it was accidental" (D 4061).

This biased approach, evidenced notably by marks D 1750 and D 7033, should also be considered as the cause of the absence of house searches at the domicile of some of JANDOUBI's acquaintances, mentioned in the RG note or who seemed to have had an uncanny or even suspect behaviour, as evidenced by the facts gathered by the few investigations around them (notably BRIH Smaïn, EL BECHIR Djilali, MASSAFI Younes, THE ABDELHOUAB brothers and Miloud REZIGA). By contrast EL BECHIR Senouci's home was searched (D 1503) as well as of two of his colleagues', SAYAH Bouzid (D 1508) and LABANE Mimoun (D 1511). These searches could not be justified by any serious reason, excepted that they had been working in the AZF factory.

1-1 c) reconstruction of Hassan JANDOUBI's moves during the hours before the explosion

The judiciary files present no clear reconstruction of the chronology of Hassan JANDOUBI's moves and doings and of his fellow-workers present at the site, on the morning of 21 September. The motives put forward by the SRPJ (D6687) to not answer to the request from the defendants do not look to be relevant. In addition, two truck drivers (Karim BEN DRISS and Franck AVEZANY (D 560, 575, 3790, and D 4908) report the presence of two men who didn't belong to the team of loaders and who weren't identified. While not being as crucial for the inquest (as opposed to searches and investigations on phones), such inquiries as asked by the defense (D7248) would have been useful for the search for truth. No serious motive could be opposed to the acceptation of the request of the defendants of 11 October 2006 (D 7246), notably as the latter had tried to begin to reconstruct a chronology based on available evidence (D6696). The refusal by the instructor judge and the Toulouse SRPJ appear to have been justified only by the orientation given to the inquest in one only direction at the exclusion of any other : an industrial accident.

1-3 the stolen SIM Card and the study of phone calls

This side of the case appears to be the most serious fault commited by the Toulouse PJ in the conducting of the inquest. On a double count. By not proceeding to verifications based on the detailed bills (Fadet) of this SIM card and of the persons who

9

were in contact with him, that the study of their own fadets would have helped to establish, the Toulouse SRPJ deliberately ignored a way to know with certainty JANDOUBI's relationships, to establish the true nature of his putative clandestine activities and to check the validity of the data collected by the Toulouse RG. But overall, it didn't take the necessary protective procedure to conduct investigations on phone calls, which consisted to ask to the telecomunication companies the detailed bills of the interested persons. These computerized documents permit to know for each call the number of the SIM card (IMSI), the reference relating to the box (IMEI) that is associated with it, the time of the call (with a one second precision), its lenght, and the location of the call.

These opportunities are irreparablely compromized by a lack of requests of fadets to the relevant companies, who retain them for only one year. These detailed bills should have been asked for Hassan JANDOUBI for a longer time, and too for the members of his circleand the people mentioned in the RG note. In every terrorist case I had to investigate, the studies of phone calls played a crucial role.

The inquest on the assassination of the prefect of Corsica, Claude Erignac, was largely solved using them. As soon as the inquiry began, the whole mobile phone networks in Corsica were frozen and the computerized data were kept by the companies, obeying a judiciary order. So that this data could be used later, when the investigators came to need them. More recently, the Sous-Direction Anti Terroriste [Anti Terrorist Under-Directorate] of the DCPJ (SDAT), acting under letters rogatory, asked mobile phone detailed bills in the case of the Artigat community, that I have also investigated. Their data could have easily been cross-checked with those from Mr JANDOUBI's fadets and of his friends' and relatives', had the latter been requested. Such a failure is really surprizing from the SRPJ, notably because it had been put in charge of the Artigat inquiry by the anti-terrorist judges from Paris and that it knew this study on their phone calls as well as the existence of the software developed by the ministry of Interior to proceed a mass of data.
......

to be continued

 

[Analis]

continued

......
The faults of the Toulouse SRPJ look even more inexcusable, since my own study of Mr JANDOUBI's fadet, despite that it could be only incomplete, was enough to bring out some suspect behaviours of the user or users of this cell phone, deduced from the insertion of more than one SIM card in the same casing. Which suggests that JANDOUBI had a set of SIM cards and many casings, combining "chip" and casing according to the circumstances.

The contents of the files underline that Mr JANDOUBI got fraudulently a SIM card stolen to the CHU of Toulouse (D 554, 2209), in conditions that are still unsolved. This SIM cards was numbered IMSI 2008 01 4000 404 627 and was inserted by

10

JANDOUBI in his casing, a TRIUMPH numbered IMEI 105 473 31 57222. The chip was activated on 12 February 2001 (D 554). According to his wife, Hassan JANDOUBI had been using this phone for 6 months (D 1502).

The Toulouse SRPJ got, through a judiciary order, the detailed bill of the mobile line 06 12 52 48 42 relating to the IMSI number 2008 01 4000 404 627 already mentioned, only for the period from 23 July 2001 to 22 September 2001.

Nevertheless this detailed bill (Fadet) was not studied at all and the phone numbers of the called persons as well of the callers were not identified.

Yet this computerized listing contained - as explained previously - data that was crucial for the pursuance of the inquest.
It was possible to know for each call, from or sent towards this phone :

* The IMSI number and the associated 10-figure number
* The day and the times of the call
* The lenght of the call
* the called number, also 10-figure if they are in France
* The identification of the relay involved
* The identification of the casing (IMEI) in which the "chip" (SIM) was inserted

The cross-checked study of this computerized data allows to know which casing and which chip was used, to date the call and even to locate the mobile phone thanks to the activated relays, whose geographical coordinates are known.

