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Paris: False Flags & Inconsistencies

You could take a perfectly mundane picture of (say) a man walking a dog on Clapham Common and, if you were to introduce it to people with preliminary remarks such as:`Don't you find something odd about this?`- then I can guarantee that the viewers of the picture would start noticing untoward things about it (Why are the shadows at that angle? That man's hat doesn't look real! Just what breed of dog is that? - and so on).

Likewise if that picture of a rock gig's audience had been taken at any other time then nobody would have had the slightest thing to say about it.

It seems that in an internet-lead era we have become captivated with the image, the image above all else - and there are people who have so much lost touch with day-to-day physical truths that, when an atrocity occurs, the first thing they do is to go online and complain (for example)that there is not enough blood on the bodies of the slaughtered people...and that, generally, the images are not good enough, not `real` enough, as according to their expectations of what `real` should be.

I find this fact to be far, far more disturbing than any purported `false flag operation `could ever be.
 
Perhaps it's not a forward-pointing finger....the hankie suggestion, if it's not a finger, is as good as any

Is Number 6 actually a pinkie?

And, without pointing any fingers, here's another...hanky/hot-dog/finger/artifact
View attachment 1600
At first glance that does look like an unfeasibly long little finger. But it's blending into the index finger of the upheld hand behind - the little finger seems to end at the second knuckle of the index finger, IYSWIM. So no mystery, move along.

And yet, what is going on with the hand from which the index finger sprouts? Follow it down to the wrist - what's going on there? It looks as if someone is wearing a flesh coloured glove (and see how the bulge coincides with the eyebrows of the guy stood behind.

I have to say, I am far from convinced that there is anything to the Paris killings beyond the usual cock-up and confusion that are inherent to such events, but that hand is odd.

Peace_Love.jpg
 
I feel rather uncomfortable saying this, but the San Bernadino is the epitome of terror. A terrorist doesn't need to have visited training camp in Pakistan or elsewhere, they don't need to pay subs to an organisation, they don't need to await orders from some high command. They can just open fire in a crowded place, it doesn't even have to be a place of significance, and be seen as 'doing their bit' for whatever the cause.

Now that is terror.
 
Without organisation or political goal, is it terrorism though?
 
Without organisation or political goal, is it terrorism though?

I believe so.

Now we don't have to look at folks returning from Turkey or Pakistan to see if they were radicalised. It doesn't have to happen in a Mosque, or need an inspiring Imam to get folks to martyr themselves. The San Bern attackers may have been 'known', but obviously not to any great extent. They were just on the fringes. They didn't match the expected profile of a terrorist, i.e. a young man. They were a married couple.

Those are the folks that nobody sees, because they are just ordinary everyday folks. How can that kind of terrorist be tracked? There are no official ties to any organisation. No links to be made, no waiting for the right time to catch them when the plot is about to unfold.

It's the next level of terrorist threat. High profile targets are hard to be successfully...erm, well, killed. Groups can be infiltrated, phones and email tracked, but a plan made in the marital bed? I wouldn't be surprised to hear of increased numbers of 'lone wolfs' acting on their own initiative.
 
Without organisation or political goal, is it terrorism though?

Given that a terrorist organization has called upon followers of its religion to take action in its name I think so.

They don't need to be card carrying members of the organization anymore. Which, as CultJunky says, makes it all the more frightening.
 
I feel rather uncomfortable saying this, but the San Bernadino is the epitome of terror. A terrorist doesn't need to have visited training camp in Pakistan or elsewhere, they don't need to pay subs to an organisation, they don't need to await orders from some high command. They can just open fire in a crowded place, it doesn't even have to be a place of significance, and be seen as 'doing their bit' for whatever the cause.

Totally agree, and the lack of targetting adds to the terror because there isn't anywhere you can avoid to be safer (or even just to feel safer), they might get you anyplace.
 
We certainly have quite the fifth column. I do wonder about the pipe bombs, surely those are not so easy to make on your own. Where did he get those from?
 
We certainly have quite the fifth column. I do wonder about the pipe bombs, surely those are not so easy to make on your own. Where did he get those from?

As I recall reading somewhere (I'm not an expert and have only read about them, please take me off the watchlist), pipe bombs aren't that difficult to make. They're basically crude shrapnel grenades made from metal pipe, gunpowder and a fuse. The hardest bit is milling the screw caps for the pipe (decent metalworking facilities help). All the components are readily available in the USA and I bet assembly instructions would be easy to obtain online, especially if you're communicating with terrorists.
 
The problem with bombs is usually making them without having them explode too early or late. Making 12 of them without blowing yourself up is impressive.
 
They are just like those novelty exploding cigars, just it's a pipe instead.
 
