The Tokyo firebombing raid in March devastated the capital city by employing over 300 bombers. The Hiroshima attack produced similar municipal devastation / disruption using only one. Crudely put, that's a force projection amplification of circa 30,000%.
So to be clear on this: you are certain (with reasons) that the Japanese High Command were entirely-appreciative of this crucial 'amplification' point?
That their strategic appreciation of this game-changer was already pre-primed via intelligence, confirmed by Hiroshima, and then placed into beyond-fluke finality, precisely as per the conventional narrative?
How would they have become aware of this? Please note, I am genuinely interested, do we know if there was still any meaningful intelligence sharing going on between the Axis forces as late as 1944/45? On a similar note, is it known whether Nippon had done any heavy water /proto-atomic weapon research, as a parallel to the Allied and Nazi efforts?
Or, do you mean by balance of probabilities, the writer's revisionist position is just less likely?
I was unaware of the actual extent and tonnage of conventional US bombing, in the itemised detail outlined in the article, especially the fact (presumably true?) that neither the Hiroshima nor Nagasaki raids resulted in the highest death-toll or devastation....extended conventional bombing on other targets significantly-exceeded their thresholds. And yet I am unaware of having ever seen a picture of any bombed Japanese target other than the two 'nuclear cities'.
Your counter-point regarding the extended timeline of stubborn denial shown by the Japanese (being the much-more significant elapsement than the period following the first strike) is fair enough....but: is there no validity in the writer's statement about the Japanese lesser-of-two-evils being a US occupation, and
not a Russian one? You almost support this possibility, with your excellent point regarding unsettled military scores between Russia and Japan from the previous decades.
Do you not share even the slightest common-ground with him regarding "The Bomb" being used, post-war, as a totemic substitute for much of Japan's military hierarchy's failings?
I'm sorry, I feel that there could be more than just a few nuggets of truth touched upon within his exposition. It is not an era of history that I understand enough of, but I feel some fascinating points are made within the piece.