Islamists operating on French territory as well as ordinary criminals often use stolen mobile phones and chips or "mobicartes" for their clandestine activities. By switching SIM cards and casings, they think they can cloud their communications and prevent to access them and to identify their contacts. But these manipulations are useless if the fadet is got and that in-depth studies are conducted on IMEI/IMSI checks.

The result of these cross-checkings allows the identification of the other SIM cards and casings. New detailed bills relating to these other SIM cards help to reconstruct the history of these calls, and to put in evidence the manipulations made on the mobile phones, to relate them to criminal activities attributed to suspected people, who from then may be identified.

In 2001, the study of computer data of mobile phone networks was a tried and tested technique, well known by every judiciary

11

police service, not only for cases of terrorism but also of organized crime. The Direction Centrale de la Police Judiciaire (DCPJ), whose the Toulouse SRPJ is under the authority of, had developed a software to make this technique easier to use.

So the retracing of the calls made with entangled casings and SIM cards (even if they are of fraudulent origin), analyzed with the help of this software that was available to the Toulouse SRPJ, allows us :

* To identify with certainty every call made with one or more casings combined with one or more "chips", even if they were stolen.
* To locate calls and to follow the movements of the cell phone and so to reconstruct the path followed by its user.
* To identify clandestine behaviours (frequent switchings of casings ans chips with no justification, at important times for the inquest)
* To gather solid evidence to incriminate suspects.

So the study of telephone networks activities is a very important source of evidence in terrorist cases, as important as phone tappings themselves.

The examination of JANDOUBI's fadet for the period from 23 July to 22 September 2001 reveals a clandestine behaviour that his relatives and friends seemingly tried to conceal.

For example, this document reveals that Hassan JANDOUBI had another casing (numbered IMEI 44 874 4951 162 190) that was not identified. In view of these switchings, it is reasonable to suppose that JANDOUBI also had other "chips". But it was necessary to make studies of crossed IMEI/IMSI uses made with this second casing.

Even a supeficial look at this fadet by someone with a knowledge of the standard form for this document brings out that these switchings took place at important times. For example, on 20 September, the day before the AZF explosion, Hassan JANDOUBI made 28 calls with the MOTOROLA casing and 2 with the unknown casing. At 18:19 he called his parents' home for more than 8 minutes (see supra), and for his next call at 18:39 he switched his casings. Nobody could remember this long call the day before his death and the holder of the phone number called at 18:39 was nor identified nor interrogated. There are other instances of suspect behaviours, especially as in view of the fadet, these switchings of casings may not be explained by technical reasons, like the recharching of batteries.

12

Not only this fadet was not used but no other detailled bill was asked. In such an investigative context, the Toulouse SRPJ should have identified the other chip or chips associated with the second casing numbered IMEI 44 874 4951162 190, and requested the relevant fadets as well as those relating to the numbers present on the first fadet.

This data is definitely lost, the companies retaining their clients' detailled bills only for one year, as already mentioned.
......

to be continued

 

[Analis]

Well, there are so many sides, so much data and infos, that it is difficult to find his way among all of this. This note only was too long to be posted in one part, or even two or three. But there are important conclusions to draw.

continued

......
If Hassan JANDOUBI's clandestine behaviour, suggesting a double-life, is apparent from the study of this fadet, the true nature of his possible parrallel activities is unknown, for lack of related investigation.

The lack of investigations on telephone calls, or more exactely the refusal to initiate an investigation on JANDOUBI's mobile phone, found in his car (D 543) is indusputably a heavy breach of the rules of a good criminal inquest, heavily impeding the examination of the malevolance lead.

1-4 The investigation of the Renseignements Généraux

Its contents should have been checked, as it was a piece of evidence included to the inquest files. The argument according to which it was made only of uncorroborated information, gathered outside of any judiciary procedure, is worthless to justify the absence of attempts to verify its contents. In the terrorist cases I had to know, we were often given intelligence by the DST with no indication of its origin and of the way it had been collected. This intelligence is usable (as opposed to the situation that prevails in anglo-saxon laws) but deprived of any true probative value, in absence of any corraboration by a judiciary inquiry.

About this RG note dated 3 October, related in the file under the mark D 2209, its intelligence contents needed in-depths corroboration to validate them. However, it was not necessary ot hear the authors of this "white" note, who belong to an intelligence service and whose idnetity and investigative methods should be protected.

The reading of proceedings documents at my diposal does not allow me to conclude that any such investigation was ordered.

If we consider for example the traffic check at Valence that is mentioned in this note, it emerges from the documents that hearings of the members of the Tabligh, who indeed underwent a police check from a gendarmerie road platoon at Valence-d'Agen, were conducted with negligence. It brings out from the minutes of their hearings (D3591, 3593, 3595, 3602) that they

13

were interrogated for many days and that they confered to give the same version. Moreover, around a specific matter, the broken rear window of one of their two vehicules, an inconsistency remains unexplained. The gendarme who conducted the traffic check report (D6694) that the driver of the white Renault Laguna car had spontaneously related to them that their vehicle had been damaged "by the AZF explosion while they were driving on a "motorway"", but while they were interrogated by the Toulouse SRPJ, Miloud REZIGA (D 3593), Abdelkader HIBOUR ( D 3591) and Chafik AHMED (D 3602), Chelikh BENDJEBAR ( D 3589), and Mohammad EL QANDIL ( D 3915) asserted that they noticed that the Laguna was damaged when they left.