I feel rather uncomfortable saying this, but the San Bernadino is the epitome of terror. A terrorist doesn't need to have visited training camp in Pakistan or elsewhere, they don't need to pay subs to an organisation, they don't need to await orders from some high command. They can just open fire in a crowded place, it doesn't even have to be a place of significance, and be seen as 'doing their bit' for whatever the cause.

Now that is terror.

Both parties had been in Saudi. They were in contact with a radical mosque in New York. The man had pledged allegiance to IS online.

Pretty similar story to almost every one of this jihadi losers.
 
I have seen the opposite, that she was the one who had pledged allegiance.
 
The problem with bombs is usually making them without having them explode too early or late. Making 12 of them without blowing yourself up is impressive.

It's only a problem for the bugger making them. :evil: Very good news for them that would have been on the receiving end.

Seriously though, I did used to know a guy who grew up in Manchester who thought of what he called 'weedy bombs' as just something kids did, so maybe not that hard to make, at least in a crude form.
 
Possibly not the correct thread to post this in, but I figure the poor mods are going to have a fair few posts to recategorise in the coming weeks, but I want to tie this to my last post on this thread to keep a kind of narrative.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-35018789

Leytonstone Tube stabbing a 'terrorist incident'

There's not much in the way of info yet, but a random stabbing is now a terrorist attack. Seems there's a lot of lone wolfs out there.

 
Well, the words 'Allahu Akbar' may have been used. Just a theory.
 
After claims of warnings of an impeding attack from Iraq, strangely ignored by French security services, here are other ones coming from Israel ; this time, the source makes direct accusations against the French attitude the days before the attacks :


http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4726007,00.html

France's miserable intelligence failure
Analysis: The French government and its secret services got a wakeup call in January, but kept sleeping. While taking a few minor steps, they avoided a comprehensive reform and failed to draw conclusions from the Charlie Hebdo and Hypercacher attacks.

Published: 16.11.15, 00:12

"The French government and its secret services have experienced a miserable and crushing failure in drawing lessons from the terror attacks at the Charlie Hebdo newspaper offices and the kosher supermarket in January. They are responsible and to be blamed for Friday's terror attacks in Paris," a senior American source, who headed one of the governmental counter-terrorism organizations and has been serving as a key advisor to the FBI since retiring, told Yedioth Ahronoth on Saturday.

"A massive Islamic State force is busy planning and executing a multi-target attack, over a long period of time, and the powerless people from the French intelligence are unaware of anything. It's a disgrace. An intelligence catastrophe," he added.

Paris Attacks
Indeed, the French got a wakeup call in January, but kept sleeping. Israeli and French government and intelligence officials I have spoken to since those attacks described an ongoing failure in the
process of drawing conclusions.

A key failure is the hesitation to join international systems coordinating the war on terror. The French were very hesitant about exchanging information. Cooperation could have generated, for example, a list of suspects who would be banned entry by all countries, including France.

Two weeks ago, France received a warning about a rise in the communication volume between ISIS elements in the Middle East and elements that may be affiliated with them in different cities, but mainly took protection measures, such as tightening security at foreign embassies in Paris. There was no conceptual change, which would be reflected in actively thwarting terror.

French intelligence and its two major branches, the one parallel to the Israeli Mossad (DGSE) and the one parallel to the Israeli GAS/Shin Bet (DCRI), should have held a routine monitoring of suspects within and outside France and foiled their intentions before it was too late. They failed to do that, too.

It is too early to determine whether these warnings received by France and Germany's security organizations in recent weeks had to do with this specific act, but in any case the failure is apparent. In spite of whatever steps were taken, the attacks were not prevented.

A month before the January attacks, Yedioth Ahronoth reported that according to UN estimates, ISIS had been joined by more than 20,000 volunteers from 90 countries. The UN determined that France was one of the countries "under a serious threat" following the return of volunteers "with a lot of operational experience, military abilities and ties to the ISIS headquarters." They were the ones who should have been followed. But they weren't.

After January, the French took a number of minor steps, but avoided a comprehensive reform. The French should have trained additional, massive manpower to deal with situations of terror; to train legal personnel to file charges against terror elements and perform constitutional changes; to purchase a lot of equipment, mainly intelligence machines, which would allow an advanced infiltration of social media, and to get assistance from other countries that have dealt with such situations in the past.

That didn't happen as well. The American source says his country offered to help the French train manpower and sell them intelligence machines of the Palantir company, which specializes in the area of OSINT (Open Source Intelligence), but was turned down. Israel offered different types of aid too, and received a polite refusal.

As a reminder, the english version of The Times of Israel had reported shortly after the attacks that important members of the French Jewish community had been issued warnings shortly before the events :

http://www.timesofisrael.com/in-france-defense-experts-see-parallels-to-israel/
French-born Israeli Jonathan-Simon Sellem says Jewish community was warned of impending mass terror attack

By Amanda Borschel-Dan November 14, 2015, 2:08 pm

Amanda Boschel-Dan

Just Friday morning, security officials in France’s Jewish community were informed of the very real possibility of an impending large terrorist attack in the country, according to Jonathan-Simon Sellem, a freelance journalist and a representative of French citizens in Israel.

The Jewish community, already on high alert ahead of several planned high-profile events Sunday, had been told that after several minor attacks in France this month, a large terrorist event was thought to be on the horizon.
 
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Now, warnings coming from the Algerian DRS, whose officers would be appaled by the lack of reaction from their French counterparts :

http://www.mondafrique.com/attentats-de-paris-le-drs-algerien-avait-prevenu-la-dgse/(translated from French) :
Paris terror attacks : the Algerian DRS had warned the DGSE

By Louise Dimitrakis 19 november 2015

Last october, the DRS, the Algerian secret services, sent to the DGSE an exhaustive notice to warn their French counterpart of a strong risk of terrorist attacks in "locations hosting large gatherings of people in the region of Paris".

The DRS provided a list of names of French "radicals" with Algerian and North African roots who came into contact with the Algerian Daesh fighters. Put under surveillance a few months ago by Algerian intelligence, these figthters had long talks with French radicals who, for some of them, went to camps in Syria.

The DRS, according to our sources, has some very well trained agents who infiltrated Daesh's ranks by posing as candidates for the jihad.

So that thanks to those infiltrated agents, the DRS could obtain very important information relating to the plans of the terrorist organization. "Which explains why we didn't suffer attacks as ferocious as those in Paris", prides himself a DRS officer who doesn't understand the DGSE's lack of reaction with the information that was transmitted to them.

THE DRS is worried

In their note, the DRS had notified the suspicious behaviour of Omar Ismail Mostefai, one of the kamikazes in the Bataclan whose radicalisation had been signaled by the Algerian services during his successive travels to Algeria to meet his family. The DRS has also in their notice required for information exchange relating to the Belgian networks, that are very active to supply reinforcements to Daesh in Syria.

The Belgian inability to control the comings and goings of these radicals generated a deep concern among the heads of the DRS. They have even written a nominative list of the "brothers", the young radicals from France, including young people from the suburbs or French converts, who come trough Algerian airports to join later centers of "theological" training, that are close to the salafists.

Tracked and monitored, these strange visitors go back to France after having increased their knowledge in religion and Arabic language. And surprise, some of them were detected by the DRS in Syria or on the turkish border. But, in the opinion of many DRS officers, there's something fishy going on presently inside the DGSE.

This is the second time that Mostefai is mentioned by a foreign service, despite that it was alledged in the media that there was no hint that he was an active terrorist, only a former offender.

If we cannot deliver a definitive statement on the value of all these alledged informations, their accumulation really makes one consider that there is a strong possibility that the French security services deliberately put a blind eye on the preparation of the attacks. Certainly, they have resulted in a strong increase of their powers and prerogatives.
 
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If we cannot deliver a definitive statement on the value of all these alledged informations, their accumulation really makes one consider that there is a strong possibility that the French security services deliberately put a blind eye on the preparation of the attacks. Certainly, they have resulted in a strong increase of their powers and prerogatives.

I sort of agree with you, except I take issue with the word deliberately. I suspect they (like the UK intelligence agencies) receive a constant stream of warnings, some which later turn out to be true, but the vast majority of which are white noise.

But since their failures to better weed out the wheat from the chaff are effectively rewarded with greater powers rather than sacking the head of department for incompetence, it wouldn't be surprising in there being a certain lack of interest in improving the quality of the input rather than the quantity. After all, the more rubbish you have to process, the bigger your department grows.
 
The trouble is that what they (alledgedly) chose to ignore was not minor and unconsequential data, but crucial information. We couldn't say that the kind of warnings from Iraq and Algeria, if they were really as they were reported to be, were mere white noise. If it is true that the French services were as cavalier as they are claimed to have been when they answered to the Iraqis, nobody will provide them with any information anymore ! No, they definitely don't receive such warnings on a daily basis ! Given the accumulation of such gross failures, a deliberate strategy appears to be the most parsimonious explanation. And you are right, there is the problem that they are rewarded for their apparent failures on a regular basis.

Additionaly, suspicions are reinforced by the fact that we know that they have ties with jihadists, that they were heavily involved recently in supporting them in Syria ; that accumulations of such 'failures' were also present in previous cases ; that at least one of the killers of 7th January had been provided weapons by a police mole, and that the investigation on that is forbidden (I know that I had promised new posts on this matter a long time ago, I will keep my promise soon). And that the French secret services have an ever longer history of ambiguous and suspicious activities, notably in Algeria and Morocco ; even with the 1995 attacks in France they don't seem to be clear-cut.