All these witnesses should have been interrogated under police custody or at least on the same dy so that they couldn't confer. In fact their hearings were conducted on many days, from 14 May to 26 September 2003. As for Captain Le Floch, from teh Gendarmerie platoon who had alledgelly ordered this check at the request of the RG, he was never heard. As for teh wives of the previously mentionned persons who were in the same cars, teh Toulouse SRPJ notes in a minute dated 28 December 2005 (D6695) that "it didn't look useful to procede [to the hearings] of their wives'". Same thing with the hearing of Azzedine AZEDJ, also seen as "useless", despite that they had been asked by the defense and requested by the instructor judge.

It should too be noted that no serious checkout was made of the ties alleged in the RG report between Hassan JANDOUBI and the "Afghan circles" of Toulouse, notably the islamists community Artigat.

The latter was the target in May 2005 of an inquiry ordered by the National Anti-Terrorist Division that resulted in the opening of a procedure for criminal terrorist conspiracy entrusted to the Paris antiterrorist judiciary cell. Within the framework of these proceedings, numerous studies of phone calls were conducted. No cross-checking was made with the AZF inquest. It was true that the absence of fadets in the latter couldn't allow such probings. Yet the investigation on the Artigat community culd establish that some of its members were involved in armed Jihad, and this investigation resulted in February 2009 in the refering of ten of the indicted people to the Court of Paris for criminal terrorist conspiracy.

These few examples show that these probings were not conducted satisfactorily and that sometimes some acts asked by the defense and accpeted by the instructo judge were refused by the Toulouse SRPJ for motives of convenience.

14

1-4 the travel to Francfort

It appears from pieces of the investigation that JANDOUBI went to Francfort three times in the months before the explosion. But the circumstances urrounding these travels, his activities in Francfort and people he met were not subjected to any real inquiry.

Put in the context of the AZF case, such inquiries, that were in addition asked by the defendants, were necessary for two reasons.

° The terrorist context at the time of the events : Germany and more specifically the town of Francfort were then at the core of a very strong islamist activity tied to the Algerian GSPC, including the attempted attack on the cathedral of Strasburg end December 2000. The inquest that was conducted in France as well as in Germany, Italy and Belgium allowed to dismantle in 2001 and 2002 a number of terrorist cells linked with the Al Qaida networks. With the help of another anti-terrorist magistrate, I myself prepared the cases pertaining to the French side of the Strasburg attempted attack and to the linked proceedings that would be initiated later, notably of the "Chechen rings" in 2002. As a result of these investigations, it emerged that the town of Francfort was home to islamist networks involved in logistical activities, notably traffics in stolen vehicles, in order to fund their own activities and to prepare terrorist attacks. Garage owners dedicated to the islamist cause or involved in criminal activities appeared in our investigations.

° The shadowy areas surrounding JANDOUBI's moves to Germany : The investigation led by the Toulouse SRPJ brings into light that JANDOUBI went many times to Francfort to buy second-hand cars, including the one he used in September 2001, a Peugeot 405 break. According to EL BECHIR Djilali, his brother Sénouci and JANDOUBI went many times to Germany in order to buy cars that they later resold in Toulouse, a "business" that they had been conducting for 5 to 6 months (D1096). As for Sénouci EL-BECHIR (D 1500), he related that in November 2000, his stepbrother MASSAFI Laurent, manager of repair shop "MASTER AUTO SERVICE", had asked him to come with him in Germany in order to buy some cars and that he had asked HASSAN to drive one of these cars on the way back. They made two other travels in the same month. He added than in June 2001, he had gone back to Francfort on Hassan's request to buy a car. Senouci then gave to the investigators the phone number of the Francfort garage owner. As for Nadia MORDJANA (D 546), she claimed that her husband had gone to Germany only once. Did Hassan conceal some things from her or did she lie ? The shadowy areas are numerous : the number of travels to Germany, the lenght of their sojourns, the number of bought and resold cars (PONS Robert from the small firm TMG - D 6632- confirmed that JANDOUBI was proposing some cars to his colleagues),

15

earnings made from this business, the use made of this money.

We have to state that no serious inquiry was conducted around thse suspect activities, despite that one of the persons involved in these travels, MASSAFI Younes (D1516), who seems to be at the origin of this business, also has a criminal record (drug traffic). The garage manager in Francfort was not identified and his phone number is not even included in the minutes, despite tht it was given by Senouci EL BECHIR. In addition, if the fadets relating to the concerned persons (JANDOUBI, EL BECHIR Senouci, MASSAFI Laurent) had been requested, it would have been possible, thanks to these solid pieces of evidence, to reconstruct these travels to Germany and to identify every person in business with JANDOUBI and MASSAFI. These probings wee necessary notably because the RG note states that JANDOUBI and Senouci EL BECHIR had fallen under the influence of Afghan circles ( D 2209).

2-About the responsability claims

There are no well defined rules when terrorist groups, especially if they are islamists, are claiming responsability for an attack.

It is not uncommon that nobody claims responsability for an attack. This was notably the case with the 3 December 1996 bombing at the RER [metropolitan train in Paris] B line station "Port Royal". Osama Ben Laden claimed responsability for the 11 September 2001 attacks only lately, on 2004, a few days before the US elections. More recently, nobody took responsability for a number of terrorist actions attributable to groups tied to Al Qaida. Among them the bombing in Hyderabad in India in 2007 and others the following year in the Pakistanese Northern Province.
......

to be continued

 

[Analis]

continued

......
Sometimes it may also happen that credit for some attacks is taken for opportunistic reasons. It is then a responsability claim, for propaganda motives, of an attack perpetrated by another terrorist group. This is notably the case of the attempted bombing of Amsterdam-Detroit Northwest flight on last year 25 December by a Nigerian man, with no direct links with Al Qaida. Nevetheless, this attempt will be the subject of a responsability claim by Osama Bin Laden on 24 January 2010, in an audio tape aired on Qatari resort Al Jazeera.