Now, the security services see their powers increased thanks to new legislations and even constitutional revisions. Which may have been their goal all along.
 
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I had posted this translation of an article relating new evidence on the 7th January 2015 attacks in Paris
(involving a Gladio-like network), but I believe it is more at place here, in the Conspiracy section :

http://lesmoutonsenrages.fr/2015/05...er-le-scenario-de-lattaque-sous-faux-drapeau/
Paris attacks : new evidence comes in support of a false-flag attack

10 may 2015 ; posted by Ender.

[...]

On 3rd May, the newspaper La Voix du Nord revealed that a weapons trafficking network had been dismantled and his suspected leader, Claude Hermant, had been arrested. This network would have provided Amedy Coulibaly the weapons used for the hostage crisis of the casher hypermarket on 7 January.

According to La Voix du Nord, the network alledgly ruled by Claude Hermant had « re-militarized many neutralized military weapons from Eastern Europe. They were later sold to organized crime, not only in Lilles. »

The network was also operating in Belgium and according to the newspaper « some of these weapons would have been used by Coulibaly, the casher hypermarket terrorist ».

But Claude Hermant is a former member of the DPS, the security service of the Front National, and has a history of serving as a mercenary, involved in a number of operations in foreign countries, notably in Africa.

In an interview to the newspaper Libération in 2001, he revealed the dark side of the DPS. According to him, the security service of the FN included an « action service » involving « 30 to 60 ghosts » directed by Bernard Courcelle, head of the service from 1994 to 1999. This is in this frame that he had alledgly conducted a false flag operation in Congo in 1999 for the benefit of president Sassou N'Guesso, with the task of elaborating a bogus assassination attempt on the president in order to frame the opposition. According to him, the DPS had too organized the repatriation of president of former Zaire Mobutu, and conducted a mission of surveillance of former congolese minister Moungounga N'Guila inside the French territory within the frame of an attempted assassination requested by the ministry of Interior.

The DPS was also organizing missions of infiltration and surveillance of organizations opposed to the Front National, like Ras l'Front, SOS Racisme or Act'up.

According to Hermant, the other kind of missions organized by the « action service » of the DPS related to «organize the destabilisation of districts and towns who did not share the Front's ideology ». Their method consisted of « establishing contacts with gangs, incite them to violence and rebellion, to provide troubled urban areas with the means enable their young residents to comit acts of violence ». It is to be noted that within this frame of destabization and incitation to violence, including by providing material support, the head of DPS, Bernard Courcelle, was accused alongside Belgian trafficker Marti Cappiau in 1996 of involvment in gunrunning for the benefit of the jihadist Chechen rebellion.

[…]

In addition to the supposed links of the DPS with weapons trafficking, Claude Hermant also describes the ways the « action service » works, which make of it a very well trained paramilitary group operating alongside ways similar to those of a state intelligence service :

« The members of this special group are called « ghosts ». All of them have amilitary or paramilitary training […] The « ghosts » are financially autonomy. Their salaries are paid in cash, they are provided with false identity papers and all the means necessary to their operations. When they have sepcific needs, they are provided with. To pay a young resident to wreak havoc in an urban area, to have the means to move, to rent an hotel room. The « ghosts » live in a complete autarcy. They send they requests using what we call « mailboxes » ».

The DPS « action service » as described by Claude Hermant shares all the features of a Gladio-like structure as they were operated by NATO, for example in Italia : paramilitary training, methods inherited from intelligence services, occult financing, rooting in the far-right and the military, involvment in outside false flag operations and domestic destabilization operations.

But there is something even more surprizing among the detais that Claude Hermant gave to the criminal police of Lilles following his arrest.

The links between Claude Hermant and the services of the Gendarmerie

According to La Voix du Nord, the instructor judge in charge of the case would be in possession of numerous emails exhanged between the gendarmerie and Claude Hermant. These emails undelined a closeness between the accused and the poice services, as this extract shows : « Hello calude, we have discussed with our hierarchy... We agree with the two cases you have presented to us (weapons-Charleroi...)... »

The question asked by this mail is to know if Claude Hermant was acting in coordination with the gendarmerie as an informant, or if it was a full cooperation which would imply taht Claude Hermant was on a full mission.

In the last eventuality, the supplying to the terrorist cell guilty of the attacks on last January in Paris would be a part of a false flag attack à la Gladio.

Still according to La Voix du Nord, Claude Hermant would have said inside the law court building hall that he would not be 'the next Marc Fievet'. He was refering to a French customs officer who had infiltred the largest drug traficking networks under his hierarchy's orders in the late 80s, and who was dropped by the same hierarchy after his arrest by the Canadian police.

This reference to Marc Fievet's fate seems to evidence clearly that Claude Hermant was seeing himself as mandated by the gendarmerie and was acting in their name.

If the link between Claude Hermant's network and Amedy Coulibaly is confirmed by the justice, the consequences of this case will definitely put a nail on the scenario put forward until now by the French executive and will impose the false falg attack theory as the most likely narrative.

However, taking into account the potentially devastating consequences, one may righfully doubt that the investigations will be allowed to be conducted freely and devoid of any political pressure. The media reporting of this inquiry is until now almost non existant, an indication that the media, subordinate to the politics and enrolled in the propaganda regime of the « war on terrorism », will similarly organize a cover-up on its possible developments.

Guillaume Borrel, 9 May 2015.

Hermant's assertions on the DPS's role in occult operations led in Africa at the request of the French secret services was confirmed by the research led by a specialist of the Françafrique, François-Xavier Verschave (1945-2005).
 
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The news was not welcome by the French media and officials, who tried to bury it. But they failed, and it resurfaced quickly. Unsurprisingly, the instructor judges in charge of the anti-terrorist section did nothing to try to unearth the truth, but two of their colleagues inquiring how the killers had gotten their weapons were more curious, but they were forbidden to investigate farther :

http://news360x.fr/le-ministre-de-l...sur-les-attentats-hyper-cacher-charlie-hebdo/ (translated from French) :
The minister of Interior obstructs the investigation on the Hyper Casher-Charlie Hebdo attacks

6 october 2015

On last september, the informations site Médiapart revealed that the minister of Interior Bernard Cazeneuve had brandished military secrecy to lock the investigation on the attack on the Hyper Casher that took place in parallel with the terrorist attack on Charly Hebdo on 7th January.

The French media and political parties maintain a deafening silence on this case. However, it is easy to confirm the report from Médiapart, by reading the text of Cazeneuve's decision, discretely registered on the Official Journal of the French Republic on 18 June 2015.

This decision turns down a request for removing the classified status of files sent by instructor judges from the court of first instance of Lille, in charge of the inquiry relating to the origin of Amédy Coulibaly's weapons, author ot the attack on the Hyper Cacher.

The use of the military classification means that Cazeneuve and the PS meant that it is in the fundamental strategic interest of the french state to require the concealment of the network that prepared the 7th January attacks. This underlines the importances of the informations leaked in May to La Voix du Nord, according to which this network is made of forces belonging to the State and the far-right at the service of policies led by the PS in Syria as well as in France.

The last informations from Médiapart confirm that gendarmes and an informant tied to the Front National (FN), Claude Hermant, had armed Coulibaly.
 
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The trouble is that what they (alledgedly) chose to ignore was not minor and unconsequential data, but crucial information.
The determination that it was crucial is something that happens after the fact.

No, they definitely don't receive such warnings on a daily basis !
How do you know they do not? They likely do not provide a list of all the threats they receive.
 
Is it plausible that they receive on a daily basis warnings involving around 20 people, and with such an amount of detail ? No, I just do not believe that.

And precisely, given the amount of details provided, this is the basic duty of an anti-terrorist agent to recognize the importance of the threat. If he does not, then he is just a moron. Given the number of similar so-called failures, we would be led to believe that anti-terrorist units include only or almost only such people. The biggest mystery would be that they sometimes succeed to arrest anybody.
 
2pPWYtV.jpg


One of the first oddities to dissect. Please: feel entirely free to rationalise/debunk/defuse. But avoid spluttering vague offended refutations.

This one should be very easy to rationalise. Left side, as viewed, the twentysomething glasses guy, a couple up from the bottom.

Just a standard six-fingered fellow (not impossibly, just implausibly) or, how do we alternatively read this?View attachment 1599
I'm ready and happy to be told this is just a perspective illusion, or similar effect. Is it? And if so, how?


No. 3 is non existent - my reason being is that if there were five fingers on this hand, the thumb itself would be further to the left to accomadate the extra bulk, the webbing between the index finger and thumb would be almost vertical and there would be no shadow over finger No. three as there is in both photos.
 
Return to a story that had emerged more than one year ago ; a murky story, as is always the case when secret services are involved, with the usual claims and denials ; but it does appear to involve some strange features, notably the same kind of inexplicable 'failures' that are plaguing the history of counter-terrorism – and possibly a feud between intelligence services (and potentially crucial, as the target of the article supposedly trained Merah and the Kouachi brothers) :
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/middle-east/article24776830.htm
How a French truck driver became a target of the U.S. air war in Syria

November 26, 2014 2:55 PM
By Mitchell Prothero - McClatchy Foreign Staff

To hear French officials tell it, David Drugeon is a 24-year-old former truck driver from the Brittany region of France who occasionally worked out with French soldiers before slipping off to Pakistan to join al Qaida. He is, at such a tender age, no former French intelligence officer with military training, certainly no “James Bond.”