Another situation, at least as common, concerns the fanciful responsability claims. An attack may be the subject of a responsability claim from persons or circles hiding behind a name made up for this occasion, deprived of any involvment in the

16

attack, for personal or ideological reasons, alien to the motives of the true authors.

There are a number of possibilities. In the first case, all responsability claims are fanciful. They are usually the doing of one or more individuals whose motives are purely personal (revenge, attention seeking...). In the second case, we have both genuine responsability claims from the true authors, from one or more terrorist organization, and fanciful ones. In the third case, responsability is claimed by a known terrorist group, but who hides behind a name made up for this occasion. Public opinion may fall victim to this responsability claim. But the state services of the target country may be able to understand the message. Responsability for the deadly bombings in 1985 and 1986 in France was claimed by the "Comité de Soutien aux Prisonniers Politiques Arabes" [Comittee to Support Arab Political Prisoners] (CSPPA). Behind this name that was then unknown to the western services, the Hizbollah was hiding, and probably Iran.

So responsability claims should be studied with care, notably because they often muddy waters and make difficult to understand what happened. In every inquest on terrorist acts, every responsability claim is handled with care. If only to rule them out nd to allow investigations to be conducted in the best conditions available, protected from rumours and media influence.

Pertaining to the AZF case, the three responsability claims, "ALPHA BRAVO", "JIHAD ISLAMIQUE", "HOUARLA HOUARLA ISLAMIQUE", were condidered by the investigators as fanciful (D 6691).

However, they should have been subjected to in-depth inquiries. These names had never surfaced, but they may hide other organizations possibly involved in the 21 September explosion. Another already mentioned possibility : any of these claims might be the doing of one or more persons with political or ideological motives, who may have had links with some of the persons already mentioned in the proceedings, like JANDOUBI or some people connected to him.

In any case, in this kind of affair, the identification of the author of a responsability claim of an explosion like AZF, is of an obvious interest for the pursuing of the inquest. So in-depth investigations shold have been conducted without delay to try to identify the authors of these claims. Yet nothing of the sort was made. Probings are superficial and some acts were made too late.

17

If we consider the case of the responsability claim " HOURLA HOUARLA ISLAMIQUE", as shown in the judiciary records (D 1484), it was made via a phone call on 22 September 2001 at 9:19 am to the gendarmerie of Saint-Alban (31 [Haute-Garonne]) from a telephone booth located along the road from FRONTON to AUCAMVILLE (31). The BT [Technical Brigade] of the ST ALBAN gendarmerie identified this call on 22 September. The report made by this brigade brings into light that this piece of judiciary evidence was immediately transmitted to the proscutor of Tulouse along with a copy to the SRPJ of Toulouse. This file brings a stamp from the prosecutor office of Toulouse dated 2 October 2001, seemingly a date of receipt or of registration. As for the Toulouse SRPJ, they mention a handing in of documents relating to responsability claims for the AZF explosion in a minute dated 5 October (D 1484), including the gendarmerie report already mentioned. But we have to state that the Toulouse police did not consider that it was useful to search for the origin of the call nor to try to identify its author. These verifications were possible and might have been successful.

The ST ALBAN BT, despite that it was not put in charge of the AZF inquest, acted quickly, since they identified the source of the call in a few hours. In addition they transmitted this information to the Toulouse prosecutor office and SPRJ on the same day. This act won't be registered by the prosecutor's office until 2 October. And the files contain no trace of its reception by the Toulouse SRPJ, except for the 5 October minute already mentioned. It seems, from the examination of dates, that this SRPJ's file refers that it was transmitted by the prosecutor's office. In any case nothing was done from 22 September to 5 October. Yet it might have been possible to gather on the handset fingerprints or genetic prints, including in the case of multiple manipulations, had they been investigated swiftly.

In proceedings relating to Corsican nationalist circles close to the FLNC, the DNAT, thanks to a letter rogatory, could conduct successfully investigations on telephone boxes in a similar context. In the AZF case, nothing of the sort was done as shown by the files. . SImilarly, no inquiry was conducted on phone networks, either on anterior or ultérior calls or on IMEI/IMSI cross-checkings, from the fadets of the telephone booth and of persons linked to JANDOUBI or mentioned in the RG report. People who could have an intert in trying to take over this event. These fadets were not requested in 2001. Four years later, on 30 November 2005 (D6677), the Toulouse SRPJ, obeying to a letters rogatory, tries to reinitiate the inquiry. FRANCE TELECOM aswers them that they don't have any competurized archives from 2001. So it ends with a notice of unsuccesful research.

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As for the other reponsability claims, it would have also been possible to identify the calls and to explain a number of oddities, thanks to the competurized handling of telephone exchanges.

Only one written account is dedicated in the whole files (D849) to what looked like a hijacking of a line belonging to the Service Départemental d'Incendie et de Secours [Firefighters District Service] (SDIS), and it refers to conversations gathered on 2 October at the Centre de Traitement et d'Alerte (CTA) [center to handle calls and emergencies]. No testimony was gathered and the technical explanations relating to the fax machine that was reportedly used for this claim were not checked and investigated, as could have been the case with the help of France Telecom. Despite the computer servor breakdown, it could have been possible to get the list of call sent and received on the CTA number by asking them to FRANCE TELECOM and to study them usefully, especially in case of a return call using an IMEI number (see infra). The same minutes mentions that lieutnant colonel PIZZOCARO stated to the investigators that their phone lines had already been hacked by people calling from England. No probing was made of this assertion.

The truth seems to be out there. It will be known four years later. Interrogated on 14 December 2005 (D6692), lieutnant colonel PIZZOCARO will precise that since the emergency number "112" had been generalized in Europe, as it could be called from a mobile phone deprived of a SIM card, only the IMEI number displayed on the screen at the telephone exchange centre ; so this number could be confused with a cell phone. After they had made their cons-call, people who answered them were in foreign countries, notably in Great Britain. So it was deduced that the CTA line was hacked from England. But, as Lieutnant Colonel PIZZARO underlined, no checking could be conducted four years after the events.

The only conclusion to draw is that the Toulouse SRPJ deliberately omitted to conduct the necessary verifications needed on responsability claims, probably guessing that it was useless. In addition, relating to the "HOUARLA HOUARLA ISLAMIQUE" claim the Toulouse prosecutor's office didn't react as soon as they should have, sicne this information had been transmitted to them as soon as 22 September.

3 Serious faults relating to the keeping of evidence

The handling of the crime scene and the early statements are of critical importance in any criminal inquest, especially if it

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relates to an explosion - be it accidental or malevolent. The faults commited during this crucial early step may have serious consequences on the later stages of investigations. To the point that they may be irreparable. When I was leading the inquest of the 1996 bombing at the Saint-Michel RER station, on behalf of my authority I had ordered the station to remain closed for three days, despite pressure from the SNCF that wished to reopen train traffic immediately. With the help of my colleagues involved in the judiciary inquiry, who were all aware of the crucial importance of this early stage, we took the decision to take turns to look over the crime scene and the collecting of evidence by the investigators and to affix the seals, before their transmission to te experts of the central laboratory of the Paris prefecture, in charge of expert studies.

A study of the AZF judiciary files brings out that the scene of the crime was not handled with the riguor required, which the difficult context couldn't account for.

Relating to the collect of evidence at the site of the explosion, it seems that no protective measure was taken in the first days of the inquest. It was only from 4 October that the area was protected by a police cordon, following an order from the prefect of Haute-Garonne. Before that, there were no samplings in the immediate vicinity of the crater in order to try to look for possible traces of explosives or remains of an explosive device. The first collect of samples will be conducted only late, after the crater was flooded by rain and groundwater. So that any possible remnants of explosives (and not only TATP) were washed and couldn't be found later.
......

to be continued

 

[Analis]

continued

......
Admittedly, as underlined by the summary report dated 13 July 2006 (D7033), the investigators had faced "big difficulties due to the extraordinary extent of the disaster", which is unquestionable, but couldn't justify the lack of rigour that defined the first stage of the inquest, even if it lasted a long time. Protective measures should have been taken without delay, as with any crime scene, and not many days too late.

As the scene had not been secured in the first days following the explosion, the investigations on the crater site, its immediate surroundings and inside the AZF plant couldn't be conducted with the riguor required to properly gather the evidence. The previously mentioned report states (p.6) with no more precisions that "(the teams of investigators) were conducting searches in office buildings and among the rumble..". At the chapter "Searches and findings in and around the crater" (page 8), it is written that "it was found as early as the first days that the explosion had had devastating effects

20

shaped like a cross, which were more important along two directions : North/South and East/West" but when it comes to the topographical notes of the crater, it is noted that they were made lately and they may have been flawed by erosion caused by streaming rains. Which may explain the imprecise measurements of the crater ("its surface was estimated to around 3000m², its depth to around 10 meters including 5 meters below the surface, its volume to appro. 8770 m3").

In such a situation, no evidence could be found that could have been useful to the inquiry. The report notes states about this : "no body, no remains of tools or explosive device could be found. Rumble and muds were stocked in immediate closeness, waiting for latter studies". But no care was taken to protect this pile of debris in the immediate aftermath, comprimizing any ulterior investigations, considered in this summary report. Despite that nor the size of the pile nor the lie of the location were really a source of difficulty.

In the case of the UTA DC10 bombing above Niger in September 1989, the debris of the aircraft were spread on a 680 km² area in the Tenere desert. As the explosion seemed to have taken place in the fore front of the airplane, every debris from the relevant area, spread on 80 km², were collected, meaning more than ten millions parts, most of them made of metal. After they had been sealed off, they were sent to Paris. A great deal of them allowed to reconstruct the front part of the plane. The smallest pieces of wreckage were submitted to a detailed study that allowed to find crucial incriminating evidence, parts from the suitcase bomb bearing traces of explosives and a very small part of what would prove to be the printed circuit of the detonator of the explosive device.

The summary report also states (p.19) that "every sampling proved negative". But it doesn't seem, as shown by the files, that searches were conducted outside the AZF factory. Yet, it is well known that the parts of an explosive device or from a pyrotechnic chain, because of their low mass, are usually projected to a great distance, proportional to the energy of the explosion. In the case of a bombing in Belfort, one of the experts involved in the AZF case, that I had assigned to determine the location of the explosion, had suggested to enlarge the area to be searched, which had allowed to find pieces from the device at more than one hundred meters from the epicenter of the explosion.