Then why has he been targeted at least twice in U.S. air raids on Syria at a likely cost in expended weapons of millions of dollars? “We don’t waste $1.5 million cruise missiles on truck drivers from Brittany,” said an American official asked last month about Drugeon’s background. Like all of the intelligence officials cited in this story, he spoke anonymously because of the sensitivity of the topic.
......
Little information in the official accounts of Drugeon’s background explains how he came to be one of the central figures in a U.S. military effort that appears to be as much manhunt as strategic jockeying for advantage.

French officials downplay his significance, dismissing claims by European intelligence officials that the French had described him as a “big fish” with knowledge of Western intelligence tradecraft in seeking to have him targeted by the U.S. military campaign in Syria.

But the two strikes against Drugeon also suggest he is more than just another European who’s joined the jihad against the West. A monthlong McClatchy probe – spanning five countries and interviews with more than a dozen intelligence officials – found many who believe that the French intelligence service once recruited Drugeon to work as an informant inside al Qaida, only to see him enthusiastically pursue a life of jihad.

Drugeon first came to the attention of international intelligence services – the French were aware of him sooner – as the rumored mastermind behind a “lone wolf” attack in March 2012, when a Frenchman of Algerian descent, Mohammed Merah, killed three Jewish schoolchildren and four others in a shooting spree across southern France.

It was then, according to three non-French European intelligence officials, that Drugeon’s name began appearing in intelligence reports – provided by the French government – that described him as having an intelligence background and military training before joining al Qaida in Waziristan, the mountainous region of Pakistan where al Qaida continues to maintain safe havens and training facilities.

“They put him out as this super dangerous guy with, and I’m quoting from the report here, ‘familiarity with Western intelligence tradecraft and practices,’” said one European intelligence official who is responsible for tracking Europeans who’ve joined either the Islamic State or al Qaida and might return to Europe to conduct attacks.

“There was no ambiguity to the reports, which also stated that he’d received military and explosives training, and it was stated in a way that led us to believe these skills had come from training with the French government,” the official added.

That same description was given to Syrian rebels who said they were asked to monitor Drugeon on behalf of a Western intelligence service that they believed was part of the U.S. government. Interviewed in southern Turkey in early October, the Syrians said they had been told that the Frenchman was a highly trained former French spy and that they should report on his movements and prepare a kidnapping operation to turn him over to Western authorities.
…...
The Syrian rebels’ account of Drugeon was later confirmed by two European intelligence officials – from different countries – who had direct access to the intelligence provided by France about Drugeon. Their account was corroborated by an officer from a third country who’d not been officially briefed but was familiar with the situation because of the Western concern that Drugeon posed a special threat because of this experience, his French background and his passport.

The French government now strongly denies that Drugeon was a member of military intelligence or that any member of France’s main foreign intelligence service, the General Directorate of Foreign Security, known by the initials DGSE, had defected to al Qaida.

One French official suggested that the description of Drugeon having Western-style intelligence or military training was a misunderstanding by “perhaps an overeager American intelligence analyst.”

“That’s ridiculous,” responded one of the European intelligence officials. “My report came from France and there’s no ambiguity here, they’ve changed the story.”

Still, the official acknowledged, Drugeon is too young to be an officer in France’s intelligence service. He suggests another theory for why the French would have seen Drugeon as a major threat. “What they don’t want to admit is that they clearly put him into play in the hopes he would go to Pakistan and report back to them,” he said. “Well, he went to Pakistan. But when he got there he told everyone he was a defecting French spy and proceeded to become one of al Qaida’s best operatives.”

A second European official, this one a member of his country’s military intelligence service, also suggested that as a likely explanation for the French decision to downplay Drugeon’s experience.

“The reports basically describe someone who was working for the French,” the second official said. “He’s absolutely someone you recruit and it’s clear they at least tried.”
…...
The group was put under surveillance by the Directorate of Territorial Surveillance, the French equivalent of the American FBI, according to multiple officials as well as French media reports.

Drugeon made three trips to Cairo between 2008 and 2010, ostensibly to study Islam and Arabic. Each trip lasted three to six months, and after the first two he returned to France to take jobs to pay for the next trip, according both French and other European authorities. It was those trips that brought him to the attention of the French intelligence service.