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In addition, the study of the files showed a number of procedural faults, which might have had serious consequences on the legality of the proceedings, notably about the pieces of evidence.

The file D543 pertains to the "findings made in the car 405 Peugeot, GGO 4003, belonging to JANDOUBI Hassan" made on 23 September 2001 by commander DONNEZ. But it was in fact a vehicle search, conducted outside the rules defined by article 57 of the code of criminal procedure, since the vehicle was searched in depth and sealed off. And it isn't possible to use as a justification article 78-2-2 of the same code, which in any case was not refered to, since it concerns only investigations on terrorism, traffic of drugs, weapons and explosives, theft and concealment. Yet, during an other search in this car conducted by commander COHEN on 26 September (D548), which didn't either obey to the conditions established by article 57, different findings were made. The minute describes a sport bag KIPSTA which isn't mentionned in the 23 September record, and on the contrary doesn't mention a black bag ADIDAS that his colleague had reported three days earlier. Why this discrepancy ? Which record should we believe ?

A similar remark could be made about the finding of a gas mask (D 1492), that may come from a burglarized facility belonging to the city of Toulouse. The relevant minute mentions nor the location where nor how it was found.

Such is also the case of a key bunch belonging to JANDOUBI (D 1483). Again, the record doesn't explain where and how these keys were found.

These few examples show that these occurences were not isolated mistakes, but usual practice approved by their hierarchy. They are as more serious that they concern matters that are strictly ruled by the proscriptive provisions of the code, whose non-observance usually results in the act of investigation rendered void.

The last remarks relates to the identification of bodies of victims and the autopsies.

The proceedings files doesn't give any clear precision about the number of victimes and their location at the time of the explosion. In their request dated 26 February 2002 (D 2285), the defense asked for every report from the district emergency centre and from the firefighters of Lounion and Vion, who were present on the site, to be added to the records, as well as more precisions about the amount of victims killed by the explosion, the location of their death (AZF or at the hospital) and

22

their identity. As shown by the files, these informations were not available 5 months after the explosion. Faced with these discrepancies, a result of the lack of monitoring of the emergency operations by the Toulouse SRPJ, the Court ruled out the work of the PJ (page 203 of the ruling) to the benefit of the Safety and Health Committee (CHCT) (page 204), despite that it is not a criminal police service.

The record D 76, written on 22 September, the day following the explosion, informs us that a body numbered N°10 was brought to the hospital mortuary on 21 September at 22:50 and that "it was found at the second AZF door, on the ninth area of the crater" [refers to areas delimitated by inquirers]. But we know nothing of how and where exactely it was found, nor of the service which took it to hospital. And it doesn't seem that the conditions of its discovery were recorded, despite that it is of much interest to the inquest. As for JANDOUBI (body N°12), we learn that he was brought to the hospital on 22 September at 00:30 and that he was found on area 5 of the crater.With no more precisions givent than in the case of body N°10.

Samples of Hassan JANDOUBI's blood and internal organs were taken (D 80 and 82) during an autopsy intended for toxicological studies. The result of these tests were not included in the proceedings files in 2006. The defense requested them to no avail on three occasions, on 26 December 2002 (D2885), 16 June 2004 (D4636) and 13 July 2006 (D7033). They will never be added to the files.

About autopsies as a whole and especially of JANDOUBI's, the most basic conditions ruling the conservation of the body before study were not observed. The files learn us that an embalmer had manipulated the body (D 3234 and 3654) and that Mr Mokhtar BENOUNAN (D 4399) had washed the body to follow a Muslim ritual. The forensic scientist will state this post mortem preparation during the autopsy (D 82).

These facts imply that the Toulouse SRPJ exerted no control over this stage of the inquiry, despite that it is very important. Similarly, police investigators and the instructor judge were not very concerned by toxicological tests whose results remain unknown.

4 Police custodies and indictments

The problem is to ascertain if the police custodies and the indictments of the interested persons were justified. A delicate

23

matter since these procedures are often used in criminal proceedings. An indictment is an important stage of an inquest, not an end. Police custody is commonly used, as was the case in investigations I was involved in. Nevertheless, to take the easy way is not only legally disputable, but also not very productive.

In every proceedings I was involved with my colleagues of the anti-terrorist cell, people were put in police custody only after a long work of investigation, allowing us to gather the most evidence available. Relating to the Grande Paroisse employees, the contents of the files do not show that such any work had been conducted that could justify such a measure. At this stage of the inquest, it didn't seem that any relevant factor had led the investigators, except if we consider as such a will to persist in the direction of an industrial accident. No plausible motive to suspect their involvment, in view of the pieces of investigation collected, including the results of the first studies that would soon be shown as not well-founded, could justify to put them in custody. In addition, there was no danger that they would confer, not that they would try to flee. This risk was however present in the case of a malevolent deliberate act, that would suppose the existence of accomplices and of fraudulent acts.

This treatment of the grande paroisse employees looks even more surprizing at this stage of the inquiry, that JANDOUBI's wife, as well as many other persons suspected in the malevolent act lead, was not tinterrogated under police custody (see supra), despite that it might gave been justified. All said and done, the weakness of the evidence collected against these employees with the only intent, it seems, to validate the lead privileged earlier, seems to be the most questionable side of the inquiry.
......

continued

 

[Analis]

continued

......
Coming to the indictments, the records of first appearance in June and July 2001 [sic] (D 2422, 2423, 2424, 2426, 2427, 2429, 2430, 2298) do not help us to understand the motives that led the instructor judge to take such a decision. Yet, the instructor judge has a legal duty to state which evidence, serious and corroborated, allows him to estimate that the person concerned was likely involved in the crimes investigated, as a main perpetrator or an accomplice. In addition, article 80-1 of the code of criminal procedure as modified by the 15 June 2000 law, enforceable from 1st Januray 2001, makes compulsory for the instructor magistrate to indict only after he allowed the person concerned to answer to the charges. That implies that the accused knows which charges he is accused of. The records of first appearance already mentioned don't mention if this was the case.