By 2008, Drugeon also had become a regular presence at Camp Coetquidan, a well known French military training facility in Brittany that has some facilities open to the public. French officials insist that’s merely a geographic coincidence, even though Camp Coetquidan is 50 miles from Drugeon’s home in Vannes.

“There are closer gyms to Vannes in Brittany than Coetquidan,” said one French intelligence expert. He said he doubted the official denials and ticks off the evidence: A radical being monitored by French authorities, known by French intelligence to be traveling regularly to Cairo for Arabic and religious training, is driving more than an hour for workouts with French soldiers.

“Nobody notices?” the intelligence expert asked.

The second European intelligence official agreed.

“We seize passports for less, but he’s allowed to hang out with soldiers and travel to Cairo three times?” the official said. “That only makes sense if you’re helping him establish cover. Or incompetent. And the French (services) are not incompetent.”

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, an intelligence and terrorism expert for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and an assistant professor at Georgetown University in Washington, has closely followed Drugeon’s case. He said the French denials that Drugeon was a well-placed intelligence officer who defected to al Qaida “raise far more questions than they answer.”

“The French are highly aggressive in pursuing human sources,” he said. “It’s not at all inconceivable that Drugeon may have been an agent.”

The manner of his departure for Pakistan raises further suspicion, say experts. In April 2010, Drugeon again booked a flight to Cairo – his third in two years. He departed from Brussels, with a brief stopover in Rome. But when his time in Cairo ended, he didn’t return to Europe. Instead, he flew to Pakistan.

“He triggers warning after warning with his behavior and nobody tells the Belgians, the Italians or even the Egyptians – who tend to be very cooperative on these matters – that the kid is on his way to Pakistan?” said the second European intelligence official.
 
So, the track leading from the 7-1-2015 attacks to Claude Hermant has been fordidden of investigation, as would be in any dictatorship. But the lead keeps on resurfacing, notably recently in article published in the Croatian newspaper Slobodna Dalmacija(couldn't find an english translation), which recalled his supposed membership both of the far-right and the French intelligence community. Indeed, the mere fact that French authorities brandished defense secrecy implies that the matter is sensitive ; it is not the first time that questions have arisen in this decidly murky area, there is already a long history of suspicions, sometimes even discussed in a parliamentary assembly :
http://www.voltairenet.org/article190028.html
Who organised the attacks of January and November 2015 in Paris?
New information, published by the Croatian daily Slobodna Dalmacija, alleges that the French state was responsible for the attacks which occurred in Paris in January and November 2015. Either the French authorities had previously infiltrated the groups which perpetrated these attacks, and chose not to intervene to prevent them, or else they were directly implicated in the organisation of the attacks. In any case, it remains to be determined who made these decisions, and whether or not he was acting on behalf of the Republic.

Voltaire Network | Damascus (Syria) | 22 January 2016

According to the official version, the attacks of January and November 2015 in Paris were sponsored by Al-Qaïda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) —for the execution of the editors of Charlie-Hebdo— and by Daesh for all the others. The authorities have admitted that the Charlie-Hebdo attack was coordinated with the attack against the supermarket at the Porte de Vincennes, although, according to them, AQAP and Daesh are enemies. They also admitted that doubt persists concerning the claim that Amedy Coulibaly was a member of Daesh.

Reuters revealed that the weapons used in the attacks came from the factory of Crvena Zastava, situated in Kragujevac (Serbia) [1]. Both Associated Press and the Palm Beach Post believed that one of the Serbian pistols had been transported by Century International Arms, a Florida firm linked to the CIA [2], although the Press Agency – but not the Post – has since retracted the claim [3].

According to the Croatian daily Slobodna Dalmacija, the weapons used in the January attack against the supermarket, and others used during the attack in November, came from the Serbian manufacturer Crvena Zastava, and were moved to France by the same dealer, Claude Hermant [4].

Our readers will remember that in 1998, the Réseau Voltaire uncovered the surprising activities of the security contingent of the Front National, the Département Protection Sécurité (DPS). This unit had been compiling a list of personalities and had scouted their homes – apparently a small group of individuals within the DPS were preparing certain illicit activities. After a long period of complicated negotiations, we managed to obtain the creation of a Parliamentary Commission of Enquiry to investigate these facts [5]. The elements that we provided for the Assemblée Nationale, specifically concerning the double mission of members of the DPS - for the Front National in France and for the organisation of coups d’état in Africa - were quickly blocked by the Secret-Défense [6]. However, this information provoked a crisis and division within the Front National, so that finally, no-one was available to answer the allegations. Two years later, in 2001, one of the ex-members of the DPS, Claude Hermant, (mentioned above), admitted to the French daily Libération the existence of the « Action » structure within the DPS [7].

Here’s a reminder of our work between 1998 and 1999. We had established that in 1972, the « Front National pour l’Unité Française » had been created in secret by Jacques Foccart, then responsible for Affaires Africaines et Malgaches at the Élysée, by request of President Georges Pompidou. The FN was led from the beginning by Jean-Marie Le Pen, who had played an important rôle in Charles de Gaulle’s ascension to power in 1958, before turning against him [8], and by François Duprat, who had engaged with Bob Denard in the support of Moïse Tchombé in Katanga. [...]

Concerning the DPS, we have shown that it was directed at the time by Bernard Courcelles, also the bodyguard for Anne Pingeot, François Mitterrand’s mistress, and by Gérard Le Vert. The DPS included a secret group of about 60 men, all of whom were linked to the secret services, and were mobilised whenever necessary to carry out secret missions, mainly in Africa. This is the group to which Claude Hermant belonged. The true directorate of the DPS was not the Front National, but the Ministry for Defence, with the DPSD, a secret service with almost the same name, whose mission was the protection of the armed forces.

Now the revelations of the Slobodna Dalmacija make sense. In January 2015, when he was jailed for « arms trafficking », Claude Hermant described himself to the committing magistrate as an « informer » for the Customs and the Gendarmerie. When asked by the magistrate for details of the weapons he had sold, he played the Secret-Défense card. The Advisory Committee for Secret-Défense, and then the Minister for the Interior, Bernard Cazeneuve, opted in his favour [9].

In summary, Mr. Hermant belonged to a structure which, under cover of the security unit for the Front National, was unofficially charged by the Élysée with secret missions overseas. Today he is paid for freelance work by the Customs and the Gendarmerie, still without any official status. According to Slobodna Dalmacija, he bought decommissioned weapons in Serbia and recommissioned them himself, and that these were the weapons used in the attacks of January and November. The Croatian daily also spoke of the results of a microscope analysis of a firearm which no-one has so far mentioned. Mr. Hermant also allegedly sold weapons to Islamists in Brussels. His trafic, despite being illegal, is covered by the Secret-Défense.

Let us mention that according to the US Press agency McClatchy, the Kouachi brothers, the killers of Charlie-Hebdo, were linked to the French secret services [10]. Finally, let us also note that Claude Hermant was imprisoned on the decision of judges from Lille, Stanislas Sandraps and Richard Foltzer, who were investigating his arms trafficking, and not by the Parisian judges who were investigating the attacks, Christophe Tessier, Nathalie Poux et Laurence Le Vert. Madame Le Vert is incidentally the cousin of Gérard Le Vert, mentioned above, Claude Hermant’s ex-boss in the DPS.

In conclusion, either Mr. Hermant was working on infiltrating the terrorist cells who perpetrated the attacks, without their action having been prevented, or else – and this is less probable – his current superiors, probably in the Élysée, themselves participated in the organisation of the attacks. But it still has to be determined why, and in whose name, Claude Hernant’s superiors acted as they did.
Thierry Meyssan
Translation
Pete Kimberley

[4] «Oružje za Charlie Hebdo prodao hrvatski branitelj», Marijo Kavain, Slobodna Dalmacija, 11 january 2016. French version : « Les armes pour Charlie-Hebdo ont été vendues par un ex-combattant volontaire croate », Translation Svetlana Maksovic, Réseau Voltaire, 14 january 2016.
[5] You will find here extracts from the report presented by the Réseau Voltaire to the parliamentarians, here the text of the parliamentary hearings, and here the text of the parliamentary report. In French.
[6] La Françafrique, le plus long scandale de la République, de François-Xavier Verschave (Stock, 1998).
[7] «Un ancien du DPS révèle à "Libération" les activités de déstabilisation et d’infiltration menées en France et en Afrique», par Renaud Dely et Karl Laske, Libération, 6 juin 2001.
 
Some interesting analysis/opinion around the recently-released CCTV footage depicting one of the Paris suicide bombers, allegedly filmed during their self-detonation in the targetted cafe (this by the known Youtuber 'The PaulstalService')

Note that the overtly-cartoonised/'Sim City' style footage is by either the French authorities and/or the news media, and that the parody movie-terrorist scenes are from the 'Zohan' pseudo-comedy film. All that 'ThePaulstalService' claims to have done is edit together extracts from the publically-released imagery (limited though he says that is) and overlay a commentry.

Please don't just reactively-reject what he's observing. If he's not making valid observations & comments about the released footage, in what way would that be the case? It's rather difficult to refute his conclusions (arrived at, from the evidence presented).

There is of course lots of fevered conjecture and theorising upon the Paris (and other) attacks littering the internet, but this seems to be a fairly-dispassionate and lucid effort (which may, of course, still be deliberate or accidental disinformation).

But: all very intriguing....

 
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