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Indisputably, this is a violation of the new articles of the code that were intended to reinforce the rights of defendants.

5 General assessment

Which general assesment should we make on this extraordinary inquest ? Indisputably, it involved many civil servants and required the setting of a huge organization. Regional and national turmoil, mediatic frenzy and the fact that it took place in the aftermath of 11 September terrorist attacks, have obviously influenced the course of the inquiries.

Relating to the methodology and orientations followed, two statements should be made. They are mostly the cause of the failure after eight years of work. The first one is the constant, deliberate and unambiguous decision to choose only one orientation for the investigations, that of an industrial accident. The second one is the great difficulty met by the instructor judges to control the work of the police, that largely acted out of their control. They were impeded by a schedule that was mostly imposed to them, and by a direction given to the course of the inquest by a prosecutor's office that was not neutral, helped intense media campaigns, partly fed by rumours and dubious claims from experts and police. In such a context, the defendants met much difficulty to be heard, despite that they had made an important work of investigation, leading to many requests.

If the lead of a malevolant act (whatever the motives) hasn't been proven to be true, it can't be ruled out either at the end of this very long inquest, as the Court admitted. Despite that it critized the defendants' attempts to back up an other lead than of a purely accidental explosion, the latter couldn't conclude that the "failure to find traces of explosives or any explosive device" allowed it (the Court) to rule out definitively a terrorist explanation.

The Court had to state that in another case that took place at the same time, but without links with the AZF disaster, criminals had used weapons of war and were in possession of a whole arsenal, including explosives, detonators and fuse, i.e. the whole material needed for a criminal bombing. We may add, despite that it wasn't noticed by the Court, that the region of

25

Toulouse is home to anarchist and far-left terrorists, like Action Directe in the 80s. So, the use of an explosive or of a pyrotechnical device as a trigger for the 21 September 2001 can not be ruled out.

Yet we have to conclude that police investigators did not react with the required rapidity, contrarily to what the Court wrongly states on this matter ("criminal police had led the required inquiries with swiftness), an assessment that is contradicted by some of its other considerations contained in the ruling.

The initial strategy of inquest, chosen by the chief investigator and the criminal police, has indeniably impeded its course and irreparably impaired essential investigations.

The first evidence pertains to the number of records dedicated to the study of a malevolent act.

For the first 8 days, of the 650 minutes written by the criminal police, only a few tens are dedicated to the lead of a malevolent act. Moreover, from 28 September 2001 (day when police was commissioned by an instructor judge for the first time) to the police custodies in June 2002, minutes pertaining to part F of the proceedings (other leads than an accident) comprise only 85 of a total of 2000. This hypothesis would be taken into account by the police only until half October 2001 (records numbered F2 to F36 - D1090 to 1125 and F37 to F75 - D1483 to 1521).

As mentionned earlier, a close look at this part of the proceedings reveals that the conduct of the inquiries were biased, and the existence of serious mistakes or faults.

For example :

* Nadi MORDJANA was interrogated outside of any consistent strategy, her hearings being scaterred on four years, from 2001 to 2005, outside of the relevant procedure, despite that it had become apparent that her claims about some crucial features were suspect.
* A late house search at her domicile.
* Incoherent hearings of Hassan JANDOUBI's friends and relatives.

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* A certainly inadequate use of the RG note, notably relating to the car check at Valence d'Agen (Gendarmerie officer LE FLOH wasn't heard, as well as the wives of the members of Tabligh involved, and Mr AZEDJ who had housed them-D33695-), and a wrong understanding of the Tabligh circle. It is notably written in the record numbered D6691 that "Tabligh is a religious circle with no links with islamist terrorist circles", which is refutated by specialized services (despite that the PJ refered to them), as well as by a number of cases I had to handle, that involved this organization. It could be notably stated that people in charge of Tabligh in the region of Lyon had provided help to activists of the Tunisian organization "An Nadah", and that members of the Afghan "Hezb-I-Islami" had also been helped by members of Tabligh. Similarly, an activist close to the Algerian GIA had used the networks of Tabligh to go to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Moreover, when an islamist network close to Al Qaida was dismantled at Milan in 2002, it was found that one of its members belonged to Tabligh. And this inquest is linked with the attempted bombing of the Strasburg cathedral. It is to be remembered that JANDOUBI was involved in a traffic of cars bought in Frankfurt.
* The lack of any checking of JANDOUBI's moves to Frankfurt.
* The refusal to conduct an in-depth study of JANDOUBI's phone activities, despite that a mere look at his fadet brought into light some clandestine activities, some of them might be tied to this cae, notably his call to his parents on 20 September 2001. It shoud be remembered that relevant techniques were already tried and tested in 2001 and the Toulouse SRPJ did know of them. At the very least this regional criminal police service should have taken protective measures by requesting to mobile phone companies to provide every JANDOUBI's detailed bills, as wel as of his relatives' and acquaintances' and of every person mentioned in the RG report. If such measures had been taken, it would have been possible to evidence possible connections with the 'Artigat' case, mentionned in the RG note, that related to a local islamist network that sent jihadists to the Middle Earth and notably Iraq in 2005 and 2006. This organization was very active in 2001. Having been in charge of this case with judges from the antiterrorist cell, I commisionned the SDAT of the DCPJ to conduct investigations and to study the phone communications of persons involved in this network. A crosscheck study of this data with this that the Toulouse police should have gotten, would have allowed to probe if infos contained in this RG white note was genuine.
* Serious faults in the handling of the crime scene. The area around the crater was secured too late.

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* Findings in JANDOUBI's vehicle made using an irregular procedure, resulting in contradictory conclusions relating to its contents.
* Lack of any probing of the responsability claims.
* A number of inquiries were not conducted, despite that they had been requested (new hearing of JANDOUBI's parents (D6653), refusal to interrogate the spouses of people present in the car checked at Valence d'agen (D6695) and Azzedine AZEDJ who had housed them).
* Reluctance to carry out inquiries commissioned by the instructor judge, followoung requests from the defendants : the rogatory request issued on 12 July 2004 to this end will be obeyed only end June 2005, after the instructor judge had to write a letter to remind his order on 17 June (D6600). The PJ explained that they had began to "file and analyze the requested investigations", despite that they began them only after they were reminded to do so.
* Hasty police custodies of AZF employees, and indictments based on non probative arguments, additionally not mentionned on the first appearence record.

This list is not exhaustive. It is just intended to bring into light what seem to be holes, procedural mistakes, serious faults and even a deliberate refusal to carry out orders from the instructor judge, especially when they refered to acts requested by the defense.

These malfunctionings come, for a large part, from a constant will of the Toulouse SRPJ, under the influence of the prosecutor of Toulouse, at least at the beginning of the inquest, to privilege only the lead of an industrial accident. Commanders COHEN and BURLE from the Toulouse SRPJ related that commissioner MALON had asked them not to conduct any investigations on the lead of a malevolent act, notably pertaining to JANDOUBI's case, this lead risking to "pollute" the inquiry. During the trial, commissioner MALON admitted that it was indeed his stance, and that he had impeded investigations on JANDOUBI. This biased stance was in addition shared by the Toulouse SRPJ hierarchy. Mr Marcel DUMAS, then head of the SRPJ, stated to the AFP on 9 April 2004 (D4376) : "We are ready to interrogate 800 000 Tolosans, but will a hundred years of inquiries for the 30 deads at Toulouse be needed, as ten years were needed for the three dead of the Total oil refinery at La Mède (Bouches du Rhône)".

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As I mentioned at the begining of this note, this kind of inquest should be conducted without any bias, the investigations bringing out leads that should be verified, until one is selected that should lead to the truth. An inverted take, to privilege only one direction and to only look for evidence that would corroborate it, leads inevitably to failure. In this case, the SRPJ has obviously lacked of critical thinking and failed to its duty to conduct this inquest with rigour and fairness, as any criminal police service should do. As for the main heads of investigations, prosecutor"s office and instructor judges, they seem to have been overflowed by the general ambiance, public opinion, media, the weight of their hierarchy, and to have been unable to exert control over the strategy of inquest and the work of the criminal police.

 

[Analis]

This long study put into evidence wrongdoings in only one side of the affair. All other facets being submitted to the same fraudulent treatment. Certainly, there were actually many motives to suspect a terrorist attack, and notably Hassan Jandoubi's involvment. Corroborating what had already found by others. Daniel Dissy, for example, who led his own investigation hearing witnesses who were present before the main explosion, came to a similar conclusion (AZFES p.111). If it is not exhaustive, Bruguières' study underlines other facts usually overlooked. Notably, the extant of the suspect use of his mobile phone.

But the main teaching of all the evidence underlined by Bruguières and others is not there. It is that it brings into light an anomaly, an anomaly which reinforces the theory of a false flag attack.
Indisputably, there was much reason to suspect that Jandoubi and some of his friends and colleagues were involved not only in the 21.9 disaster, but also in many suspect activities, possibly of a terrorist nature. That's where the shoe pinches. This supposes that they didn't act alone, with a strong possibility that they had many accomplices left behind them. Who might commit other acts, possibly soon after. The authorities would never allow a possible terrorist organization to roam free, without investigating, especially if they are suspects in an awful bombing.
There, they had much genuine evidence that something was wrong. Even if this was based only on suspicions, they would not let the possibility of a terrorist network unchecked. With the risk that they could strike at any time. It is decidely strange that they didn't launch an investigation. And even uncannier that they acted to prevent any investigation in this direction. Even if the suspects had really acted alone, it could be established only after an in-depth inquiry.
This would be equally true if they had already infiltrated the terrorist organization before the bombing, and so gathered knowledge about it. Because it would be incomprehensible that they did not do their best to dismantle it in the aftermath.
And it was not the first time. We had already faced a similar situation when a jihadist commited a slaughter at Béziers on 1st september, and it was revealed that he was in possession of a full arsenal, complete with heavy weaponry. Again, a serious inquiry was prevented, under the decidely against all odds motive that he was that he was just a loner.

The explanation might be out there. They didn't investigate because they had a pre-existant precise knowledge of who the persons involved in these events were and what they were doing, and that it had not been their intent to stop them. Because they were behind them. This would seem unlikely, but not if they were not members of regular terrorist units. But were in fact under the control of what the Pentagon calls P2OGs (Proactive, Preemptive Operations Group). Bogus terrorist cells, made up for the task of perpetrating fake terrorist attacks.